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This thesis explores the intra-organisational dynamics behind the increasingly prevalent adoption of 
private-sector style enterprise risk management (ERM) practices by public-sector organisations. The 
core tenets of ERM are predicated on the idea that a diverse range of organisational issues and 
challenges can be processed and managed through a set of standardised, universal tools and 
techniques.  Neo-institutional theory holds that broad, macro level pressures act upon organisations 
at a field level creating pressures to adopt homogeneous structures and processes as a means of 
gaining and maintaining organisational legitimacy. However, outside of the notion of a range of 
strategic decoupling responses, relatively little research has been undertaken on how different areas 
of an organisation actually interpret and apply the institutionalised practice of risk management 
across its functional departments.   To that end, this thesis looks at how the Port of London 
Authority is operationalising a newly adopted risk management policy as it continues to manage 
societal and organisational risks. 
Through the use of 41 semi-structured interviews, document analysis and participant 
observation, the study explores why and how employees from functionally disparate areas of the 
organisation utilise risk management practices. The study focuses on the organisational, institutional 
and cultural dynamics that drive and shape an employee’s understanding of what ERM is meant to 
achieve and how best to go about implementing it. The findings suggest that employees decoupled 
the ERM practice differentially across the organisation’s departments as a means of ‘organisational 
conservatism’. The research presents new knowledge in regards to how the Port of London 
Authority relied on three distinct ‘if-then’ logics as a means to decouple ERM from its intended 
outcome of managing risk across the organisation to one that serves to protect and reinforce 
existing organisational arrangements and rationalities. This process of organisational conservatism 
enabled departments to reinforce their identities, increase their organisational standing and 
substantiate past actions. In essence, the organisation adapted ERM to reinforce and justify existing 
practices as a means to become more certain about what it already knows, rather than reduce the 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Enterprise Risk Management in the Public Sector 
The adoption of explicit risk management frameworks by public sector organisations has seen a 
considerable increase over the past 25 years (Gephart et al. 2009; Power 2004). This has in part 
been a response to some significant organisational failures to manage an increasing number of 
socio-technological risks, such as Chernobyl reactor meltdown, the 2008 financial crisis, or the BP 
Deep Water Horizon oil spill (Scheytt et al., 2006; Beck 1992). The idea that enterprise-wide risk 
management, or more commonly referred to as ERM, can actually aid in minimising these types of 
events has resulted in governments across North America, Australia and the United Kingdom 
adopt them in a wholesale fashion (Gephart et al. 2009; Kimbrough & Componation 2009; BC 
2012; HM Treasury 2004; VAGO 2007). However, in adopting what were once originally designed 
for the financial sector, these newly implemented approaches to risk management have struggled to 
balance the interplay between societal or ‘primary risks’ with those posed to the institution or 
‘secondary risks’ (Rothstein et al., 2006a, Power 2004; Power et al., 2009). Despite the potential 
negative impacts of the ‘risks of risk management’, public and private sector organisations continue 
to seek the institutional legitimacy afforded through the adoption of the ‘holistic’, ‘integrated’ or 
‘enterprise-wide’ risk management practices (Soin & Collier 2013).  
The need for organisations to identify, assess, and respond to the risks they face is nothing 
significantly new. It can be argued that organisations have always sought to reduce the likelihood of 
failure through the application of well-informed strategies, efficient operations, and sound market 
intelligence. However, what is new, is how organisations have begun to rely on risk management to 
frame, or re-frame, the potential for organisational failures through the tools, processes and 
language of risk management (Huber & Rothstein 2013; Maguire & Hardy 2013). In their attempt 
to increase the robustness of their corporate governance, optimise the allocation of increasingly 
scarce resources, and provide improved transparency of internal decision-making, public sector 
organisations are now faced with a new set of challenges that can accompany ERM’s adoption.  
In general, the goal of ERM is to direct organisational attention to potential failures and 
subsequently coordinate efforts to control and minimise them in a standardised and repeatable 
fashion. Typically, this would include “all the processes involved in identifying, assessing and 
judging risks, assigning ownership, taking actions to mitigate or anticipate them, and monitoring 
and reviewing progress” (HM Treasury 2004:49). Others suggest the underlying goal of ERM is one 
that produces an increased understanding of how a wide range of risks unfold and interact across a 
“portfolio of all activities.” (IRM 2002:2). Regardless of wording, the overall objective of ERM is to 
elicit repetitive, predictable and continuous behaviours aimed at achieving a desired state in which 
negative outcomes/consequences are minimized, if not eradicated all together. The result of the 




effort being the increased likelihood of achieving organisational objectives (i.e. effectiveness), while 
at the same time reducing the costs associated with failures (i.e. efficiency). 
Driven primarily by a flurry of large-scale organisational failures in banking institutions, as well 
as the private-sector, ERM quickly assumed a key role in how organisations could establish and 
demonstrate good corporate governance (Power et al, 2009). It is now not uncommon to see risk 
management as being statutorily mandated, if not at least societally expected. In assuming this 
pivotal institutionalised role, ERM is now seen to be a central organising principle within public-
sector institutions (Power 2007; Huber & Rothstein 2013). The dominant role that ERM plays in 
how organisations undertake their daily decisions has been seen to result in both the ‘risk 
management of everything’ and ‘the risk management of nothing (Power 2004; 2009). In one sense, 
any aspect of organisational life can be calculated as representing some type of risk, making it 
someone’s responsibility to control it. And from another perspective, ERM’s audit-logic ‘boundary 
preserving model’ reaffirms rather than questions existing ways of operating (Power 2009). Perhaps 
a symbolic adoption should not be surprising considering the tendency for organisations to 
decouple practice from policy in their attempts to buffer existing organisational arrangements from 
the introduction of legitimising managerial models, such as ERM (Meyer & Rowan 1977; Power 
2007; Bromley and Powell 2012).  
Although a variety of public organisations have acknowledged the need to adopt a 
‘standardized approach’ to managing risk, there also appears to be fundamental issues in translating 
frameworks that were originally designed for the financial and insurance sectors to a public-sector 
environment (Power 2004; Schyett et al., 2006; Rothstein et al., 2006). Some note the advent of 
‘New Public Management’ (NPM), in which there is an increased uptake of private-sector practices 
as a means to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of private institutions, as driving much of the 
interest in ERM by public organisations (Black, 2005; Hood 1991). However, assessing the dynamic 
and ambiguous nature of public sector risks can push past the limits of what ERM was intended to 
do. In a recent study of regulatory organisations seeking to leverage private-sector approaches to 
managing risk, Black (2005) identified a number of challenges. In speaking to assessing 
probabilities, the author notes: “Whilst the procedure looks technical and formalistic, the 
assessments are inevitably made by individuals, and as such prey to individuals' perceptions and 
evaluations of risk.” (Black 2005:533). Others too have noted the methodological obstacles that 
were encountered by policy makers when it came to assessing risks, stating that it represented more 
of a ‘codification of existing beliefs’ that served to further entrench existing understandings rather 
than presenting any type of challenge function (Rothstein & Downer 2012:789). Further still, the 
explicit management of risk has been seen to generate unintended consequences in the form 
explicit audit trails that threaten to uncover hidden lines of accountability and in turn, amplify the 
salience of blame throughout an organisation (Huber & Rothstein 2013). 
Echoing the above, Hood and Rothstein (2000) point out, the pitfalls associated with adopting 
private sector risk management, such as: exacerbating blame avoidance issues; applying valueless 




mechanical procedures; and, undermining organisational transparency and learning. Identifying 
these issues begins to raise questions concerning the expectations placed on ERM frameworks that 
are required to address an increasingly complex, uncertain and ambiguous risk arena (Adams, 1995; 
Klinke & Renn, 2002; Rothstein et al., 2006; Power, 2007). Finally, it suggests that although 
theoretically ERM can be applied across an organisation, in actuality, the types of risks and actors 
involved are internally differentiated – leading to a potential degradation of, and deviance from, 
management system protocols (Hutter 2005; Mikes 2009; Arena et al. 2010; Vaughan, 1999). 
However, despite these potentially significant hurdles, a variety of public sector organisations across 
the UK have already, or just beginning to, implement ERM programmes as means to increase 
transparency and justify decisions in a response to shifting societal expectations. All of the above 
begins to highlight that although ERM may promise a reduction in the number and severity of 
future adverse events, it may represent much more of symbolic exercise that achieves much 
different outcomes than originally intended.  
1.1.1 ERM and Port of London Authority 
One sector that has seen a substantial shift in what society considers their role is when it comes to 
managing risk is that of port authorities (Verhoeven 2010). Port Authorities around the world have 
been undergoing what has been considered a ‘renaissance’ due to the evolution of the port 
authority’s traditional focus on regulatory and/or landlord activities back to one of being 
positioned as an innovator and facilitator of entrepreneurial spirit (Verhoeven 2010). Port 
authorities around the world are under immense pressures from multiple stakeholders, such as key 
market actors (ship owners, container operators, etc.), government decision-makers, and societal 
interest groups to develop in ways that maximize functionality and minimize negative externalities 
(Notteboom & Winkelmans 2001; Cheon et al. 2010; Haugstetter & Cahoon 2010). Balancing the 
often-competing interests of these influential groups demands precaution and flexibility and 
requires a port authority to not only take risks but also to be able to live with the consequences. If 
ports and their associated authorities are to continue to thrive and prosper, port authorities must 
challenge pre-existing institutionalized patterns of development and foster institutional plasticity 
(Notteboom et al. 2013). 
In meeting the challenges noted above, port governance systems (of which ERM is a 
significant component) play a critical role in enabling an entrepreneurial and market-oriented 
transition to take place. With its private sector roots, the institutionally driven practice of ERM 
would appear to be a process aptly suited to the task, yet the practice of risk management by 
regulatory organisations has been plagued by a variety of challenges to implementation (OECD 
2010; Hutter 2005a). Despite this, one such organisation embarking on this challenge is that of the 
Port of London Authority (PLA). The PLA is an organisation primarily charged with overseeing 
navigational safety along the Thames River as well as promoting economic trade and development, 
leisure activities, and, at the same time, protecting the environment. In addition to this, the PLA is 




what is known as a ‘trust port’ and in being so, is a self-funded entity. As a trust port, the PLA must 
recoup its operational costs through the fees it levies (conservancy charges, pilotage dues, river 
works licensing etc.), with any surplus being re-invested into the infrastructure to ensure the 
organisation remains viable. To that end, like many of its peers and counterparts, the PLA had 
identified a need to ensure that its scarce resources are applied to the areas that matter most in an 
efficient, effective, and defensible manner.  
Driven primarily at the executive level as a means to increase oversight and governance of the 
management of risk, the PLA sought to implement a holistic, ERM type approach to managing 
risk. This meant not only extending existing efforts to manage ‘mandate risks’, like those associated 
with navigational safety, but also reconciling existing navigational risk management practices with a 
more unified and holistic approach. However, feeling that they lacked the current in-house 
expertise to operationalise an ERM framework, despite years of ‘formally’ managing navigational 
risks on the river, the organisation turned to the aid of an external multi-national risk management 
consultancy to help implement an ERM programme. In addition to this, the organisation was also 
actively soliciting guidance from King’s College’s Centre for Risk Management which served as a 
catalyst for the following research study; one that embedded the researcher directly into the 
organisations daily life. Gaining this privileged access afforded the researcher the ability to conduct 
a wide range of targeted interviews, review internal policy documents and risk registers, and 
personally observe how the PLA was responding to risk in a variety of organisational settings.  
Representing a rather ‘typical’ public-sector ERM adoption scenario, the case of ERM 
implementation at PLA presents a rich opportunity to explore how and why public-sector 
organisations respond to ERM and possibly provide answers to important questions such as: How 
would the different skills, knowledge and cultures respond to the introduction of, what can be, a 
very intrusive and explicative means to decision-making under uncertainty?; Why might different 
departments be receptive or resistant to the practice and what can be learned by the underlying 
logics that shape and guide their responses?; And, how might ERM evolve in the future in order to 
ease the challenge of implementation and at the same time, avoid the pitfalls associated with its 
adoption? In answering the above questions, this research furthers the understanding of how the 
public organisations operationalise, and respond to, an enterprise-wide approach to risk 
management.  
1.2 Research Aims and Goals 
The academic exploration of how organisations respond to the institutionalised expectation to 
manage risk continues to grow. As the review of the literature in chapter 2 demonstrates, there is a 
high likelihood that public sector organisations adopting private sector models will incur challenges 
in coupling practice with policy. Outside of a few examples (Arena et al., 2010; Mikes 2009; 2011; 
Woods 2009), there appears to be a gap in the research that speaks to how the introduction of 
enterprise risk management frameworks unfolds across the individual and departmental level of 




organisations. As such, this research looks to explore the recent introduction of an ‘enterprise-wide’ 
risk management programme across a single public-sector organisation. In doing so it asks the 
following research question:  
 
How and why does the Port of London Authority respond to the introduction of an 
enterprise-wide approach to managing risk? 
 
In asking the above question, three associated research objectives have been identified: 
Goal 1: Describe the Practice  
The first goal of this research is to explore and present a nuanced account of how the 
PLA is operationalising its ERM programme in order to understand if and how the practice of 
ERM may vary between departments. This goal focuses on describing in detail how the 
organisation responds to the policies, activities and technologies associated with managing risk 
across the various organisational settings (Arena et al., 2010). Specifically, it provides insight 
into how the various departments of the PLA interpret how risk management should happen, 
how the employees engage with tools, and which risks they consider worth managing. The 
achievement of this goal will result in a ‘painted picture’ of how ERM actually takes place at the 
PLA. 
 
Goal 2: Explain the Practice 
The second goal of the research study is to illuminate the supporting rationales that drive 
and shape why ERM is being practiced at the PLA in the way that it is. Specifically, it looks to 
explain why different departments in the PLA use ERM and what ends they are achieving. It 
also looks to further understand the intra-departmental and intra-organisational dynamics that 
unfold as a result of the introduction of the programme. And lastly, goal two seeks to 
illuminate how the practice ERM relates the PLA’s identity and if it influences how the 
organisation relates to the world around it. 
 
Goal 3: Identify Wider Implications  
In achieving goal one and two, the third goal looks to take a step back and situate the 
findings of the research study in a research wider context. The intent of this goal is to be able 
to reflect on the study’s findings in relation to the current socio-theoretical positions identified 
in the literature review. Specifically, it answers whether the adoption of ERM by public sector 
organisations has substantive implications or whether it is more reflective of symbolic 
legitimacy seeking exercise.  
 
The achievement of the above objectives is intended to provide greater insight into, and 
understanding of, how public-sector organisations respond to the institutional pressure to expand 




their risk management frameworks into enterprise-wide approaches. To date, the  literature 
provides little insight at the micro-level as to how ERM is understood and implemented on a day-
to-day basis. In filling this gap, the findings contribute to two main sets of literature. First, the 
accounting and audit management literature often highlights high-level disconnects between how 
ERM is designed ‘on paper’ versus how it is applied in practice (Mikes 2009; Power 2007; Rothstein 
et al. 2006), but such arguments are rarely based on detailed empirical studies. This study goes 
beyond the simple idea of decoupling to show how there are hidden costs associated with ERM 
using the example of how different areas of the PLA are unwittingly editing out key risk 
information. The rich stories and organisational narratives that currently house the majority of the 
risk information are re-shaped by the formalised structures of ERM, stripping it of the vital context 
in which risk objects are understood. Editing these narratives down in order to fit into the 
constraining structure associated with an ERM risk register spreadsheet removes the vital context in 
which the risk was first understood. Although initially the mis-match between what staff know how 
to do and what the register suggests they are doing might not amount to much, when key staff 
leave the organisation, the tacit knowledge that could have been captured by the process will be 
lost. Left unchecked, the paper-based accounts will continually shift farther away from reality in 
turn hampering the PLA’s actual ability to manage real risks.  
Second, the findings also contribute to debates within organisational sociology and how 
organisations respond to institutional demands for organisational legitimacy. Well-worn themes 
within the literature on Neo-institutionalism, such as ‘means-end’ decoupling (Bromely & Powell 
2012), the role of identities in shaping practice (Lok 2010) and the creation of institutional logics 
(Thorton et al. 2012), are further unpacked in order to highlight how the different areas of the 
organisation operationalises ERM. In the case of the PLA, the different functional areas of the 
organisation used the practice of ERM to reinforce and conserve their organisational identities, 
redirect managerial attention to further their departmental standing, and reconcile pluralistic 
institutional pressures. As the ‘risk society’ continues to increasingly rely on the concept of risk and 
the associated managerial systems that promise reduced uncertainty, increased control, and a greater 
ability to make the right decision, furthering the academic understanding of how ERM shapes (and 
is shaped by) organisations, becomes even more important.  
Furthering the contribution in both of the above-mentioned sets of literature, the type of data 
collected and the subsequent analysis of it also constitutes a novel approach. The level of access 
granted to the researcher and the ability to uncover a variety of risk narratives that were generated 
by the semi-structured interviews, the review of risk documents, and the observation of risk 
assessment meetings ‘as they happened’, resulted in a rich source of empirical data sets. This is 
significant in that there were no identified studies within the literature review that provided a 
comprehensive breadth of ERM practices across multiple organizational departments at a micro-
level. The data sets were then subjected to an iterative process of narrative analysis that yielded 
valuable insights into what actually happens at the ground-level when it comes to practicing ERM. 




The results of the study suggest the very tools that are designed to identify, assess, and treat risk 
could actually be undermining the organisation’s ability to do so. Up until the introduction of ERM, 
the PLA simply got on with doing what it had always done and relied upon its professional skill and 
expertise in order to keep the river safe and economically viable. This new need for explicating 
ingrained practices and rationales not only takes a lot more time and effort but introduces a 
substantially increased divide between practice and policy. If things do go wrong, this divide is 
surely going to be questioned by those wishing to hold the organisation to account, which ironically 
increases the perceived need of PLA staff to explicitly document their risk management activities.  
 
1.3 Thesis Outline 
The content of this thesis is organised as follows: Chapter 2 provides an overview of the relevant 
literature and theory that guides and focuses the research study. Specifically, it highlights some of 
the organisational dynamics that shape, and are shaped by, the act of managing risk across public 
sector organisations. Chapter 3 presents the chosen research design and methods used in the study 
and also details how the how the data were analysed and interpreted. A review of internal policy 
and protocol documents, statutory guidance material, and risk registers was undertaken; semi-
structured interviews were conducted with PLA employees tasked with ERM responsibilities in 
order to explore corresponding rationales and strategic responses that constitutes the ERM 
practice; and lastly, employees engaged in ERM associated activities in the form of internal and 
external meetings were also observed. Chapter 4 offers a brief history of the PLA, along with its 
current operating objectives and associated organisational challenges. Chapter 5, 6 and 7 are 
empirical chapters that focus on the administrative, navigational and operational areas of the 
organisation respectively. Each chapter explores three ‘dimensions’ through which the 
organisational response to risk management is seen to unfold (i.e. functional, cultural and structural 
dimensions) and explores the substantive and symbolic responses to the introduction of ERM by 
the different areas. Chapter 8 compares and contrasts the findings of empirical Chapters to explore 
if ERM actually achieved what it was originally intended for or if it was rebuffed and repurposed by 
the organisation in order to achieve other objectives. Chapter 9 provides a summary of the research 
findings, identifies practical implications pertaining to the practice of risk management, and ends 
with some suggested areas of exploration for future research based on the limitations of this study.  







Chapter 2 Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
From a basic standpoint, there is simply a greater chance of success if we all work together. 
However, organising ourselves as a means to achieve shared goals and objectives does not in of 
itself reduce the chance of failure, and at times can actually make it more likely that things might go 
wrong. Conventional wisdom has it that organisations, public and private, exist in order to facilitate 
the achievement of a desired outcome that, for whatever reason, may not likely be accomplished by 
the effort of a single individual (McAuley et al. 2007). The likelihood of an event occurring that may 
influence, positively or negatively, the achievement of this outcome is organisationally conceived of 
as a risk (IRM 2002). Risk is intrinsically linked to uncertainty and the effect it has on organisational 
behaviours (Power 2007; ISO 2009). The explicit process of dealing with the risks associated with 
an organisation’s objectives is the remit of a specialised profession and practice known as risk 
management. Yet how has this relatively straight-forward managerial system of control come to 
play such a significant role in Anglo-Saxon organisational life? Where did this explicit system of 
identifying, assessing, and responding to the likelihood and severity of adverse events come from? 
And, how do organisations respond to such an auditable and calculative process in an increasingly 
complex and ‘unknowable’ world? In posing these questions, the following chapter serves to 
provide insight on the accumulated body of relevant academic literature and in doing so, helps 
narrow and refine the focus of this research study’s objectives. 
2.2 The Rise of Enterprise Risk Management 
As much as the present-day complex technologies have driven the need to manage risk, the practice 
of ERM owes its current form to a range of developments across a variety of human geographies. 
Some have traced its roots as far back as the Ancient Greeks and the Code of Hammurabi’s ‘eye for 
an eye’ rule; suggesting that someone be held to account in the occurrence of a societally 
unacceptable failure. Also associated with the Code of Hammurabi, Covello and Mumpower (1985) 
have linked the current marine insurance industry back to the concept of Bottomry, a type of 
arrangement where a ship’s master would borrow funds as a contingency against any unforeseen 
troubles the ship may encounter on its voyage and in essence. The rise of the maritime insurance 
industry provided much of the underpinnings for how risk is managed today. Lloyds of London, or 
as it started out as ‘Mr. Edward Lloyd’s Coffee House’, was the location of choice for significant 
players in the maritime industry to gather relevant news and trustworthy information about the 
world of shipping (Bernstein 1996). With reliable and up-to-date information in hand about the 
latest developments in ship design, trade routes, and navigational abilities of crews, marine insurers 
provided policies that could account for the level of risk posed by each combination of factors. 
These policies represent the transferring of a potential loss from one party to another, representing 




a socially organised and coordinated approach to managing (i.e. transferring) risk. This also 
highlighted the need for specific types of information gathering practices that took the form of 
assigning probabilities during the analysis of risk, as well as developing a corresponding treatment 
option based on the evaluated risk, a cornerstone of what now comprises standardised risk 
management frameworks (ISO 2009).  
Transpiring in tandem to the inception of what is now the modern-day insurance industry, a 
complementary approach to assessing the likelihood and consequence of future events was also 
evolving. The discipline of the actuarial science is devoted to the calculation of the mathematical 
probabilities, now heavily utilised by the insurance and finance industries, has been traced back to 
the development of ‘life tables’ by Halley in 1683. As statistical information made itself available 
through better record keeping practices and systemic population censuses, the insurance industry 
continued to expand its reach by calculating the corresponding probabilities of adverse events 
(Bernstein 1996). This concept of assessing the likelihood of death allowed for further analysis 
based on factors such as age, lifestyle and health, demonstrating that the uncertain outcomes could 
be ‘managed’ by changing the decisions one made that influenced these factors. This ability to 
categorise provided a powerful access point for state intervention by identifying and labelling 
segments of the population as targets for direct policy interventions, or as risks to be managed 
(Rose and Miller 1992). 
As scientists and mathematicians continued to prove the power of numbers in relating the past 
to the future, the quantitative sciences driving technological advancements have meant much of the 
associated risk information has also adopted a numerical form. Traditionally, quantitative risk 
assessments have been primarily represented in three approaches: actuarial; probabilistic; and 
toxicological (Jaeger et al. 2001). Here, cause and effect event chains are established as the system is 
reduced to the basic mechanical components of control. Fault tree analyses can then be generated 
and probabilities assigned to the layers of protection afforded by the mechanical containment 
barriers. These narrowly focused, realist approaches rely heavily on relative frequencies in order to 
determine probabilities. These approaches also tend to focus on human or environmental harms 
and work to objectify risk and remove any socially constructed elements that may compromise a 
rational understanding of the risks posed to people, property and the environment (Jaeger et al. 
2001). Although, as processes, machinery, and science continue to evolve, there is a need to ensure 
that the existing values, norms and morals of the surrounding society remain aligned and are not 
compromised by an organisation’s intended or unintended negative externalities (Otway & Wynne 
1989; Kasperson et al., 2003; Siegrist & Cvetkovich 2000). More often than not, the risks generated 
by industrial activity are unevenly distributed between those responsible for the hazard and those 
potentially exposed to its ill effects (Renn 2008; Douglas, 1985). However, as much as all of these 
developments speak to the concept of risk unfolding on multiple fronts, it wasn’t until the latter 
half of the 20th century when risk really saw its institutionalisation within public sector 
organisations.  




The near exponential growth of technology and the increasing severity of impacts arising 
from its failure has created what has given rise to what Beck (1992) famously termed the ‘Risk 
Society’. Beck emphasises that the scale and types of risks posed by advancements, like nuclear 
power plants and nanotechnologies, are inherently ungovernable in comparison to past 
technologies (e.g. hydroelectricity or coal-fired power plants). The responsibility to address the 
possible failures of technologies with catastrophic potential falls to that of organisations as they are 
the primary societal mechanism through which control of risk is sought. However, in their attempt 
to introduce order, logics and efficiency, organisations can inadvertently increase, rather than 
minimise, the likelihood of disastrous outcomes. As Perrow (1984) argues, accidents can be viewed 
as quite a normal outcome that ironically arise from organisations that were purposely designed to 
avoid them. Perrow’s Normal Accident Theory (NAT) posits that as technologies become 
increasingly complex, the ability of an organisation to monitor and account for exponential number 
of possible interactions makes failure simply a matter of time rather than design flaw. However, 
complexity alone does not automatically lead to a disastrous outcome, it is when these complex 
technologies exist within tightly coupled systems that small failures can quickly ‘snowball’ out of 
control. Loosely coupled systems or organisations can isolate these failures and limit the extent of 
any domino effects by a lack of direct linkages between operations.  
Others have noted a similar, yet distinct, notion of inevitable failure, described as 
‘epistemic accidents’ (Downer 2011). These types of accidents are defined as “those accidents that 
occur because a scientific or technological assumption proves to be erroneous, even though there 
were reasonable and logical reasons to hold that assumption before (although not after) the event” 
(Downer 2011:752). Although also unpredictable, like those associated with NAT, these failures 
tend to arise out new and innovative systems rather than complexity. A lack of prior knowledge and 
experience, along with the inherent limitations of engineering knowledge, is described to be the 
drivers behind these accidents. However, unlike the NAT’s ‘one-in-a-million’ one-off failures, 
Downer (2011) suggests that epistemic accidents can offer valuable learnings for future risk-
reduction efforts.  
Others still, claim that it is the inability to recognise system weakness in advance of a 
catastrophic outcome that is actually at the root of disasters, attributing ultimate causation to 
human error. Broadly speaking, disaster theorists contend that large scale technological failures are 
result of an organisation’s inattention to a series of warning signals. One such characterisation of 
organisational actors either being unaware or tolerant of error inducing activities is that of 
‘normalised deviance’ (Vaughan 1996). The author chronicles the intra-organisational cultural 
dynamics that ultimately led to the 1986 Challenger space shuttle disaster. Here, Vaughan details 
how a decision-making process in which engineers rationalised small failures as being insignificant 
and anomalous actually worked to normalise key signals of danger into ‘acceptable risk’.  In doing 
so, the engineers at NASA slowly built up a tolerance to minor glitches and process anomalies. 
After each successful flight, a new standard was set for acceptable risks, a process which in turn 




permeated other areas of the organisation and became a cultural norm. This culminated in the 
decision to launch the shuttle despite a ‘normalised engineering risk’ regarding the integrity of the 
infamous O-ring, which ultimately lead to the catastrophic failure of the booster rocket. The ability 
of these small errors to fester and germinate over time eventually leads to an inevitable loss of 
control that the organisation has little ability to recover from (Turner 1976; 1978). 
The ability of organisational actors, norms and structures to filter and reinterpret possible 
modes of failures is something that risk management was specifically designed to address. The 
extensive time and effort it takes to identify, analyse, evaluate, treat and monitor the potentially 
devastating risks arising from the complex technologies is understandably worthwhile. However, it 
could be argued that nearly all organisations are now required to devote an almost disproportionate 
amount of time to formally managing risk, regardless of the industry or sector. Although the 
growing obsession with risk management could be attributed to the increasing prevalence of 
complex technology, it was failures of a financial origin that served to really propel ERM into the 
public-sector limelight. The following sub-section now explores the rise of enterprise risk 
management and its near mandatory existence within public organisations wishing to be viewed as 
legitimate and just. 
2.2.1 Corporate Governance and the Introduction of ERM 
Although many of the catastrophic failures that were grabbing the news headlines were often 
associated with technological failures, private-sector organisations have garnered a significant 
amount of attention for the failure to govern themselves appropriately. Much of ERM’s 
prominence can be traced back to the need for corporate governance systems that work to ensure 
that shareholder value is protected, investors realise a return on their investments, and that these 
are achieved in socially acceptable manner (Letza et al., 2008). The increased need for some type of 
corporate oversight system was made salient through a series of significant organisational failures 
and scandals that came to light through the end of the 20th century and into the early years of the 
present century.  
Within the UK, the occurrence of a series of large-scale corporate failures led to a string of 
committees being struck with corresponding reports being issued that provided recommendations 
on how to improve executive accountability through the voluntary adherence to codes of best 
practice. The first of these, the 1992 Cadbury Report, was in response to a host of major financial 
institutions failures, such as the Bank of Credit and Commerce International, and spoke to the need 
to ensure accountability and transparency at the executive level of an organisation. A significant 
result of this report was the development of the Cadbury Code, which set out explicit guidance on 
corporate accounting and governance arrangements. Following on the heels of the Cadbury Code, 
the release of the Greenbury Report in 1995 was a reaction to disproportionate discrepancies 
between executive salaries and company earnings, stressing “…accountability, responsibility, full 
disclosure, alignment of director and shareholder interests, and improved company performance.” 




(Elliot et al., 2000:49). Further still in 1998, the Hampel report assumed a more proactive stance 
and sought to advance the guidance on corporate governance by merging the recommendations of 
the Cadbury and Greenbury reports into the ‘Combined Code’ and explicitly broadened the 
corporate governance remit to include both internal control and risk management. However, it is 
the Turnbull Report released in 1999 that is largely acknowledged as an evolutionary step in 
contemporary corporate governance practices. The recommendations contained within the 
Turnbull Report provided ‘official’ guidance to company’s director(s) on the obligations to the 
Combined Code, or as it more commonly referred to now, the UK Corporate Governance Code. 
In addition to this, the adherence to the UK Corporate Governance Code, was also transitioned 
from being a voluntary undertaking, to being a mandated compliance requirement for any UK 
listed company. A demand that has actually be seen to produce a perverse effect of companies 
actually de-listing in order to reduce the burden of compliance (Power 2007). 
Much like the UK, similar developments pertaining to corporate governance were transpiring 
in North America over the same time period. The USA’s Committee of Sponsoring Organisations 
(COSO) of the Treadway Commission and Canada’s Criteria of Control Board (CoCo) represent 
‘official’ state responses to the major failings and financial scandals in the corporate sector at the 
turn of the 21st century. In 1992, the COSO document ‘Internal Control - Integrated Framework’ 
was published and was the result of an independent study (the Treadway Commission) that focused 
on the causes of fraudulent financial reporting. This document heavily influenced the above-
mentioned UK’s Turnbull report, and focused on audits of financial, regulatory and operational 
aspects of a private organisation’s proceedings. It also represented the first time that an expectation 
that control design be linked to some type of explicit risk assessment process. In 1995, CoCo 
released its guidance document that echoed the COSO approach but further expanded the remit of 
internal controls to encompass all operational areas of an enterprise (Power 2007). Although both 
COSO and CoCo have specific aspects impacting the current concept of risk management 
regarding their respective nations, the collective importance of these documents is that they 
legitimized the concept of internal control transitioning from one concentrated on financial aspects 
of the business to one focused on corporate ‘enterprise-wide’ system of risk management and 
governance (Arena et al. 2010; Mikes 2009; Power 2007).  
However, although this flurry of newly released guidance documents was beginning to elevate 
the role of risk management within organisation, further pressures were still required to push ERM 
up through the ranks of managerial practices. This further pressure to manage risks to an 
organisation’s strategic objectives has been seen to originate from the rise of quality assurance 
standards and models (Power 1997). ISO 9000 is comprised of a set of quality assurance standards 
that was produced by the International Standards Organisation (ISO). Originally introduced in 
1987, ISO 9000 is a standards document that outlines seven ‘quality management principles’ and is 
focused on documenting a ‘plan, do, check’ model of organisational processes. The focus here 
again is on the now well-worn theme of internal controls and the achievement of an organisation’s 




strategic objectives. It is these types quality assurance templates that are seen to have led to the 
creation of similar standards documents for risk management standards, the first of which being 
generated jointly by New Zealand and Australia with the UK, Canada and Japan soon following suit 
(Power 2004). Recently in 2009, ISO 31 000 was introduced a ‘generic’ risk management standard, 
that is applicable to private and public organisations alike (See section 2.2.2 for further detail).  
With all of these normative standards, mandated requirements, and societal expectations in 
place, ERM has achieved a solidified role of representing an institutionally legitimatising element 
for a private organisation. However, public organisations are not subject to the same need to assure 
stakeholder values and interests remain protected from nefarious or poor quality corporate actions. 
Yet, public organisations now find themselves feverishly taking up the practice of ERM. Two 
identified pressures that saw a shift in uptake of ERM in public organisations was that of New 
Public Management (NPM) as well as ERM serving as a mechanism to discipline public 
organisation malfeasances (Power 1997; Hood & Rothstein 2000). NPM represents a paradigmatic 
shift that took place in North America and the UK at the end of the 20th century.  Representing a 
departure from the previous ‘command and control’ paradigm of government administration, this 
new approach to public administration merged the key tenets of new institutional economics 
(transparency, user choice, contestability) with that of professionalized managerialism that 
encouraged business-type cultures and performance measurement to drive reform (Hood 1991). In 
this paradigm, ensuring corporate governance oversight is in place and the risks to achieving 
strategic public-value based goals are managed, becomes achievable by the same tools as the private 
sector (i.e. ERM). Yet, just what is ERM and is how suitable is this inwardly focused ‘private-sector 
practice’ in an organisation that is primarily concerned with influencing conditions and behaviours 
far outside of its organisational walls? The following sections will now expand on the technical 
components of an ERM type approach to risk management and also some of the identified 
challenges in operationalising it with private and public organisations.  
2.2.2 What is ERM? 
Enterprise risk management is broadly an umbrella term for a range of risk management practices 
rather than any one specific ‘way’ of managing risk (Power 2004). Whether they are called ‘holistic’, 
‘integrated’ or ‘enterprise-wide’, all of these systems really speak to the systematic effort to manage 
risk by all areas of an organisation, rather than being associated with a specific function or area, 
such as engineering or the finance department. Basically, ERM is an organisational management 
system that encourages a rationalised allocation of resources applied in the form of controls that 
work to avoid future adversity and protect the object of value (Holt 2004). To achieve its ends, the 
management system relies on a set of smaller on-going routines and processes, represented by steps 
or tasks such as risk analysis, system monitoring, or evaluating risk treatment options (ISO 2009). 
This concept derives largely from the multidisciplinary world of cybernetics which is a field 
interested in understanding the machine-like interaction of natural and/or man-made systems 




working to regulate the transition from a current state to that of a desired state (Ashby 1957, 
Umpleby & Dent 1999). The subfield of management cybernetics applies the fundamentals of 
cybernetics to that of institutions and organisations in an attempt to increase their effectiveness. In 
relating cybernetics to the risk management processes outlined in the contemporary guidance 
material, the linkages become easy to see. The system is simple and cyclical, with a continual 
feedback and monitoring system to ensure not only accuracy but also optimal system performance 
as depicted in Figure 2.1 below.  
Figure 2.1: Risk Management Process adapted from ISO 31000.  
 
 
The overall intent of these types of frameworks is to coordinate efforts across the organisation 
in a consistent manner and to ultimately become a taken-for-granted way of doing business. The 
International Standards Organisation defines risk management as “coordinated activities to direct 
and control an organisation with regard to risk” and a risk management framework as “[a] set of 
components that provide the foundations and organisational arrangements for designing, 
implementing, monitoring, reviewing and continually improving risk management throughout the 
organisation” (ISO 2009:2). The HM Treasury’s Orange Book defines it as “all the processes 
involved in identifying, assessing and judging risks, assigning ownership, taking actions to mitigate 
or anticipate them, and monitoring and reviewing progress” (HM Treasury 2004:49). Finally, the 
Institute of Risk Management defines it as “…the process whereby organisations methodically 
address the risks attaching to their activities with the goal of achieving sustained benefit within each 


















processes is to elicit repetitive, predictable and continuous behaviours aimed at achieving a desired 
state in which negative outcomes/consequences are minimized, if not eradicated all together. The 
value of which being a process that “… contributes to the demonstrable achievement of objectives 
and improvement of performance in, for example, human health and safety, security, legal and 
regulatory compliance, public acceptance, environmental protection, product quality, project 
management, efficiency in operations, governance and reputation” (ISO 2009:7). 
As much as the above presents a generic and ‘one-size’ conception of risk management, styles 
of risk management have been identified (Smallman 1996). The 1992 Royal Society report on risk 
management characterised approaches to risk management as either subscribing to a ‘reactive’ or 
‘proactive’ paradigm. Smallman (1996) describes a reactive approach as rely on the setting of 
predetermined thresholds, of which an assessed risk is not to exceed. The operating environment is 
then monitored with thresholds being adjusted based on evolving actuarial models. On the other 
hand, proactive approaches are more in line with ERM type systems and rely on decision-making 
rules over that of trying to model risks that have limited amounts of actuarial data. In this approach, 
the emphasis is on preventing, avoiding and reducing risk.  
Lying at the heart of the risk management framework, and evidenced by the ISO figure above, 
is the process of risk assessment. Perhaps one of the most contentious aspects of the aspect of the 
framework, risk assessment includes the identification, analysis and evaluation of risks. Laden with 
potential pitfalls relating to exclusionary tactics, biases and data quality issues that will be touched 
upon in the section to follow, risk assessments are relied upon to capture and articulate an 
organisation’s understanding of which risks it feels are worth actively managing. It is here where the 
calculative property of ‘consequence x likelihood’ provides a representative metric of what the risk 
‘actually’ is.  Most often, these risk assessments are recorded through the use of excel spreadsheet 
types registers, in which lines items contain the descriptions, scores, owners and associated controls 
of a specific risk (IRM 2010).  The intent is then to use this register as a monitoring tool that can be 
referred back to as risks are either treated, terminated, tolerated or transferred (ISO 2009).  
Each of the steps or phases that are outlined in the various guidance documents present the 
risk management process as being a relatively straight-forward and rational exercise in which 
decisions about what is a risk, how important it is, and what should be done about it, are made in a 
logical and pragmatic manner. However, there is a large, and continually growing, set of literatures 
that question how rational and straight-forward this process is. The following section will now 
present some of the research that speaks to the challenges and issues that can accompany the 
adoption and practice of explicit risk management frameworks. 
2.3 Challenges of Operationalising ERM 
Before an organisation can begin to manage a risk, it first has to identify something as being a risk 
that is worthy of their time and effort. In acknowledging this, the challenge for any ERM 
programme becomes the simple fact that people, and even more so groups of people, quite often 




perceive risks very differently. As much as the guidance material on risk management would like to 
position the risk assessment process as one that can be mechanically applied uniformly across often 
disparate organisational departments, there is a long and well-established literature that suggests this 
may be far from what actually transpires. Couple this with the fact that the subsequent decisions 
that result from perceiving, or better yet assessing risk, can also be subject to a variety of cognitive 
and social filters, the likelihood of any ‘objective’ portrayal of what constitutes a risk seems quite 
rare, if not impossible. The following section brings to light some of the cognitive, social and 
cultural factors that present a considerable challenge to organisations seeking to generate a coherent 
and defensible assessment of the risks they should spend time managing.  
2.3.1 Perceiving Risks in Organisations  
In seeking to understand how an organisation comes to interpret something as a risk to be 
managed, two streams of research have emerged - those of a natural science realist perspective and 
one emerging from more of a social science constructionist perspective (Jasanoff 1998; Maguire & 
Hardy 2013). A realist approach to risk assumes that risk is waiting to be discovered ‘out there’ and 
as such, is amenable to objective measurement. Probabilities, frequencies and dose response curves 
work to generate technical analyses of quantifiable relationships between observable events (Renn 
2008). Although well suited for situations where actuarial data on past failures is readily available, 
realist approaches to managing risk have been criticised for not fully accounting for risk’s socially 
constructed nature (Pidgeon et al., 1992; Maguire & Hardy 2013; Wynne 1992). Hilgartner (1992) 
describes a process of risk construction in which actors seek to construct risk objects (linking harm 
with an object), and in doing so can either ‘emplace’ or ‘displace’ them within socio-technical 
networks as a means to amplify or attenuate their significance respectively. Boholm and Corvellec 
(2010) further this notion through a ‘relational’ theory of risk. This perspective heavily emphasises 
the socially constructed and relativistic nature of a risk. This approach attempts to shift the focus of 
risk being a driven by intrinsic and observable properties, to one focused on the more cultural and 
narrative dimensions risk. In doing so, Boholm and Corvellec (2010) acknowledge the culturally 
situated aspect of value and how this fluctuates depending on how an individual or group is 
oriented towards the risk relationship. The authors posit that a relational theory of risk “explains 
that risk is an epistemic construct that serves to categorize external objects in relation to other 
objects depending on what we know and believe regarding the contingent character of the 
potentially harmful causal relationships involved.” (Boholm & Corvellec 2010:182). And lastly, the 
relational risk theory highlights what Luhmann (1993) notes regafding how the identification of risk 
makes the observer aware of danger and thus introduces the need to make a decision in regards to 
what to do about the risk. Luhmann goes on to suggests that it is through the narratives and 
language of risk that humans come to terms with ‘untameable’ futures and in order to progress and 
govern our lives, risk provides a rationalisation of what is, and is not, controllable.  




As the need to make decisions is encountered in every step of the ISO risk management 
framework, it is unsurprising that considerable scholarly attention has been paid to how individuals 
make decisions related to risk.  Cognitive psychology and behaviour decision sciences have long 
since demonstrated that people use ‘mental shortcuts’, known as heuristics, to make decisions 
under conditions of uncertainty (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981; Kahneman 2002, 2011). A related 
group of studies meanwhile examined the impact of social interactions on individuals’ risk 
perception (Fischhoff, 1995). These interactions inform public conceptions of risk and what is an 
appropriate level of concern about it, such as when considering “How safe is safe enough?” in 
relation to new technologies (Fischhoff et al.,1978). Within the past 20 years, decision theory has 
also been directly informed by advances in the understanding of human cognitive processes – 
modelling effects such as sense- making (Weick, 1995), bounded rationality (Gigerenzer, 2002), and 
affect (Slovic et al., 2004; Slovic & Peters 2006).  Although the application of heuristics is viewed as 
a means to expedite a decision-making process has been seen to come at the cost of accuracy 
(Kahneman 2011), others have noted that the application of heuristics, in regards to make decisions 
under uncertainty, have found this trade-off to be marginal or even at times non-existent (Mousavi 
& Gigerenzer 2014). The application of heuristics and ‘professional judgement’ over the more 
rigorous and explicit ERM processes is important when it comes down to assessing transaction 
costs.  
Expanding on the impacts of heuristics and biases, a ‘negativity bias’ was seen to pervade 
decision making in a UK government department. The fear of being held accountable for a highly 
visible and news-worthy failure lead to the tendency to “amplify the perception of highly-visible 
‘short-term/high-frequency’ risks and attenuate the perception of ‘long-term/low-frequency’ risks, 
which were inevitably less visible” (Rothstein & Downer 2012:793). This fear of being ‘left holding 
the bag’ meant that officials would focus on making decisions that would protect short-term 
reputation over that of societally-focused environmental risks. The nature of risk management to 
connect harm with value through explicit documented assessments opens up a great potential for 
biases going unaccounted for. For example, semi-quantitative risk assessments could easily be 
shaped by assessor’s prior knowledge of the hazard (familiarity bias) or recent high-profile. This 
makes what an individual has been exposed to in the past, a significant element in how they will 
respond to risk in the future. However, as much as observed events comprise much of these past 
experiences, the culture(s) to which an individual has been exposed to, and subscribes to, also plays 
a significant role in perceiving risks.  
2.3.2 Cultural Factors Influencing Risk Perceptions in Organisations 
The link between culture and how society responds to risks has been well-documented. Often 
positioned as a counterpart to that of psychological and cognitive research exploring how risk is 
perceived, Cultural Theory was developed in an attempt to acknowledge the role social structures 
and constraints play in shaping how risks can be perceived. Seen more as ‘cultural biases’, 




individuals are seen to rely on their underlying worldviews, basic values and assumptions in 
deciding on what constitutes a risk and how big that risk might be (Dake 1992; Boholm 2009; 
Douglas & Wildavsky 1982). Units of society are then seen to subscribe to a ‘grid-group’ typology 
in which they can be positioned with one of four quadrants: individualism, egalitarian, hierarchical 
or fatalism. Depending on where within each quadrant the social unit falls, their corresponding 
cultural outlooks will bias, filter and shape their understanding of risk (Rippl 2002). For 
organisations attempting to make sense of the risks they face, acknowledging the cultural influence 
on differing opinions of what is valued, in addition to that of what poses a threat, presents 
significant implications for risk analysis and assessment techniques (Corvellec 2010; Horlick-Jones 
1998). From a cultural standpoint, our organisational identities and beliefs shape who we think we 
are and influence how we enact and how we interpret scenarios involving risk (Douglas 1992; 
Lupton 1999). However, when it comes to shaping how organisations identify, analyse and respond 
to risk, there have been other equally powerful forces identified by organisational theorists that are 
expanded on in section 2.4.  
Organisational culture is seen as myriad of complex dynamic systems (Hatch 1993), which 
form one of the most influential forms of behavioural control seen within an organisational setting 
(Schein 2004). Culture is the product of negotiated and shared symbols and meanings; it emerges 
from social interaction (Meek 1988). The underlying goal of organisational-wide risk management 
systems is to be ‘embedded’ as an organisation’s dominant culture that “… involves an 
environment that can demonstrate leadership from senior management, involvement of staff at all 
levels, a culture of learning from experience, appropriate accountability for actions (without 
automatic blame) and good communication on risk issues” (IRM 2002). Although the integration 
with existing practices may be a means to increase the effectiveness of risk management in 
organisations, it has been well-established that organisations often seek to preserve organisational 
structures and cultural arrangements when pressured to adopt institutionalised practices (Meyer & 
Rowan 1977).  
Risk management frameworks can be thought of as organisational routines, that are “recurring 
patterns of behaviour of multiple organisational members involved in performing organisational 
tasks” (Feldman & Rafaeli 2002:301). Risk management represents an explicit system of 
organisational routines or patterns that if not carefully aligned, may compete and contradict with 
other ingrained organisational arrangements and cultural values (Meek 1988; Lupton 1999; ISO 
2009). These patterns can take the form of both action-oriented behaviours, as well as well as 
cognitive regularities, that relate back to psychological risk perception research around ‘rules of 
thumb’ - ie. if {condition A} then {do B} (Becker, 2004). These types of cognitive-based 
perceptions also have a powerful role in coordinating collective activities (March & Olsen 1989) 
and as Stene (1940:1129) posits, the “coordination of activities within an organisation tends to vary 
directly with the degree to which essential and recurring functions have become part of the 
organisational routine”. From this, we can begin to see how the repeatable institutionalised routines 




and the rationales that comprise risk management could compete with an organisation’s existing 
embedded cultural routines. The cybernetic aspects of ‘step-by-step’ mechanistic risk management 
framework could easily clash with more dynamically organic, pre-existing risk management 
techniques.  Each of these routines thus act as powerful conduits to reinforce underlying beliefs 
and assumptions about what is valued and what poses a risk to that value (DiMaggio & Powell 
1991; Schein 2004).  
In speaking specifically to pre-existing cultural preferences influencing risk management, 
Power (2003) and Mikes (2009) highlight the cultural dimensions of managing risk in observing 
how risk practitioners approach measuring and management activities from either a calculative 
pragmatic or calculative idealist standpoint.  Power (2003) suggests that a pragmatic approach is 
favoured in environments that require identification of risks that test the limits for formal 
knowledge with idealistic applications being reserved for situations requiring true economic 
representations based on high quality frequency data.  Mikes (2009) posits that the actual practice of 
risk management has senior officers often moving past the quantified risk estimates and claim that 
they have access to a realm of unquantifiable risk issues that defy traditional assessment techniques. 
The author goes on to argue the benefit of relying on more subjective, participatory and interactive 
means of risk assessment as opposed to diagnostic measures allows “… various organisational 
actors [to become] aware of emergent risks, and thereby shape both high-level discretionary 
decisions and emergent strategies” (Mikes 2009: 21). 
2.3.3 Technical Aspects of ERM Interacting with Organisation Arrangements 
As much as individual cognition or cultural perspectives can influence how risks are responded to 
by organisations, the tools associated with the process have been seen to play a role in influence the 
process. The risk assessment phase in ERM frameworks commonly contain three distinct steps in 
which risks are: identified; analysed; and, then evaluated. Tools such as risk registers are often used 
to capture the identified risks and once populated, the risk registers then allow for some type of 
qualitative or quantitative analysis of the risk to take place in order to gain an understanding of its 
severity in relation to the other risks being managed. Cox (2008) expands on the role of interpreting 
risk tools with an analysis of how organisations use risk matrices to measure and communicate 
different types of risk. This research focused on the reliance on risk matrices that comprise 
frequency and severity ratings that correspond to priority levels. The findings exposed limitations in 
the ability of these risk matrices to: provide risk-risk comparisons; effectively allocate resources for 
risk-reducing countermeasures; compensate for subjectively ambiguous inputs/outputs; and finally, 
address errors resulting from negatively correlated frequencies and severities. Although the skill of 
those individuals using the matrices is always a factor, these findings stress the importance that 
although the technologies associated with risk management frameworks can aid in communicating 
and calculating risk, their products should not be accepted as absolute. 




Further speaking to how risk is ‘technically’ assessed, it has been demonstrated that 
management responds to risk differently than what has been portrayed by traditional decision-
making theory and that although managers acknowledge the importance of quantified risk 
assessments and decision trees, the ultimate decision usually comes down to a subjective ‘gut-feel’ 
about what is the ‘right’ course of action (Riabacke 2006). Here, although the uncertainty of an 
outcome is a factor, the magnitude of an adverse outcome appears to dominate the decision-
making process; emphasizing the protection of that which is valued over the lack of information 
about probability (MacCrimmon & Werhung 1986). However, much of ERM’s strength comes 
from its ability to produce some type of tangible or observable impact on strategic objectives. In 
specifically viewing the utilization of ‘strategic risk management’ principles, a lack of quantifiable 
evidence shifts efforts from ‘show me’ to ‘convince me’ and the organisation’s risk managers are 
then seen to redirect where an organisation focuses its attention in trying to balance competing 
agendas (Mikes 2005; 2009; Collier & Woods 2012). The significance of these findings is not that 
managers lack confidence in technically executing explicit risk management practices or that 
aversion/attenuation is driven by a dominating factor but rather for them, but that risk is managed 
through a variety of skills and processes that blend into an overall response to risk that is seldom 
removed from the context in which it arises.  Practising risk management is therefore a 
combination of formal (i.e. technical) and informal activities. 
Even the different types of risks being managed can influence how organisations have been 
seen to pay attention to and respond to risk. For example, Rothstein et al (2006) identify how an 
organisation faced with managing risks to society and risks to the organisation can generate a 
spiralling feedback loop where institutional ‘colonized’ risks dominate the decision-making process 
In exploring the popularity of risk as a means to construct objects of regulatory management, the 
authors argue that regulatory organisations charged with managing societal risks become consumed 
by the reflexive aspect of risk governance and that “ ‘risk colonization’ can have a spiraling tendency where 
mismatches between the management of societal and institutional risk drive regulators to ever further activity” 
(Ibid:93). Increasing demands for greater transparency of decision-making leads these organisations 
to rationalise and explicate their actions through the language, tools and techniques of risk 
management. In treating the negative externalities of the regulated parties as explicit and calculable 
risk, it in turn can create risks to the institution itself through the failure to account for potential 
legal, operational or reputational impacts. The authors suggest that this “…greater concentration on 
institutional risk can sensitize regulators to different dimensions of, and even new, societal risks for which they could 
be held accountable” (Ibid: 103). Balancing the need to both reduce risks to society through efficient 
and effective regulatory interventions and at the same time ensure that any newly introduced or 
increased risks to the institution remain under control is certainly a consideration for any 
organisation expanding (i.e. colonising) the departments through the introduction of an enterprise-
wide risk framework. 




The above literature begins to show that although the intention of introducing an enterprise 
wide approach to managing risk may seek to “methodically address the risks attaching to their 
activities with the goal of achieving sustained benefit within each activity and across the portfolio of 
all activities.” (IRM 2002:2), there is a considerable number of cultural, cognitive, structural and 
functional factors that influence the overall outcome. In addition to the challenges outlined in the 
previous section, even larger forces have been noted when it comes to shaping the adoption and 
practice of institutionalised managerial systems like ERM. The following section now explores 
some of these broader dimensions in the review of the literature pertaining to Neo-Institutional 
analyses of organisations.  
2.4 Understanding Organisations: A Neo-Institutionalist Perspective  
Practices like ERM can become a required skill or element for organisations to be able to 
demonstrate if they wish to continue to be viewed as being a legitimate entity. This idea of 
organisation being influenced by the specific practices, structures, roles or functions of 
organisations is much the focus of what is known as Neo-Institutional Theory.  According to 
Jepperson (1991), “Institutions are socially constructed, routine-reproduced, program or rule 
systems. They operate as relative fixtures of constraining environments and are accompanied by 
taken-for-granted accounts”. Like any organisation, the structure of the PLA is subject to a variety 
of influential systems and pressures that arise from the environment in which it operates (DiMaggio 
and Powell 1991). Many theories and analytical tools have been developed from political, economic 
and sociological perspectives, which seek to explain the driving institutional forces that influence 
organisations (DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Meyer & Rowan 1977). Traditionally, most organisational 
theory has focused on the political and economic pressures that shape organisational structure. 
Economic and political based approaches to organisational analysis often represent organisations as 
a collection of individual actors driven by agency; effectively accomplishing objectives for the 
lowest cost possible (Hutter 2005). They tend to view organisational design as a product of a 
rational, individual cognitive decision-making process that is primarily based on utility. Where Neo-
Intuitionalism begins to differ is it identifies the influences that the taken-for-granted social values, 
rules and shared understandings (i.e. institutions) can have on organisational structure and 
behaviours (Meyer & Rowan 1977). From this viewpoint, the organisation then becomes not only a 
product of the environment but a reflection of it as well. 
2.4.1 Neo-Institutional Pressures and Organisational Legitimacy  
Institutional forces have been described, in an organisational setting, as powerful myths that 
manifest themselves in programs, professions and technology (Meyer & Rowan 1977; DiMaggio & 
Powell 1983). These elements begin to represent more than the sum of their parts and as such, are 
less likely to be questioned due to what they represent rather than what they physically are. Doctors 
represent wellbeing, health, and medicine and the profession is legitimized by educational systems 




and Hippocratic oaths.  Accounting departments establish organisational credibility, commitments 
to good governance, and responsibility, making them more than just a number-crunching 
administrative process driven by efficiency. The more myths an organisation is exposed to and 
subsequently adopt, the more complex the organisation becomes in order to be seen as legitimate; 
legitimacy being a prerequisite for organisational survival (Meyer & Rowan 1977; DiMaggio & 
Powell 1983). If an organisation can represent what is known to be good and right in the world, 
then the products and services it provides are justified. This need for legitimacy is the driving force 
behind why so many organisations adopt such homogenous compositions, an effect known as 
organisational isomorphism – a classic example being the adoption of explicit risk management 
practices, technologies and rationales. 
In their 1983 article focused on institutional isomorphism and collective rationality, DiMaggio 
and Powell categorize an organisation’s tendency to structure themselves homogeneously by three 
separate types of isomorphic processes. The first is due to coercive political type pressures that 
stem from a need to establish organisational legitimacy in the eyes of an organisation’s stakeholders. 
A relevant example can be seen in the mandated requirements to adopt the corporate governance 
codes noted at the beginning of this chapter. The second is mimetic in nature and is in response to 
perceived ambiguities that accompany the unknowns of an organisation’s future. In this, the sheer 
number of organisations now practising ERM engenders a feeling of ‘being different’ and 
subsequently lacking what others have been able to achieve. The third and final type of pressure is 
normative and results from the professionalization of organisational roles and processes (DiMaggio 
& Powell 1983, Zucker, 1987). In this sense, risk management and its promise to reduce failure and 
negative impacts is simply viewed as the right thing to do. However, succumbing to these 
institutional pressures can come with considerable costs. What does an organisation stand to gain 
outside of complying with external expectations and norms? This brings us to the role of 
organisational legitimacy and what society sees as constituting the appropriate behaviours, 
structures and operations that should be demonstrated by an organisation that wishes to remain in 
good standing.  
The survival of any organisation is highly dependent on its ability to establish a legitimate 
standing within the evaluative eyes of the society in which it operates (Meyer & Rowan 1977; Ruef 
& Scott 1998). The concept of legitimacy has been identified as an increasingly important anchor in 
organisational analysis (Meyer & Rowan 1977; DiMaggio & Powell 1991; Suchman 1995; 
Deephouse & Suchman 2008). As with any emerging fields of study, how a key concept is defined 
becomes of increasing debate. Legitimacy is largely bi-dimensional in that it can be viewed as a 
category of expressed cognitive organisational behaviour(s) and as a socio-political analytical lens. 
As described by Aldrich and Fiol (1994:645) legitimacy is “in one sense relating to how taken for 
granted a new form is and in the other to which a new form conforms to recognized principles or 
accepted rules and standards”; the former speaking to the cognitive aspects and the latter socio-
political. For the purposes of this research, legitimacy will be defined as “a generalized perception 




or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman 1995:574).  
In further delineating its composition, Suchman identifies three types of legitimacy, the first of 
which being what he terms pragmatic legitimacy. This type of legitimacy is focused on the 
relationship between the organisation and its immediate audiences, and the direct exchanges 
between them. If a policy benefits the stakeholder then support for the organisation will be 
garnered. This can be further enhanced by incorporating stakeholders either directly into is 
decision-making or adopts external performance standards. Lastly, it can also be represented by the 
personification of organisations (Suchman 1995). This is done in order to attribute a trustworthy 
characteristic upon them (Aldrich & Fiol 1994; Suchman 1995). Programs focused on stakeholder 
engagement that invite external audiences into the organisational processes (workshops, roundtable 
discussion, etc.) not only address concerns about what goes on behind closed doors but offers the 
opportunity for evaluators to impart their values into the organisation’s decisions (Suchman 1995; 
Power 2007).  
A second type of legitimacy is that of moral legitimacy. Here, evaluation is based on whether 
or not the goals, objectives and/or processes of an organisation are deemed morally acceptable by 
society (Suchman 1995). As opposed to pragmatic legitimacy, moral legitimacy places the emphasis 
on the ‘social goodness’ rather than a direct benefit. Is the organisation doing the ‘right thing’ or is 
it acting in a manner that contradicts societal values? The concept of corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) is an excellent example of attempts to gain and maintain moral legitimacy. CSR focuses on 
the moral conduct of an organisation and specifically, the mechanisms and results of external 
ethical evaluations of corporate conduct. As stated by Power (2007: 133), “CSR now seems to take 
as its object the entire ethical character of the organisation and its governance”. Moral legitimacy 
holds advantages in times when a technical failure can be compensated by the fact that the 
organisation took higher ground and stuck to what the right thing to do was. An example of this 
type of legitimacy is Tylenol’s response to the tampering of its product and subsequent death in the 
United States in 1982. By setting aside any logistical or economic issues the company simply did the 
‘right thing to do’; Tylenol recalled every bottle (estimated to be 31 million bottles) and replaced 
them at a cost of over $100 million – a cost that does not reflect subsequent changes to 
manufacturing processes and law suits (Shrivastava et al., 1988). This, at the time, novel response to 
a direct threat to the company’s legitimacy represents a significant elevation of the moral 
‘benchmark’ that redefined what constituted an acceptable and legitimate response for multiple 
industries going forward.  
Lastly is the concept of cognitive legitimacy. Here, legitimacy is viewed as “the mere 
acceptance of an organisation as necessary or inevitable based on some taken-for-grantedness” 
(Suchman 1995:582). From this cognitive perspective, the organisation becomes tightly intertwined 
with the social fabric to the point that life cannot be imagined without it. Achieving this status for a 
single organisation is possibly less likely than if it is attributed to an organisational field, like that of 




policing or that of the field of medicine. This begins to highlight another bi-dimensional aspect of 
all three types of legitimacy. The measure of legitimacy can be taken by assessing the actions of an 
organisation (does it act appropriately) and that of the essence of the organisation (is the 
organisation itself appropriate given the social context) (Suchman 1995). As such, organisational 
fields may have great cognitive legitimacy given that one could not imagine life without a dedicated 
organisation that enforces regulations but this still leaves a lot to be said of the importance of how 
the agents conduct their business. 
Being able to demonstrate legitimacy is of growing concern as issues of organisational 
transparency continue to arise. The need to maintain transparency of internal operations has been 
closely linked to the perceived legitimacy of an organisation (Deephouse & Carter 2005). Its 
influence is characterized by organisations generating an auditable trail of evidence-based decision-
making that a robust risk management process can generate (Power 1997; 2004; 2007; Renn 2008; 
Rothstein et al, 2006; Hutter 2005). In a sense, the level of transparency demonstrated by an 
organisation is linked to the effort (or lack thereof) applied to achieving/preserving pragmatic, 
moral and cognitive legitimacy. In this sense, risk management in public organisations “may have 
less to do with the substance of assessment techniques and is more part of the management of 
legitimacy and political reputation” (Power et al. 2009:310). Much like how audit increases the level 
of organisational transparency, the forensic nature of risk management practices has heightened the 
salience of blame and accountability within ‘exposed’ organisations (Hutter 2005, Power 2007, 
Douglas 1992). The risk of blame does not solely lie outside of the organisation and can also be 
driven by internal politics and reputations (Hutter 2005; Horlick-Jones 2005). In a review of a 
medium-sized NHS District General Hospital in the English Midlands, Warring (2005:1930) 
interviewed a mixture of medical and managerial staff to find that internal blame “stemmed from 
the occupational or internal aspects of medical practice where it was felt that increased openness 
about individual competence could lead to the questioning of professional practice and lead to poor 
references, reprimands from a senior colleague or could tarnish the reputation of the consultant". 
In relation to risk management, making roles, responsibilities and accountability explicit has some 
significant implications when/if failures arise. In an organisation that fingers are either easily 
pointed at or they are quick to point them at each other, the risks of risk management may soon 
outweigh the benefits when all is said and done.   
2.4.2 Explaining Practice Variation: Decoupling, Institutional Logics and 
Pluralism, and Organisational Identities 
When it comes to explaining organisational variance of ‘standardised’ practices, Pedersen and 
Dobbin (2006) suggest that historically, institutionalism emphasises organisation-environment 
relations and depict imitation and diffusion as the legitimising process. They counter this 
perspective with a cultural view of legitimacy-seeking behaviours being dominated by intra-
organisational factors that are characterised by internal learning and socialisation processes that 




generate individualised identities. If this holds true, it is then fair to say that an organisational 
response to ERM will be shaped by contextual factors such as organisational culture and 
institutionalised expectations, which can act as complementary or competing forces shaping 
organisational behaviours (Masuda & Garvin 2006; DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Schein 2004). In this 
regard, the practice of ERM becomes less about technical competencies, skills and resource 
acquisition and more about the overarching struggle of organisations seeking to understand who 
they are and how they should act (Albert & Whetten 1985). However, aligning new institutionalised 
practices with that of pre-existing organisational arrangements can have a wide range of responses, 
often noted being that of organisational decoupling (Kodeih & Greenwood 2014). 
From a neo-institutionalist perspective, the adoption of a holistic or ERM style of risk 
management can be viewed as an isomorphic response that could be subject to a host of 
decoupling strategies that serve to preserve the existing traditions, practices and the cultural core of 
the organisation (Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Oliver 1991; Pederson and 
Dobbin 2006; Westphal & Zajac 2001). The concept of organisational decoupling, as originally 
conceived of by Meyer and Rowan (1977), transpires when the adoption of institutionalised 
practices has the potential, or do, contradict existing organisational norms, practices, and cultures. 
In response to this contradiction, the organisation decouples policy from practice in order to 
preserve a ‘technical core’ and at the same time be afforded the legitimacy that accompanies the 
apparent adoption of an institutionalised expectation. This process of decoupling affords 
organisations to adopt multiple, and at times conflicting, policies and achieve increased legitimacy 
on a multitude of fronts (Kratz & Block 2008). Power (1997) described presents the ‘Audit Society’ 
being primarily based on the notion of organisational decoupling. It is through what is described as 
‘rituals of verification’, were organisations produce a veneer of policy adoption that gives the 
appearance of compliance while preserving existing organisational arrangements. For example, a 
decoupled response was seen to arise from the intersection of three main institutional pressures: the 
adherence to NPM (mimetic); increased demands for transparency and accountability (normative); 
and, the rise of quality assurance models of organisational control (coercive) (Power 1997; 
2000:111). For Power, The culmination of these pressures generated an organisational obsession 
with self-checking that is less providing a challenge function and actually “functions primarily to 
make a certain style of auditing possible; it buffers the auditor from an increasingly complex 
evidence base, is cheaper than extensive attention to actual organisational process, and permits the 
audit to provide more or less comforting signals to regulators and politicians” (Power 2000:115).  
ERM, with its internal control roots, has the ability to generate a similar response as it works to 
provide ex ante assurance that risks will be avoided and that current levels of risk are at a 
‘comfortable’ level. Power (2004) has gone on to note how ERM has the ability to both turn 
everything into a risk to be managed by attaching ‘secondary’ risks or those risks posed to the 
reputation of an organisation by failing to attend appropriately to the risks posed to business 
objectives. In addition to this, Power (2009) also notes how the lack of challenge function posed by 




ERM practices that focus on means over ends, produce what culminates into the ‘risk management 
of nothing’. In essence, organisations focus more effort on demonstrating risk management rather 
than actually managing risk. Neo-institutional scholars have also recently begun to highlight means-
end decoupling as a distinct form of decoupling. Policy-practice decoupling is more representative 
of a ‘classic’ conception of decoupling (Meyer & Rowan 1977), i.e. paying lip service to the policy 
but buffering existing practices from any substantive change. Means-end decoupling speaks to 
when “where formal structures have real organisational consequences, work activities are altered, 
and policies are implemented and evaluated, but where scant evidence exists to show that these 
activities are linked to organisational effectiveness or outcomes” (Bromley & Powell 2009:14).  
Building on the notion of decoupling, the readily accessible artefacts representing a supposed 
healthy risk culture, such as risk registers, assessment matrices, and treatment plans, can carry 
significant symbolic weight organisationally. Unfortunately, dysfunctional aspects have been 
attributed to this cultural symbolism, via the generation of a false sense of security. In this regard, 
Clarke (1999a) notes that this sense of confidence can be ill-founded on what he terms illusionary 
control, and most notably, the creation of ‘fantasy documents’. In presenting case studies that 
explored pipeline spills, nuclear power plant disasters and civil defence, Clarke suggests that 
organisations can design response plans that largely serve symbolic rather than substantive ends. 
This largely unintentional design flaw is shaped by a need to assure a growingly inquisitive public 
that all is under well and under control, if not controllable. Most often arising when a lack of 
available, or easily transferable, relevant historical data, professionals and experts seek to create 
‘apparent affinities’ that “symbolically link extant bodies of knowledge, expertise, and experience 
and that these links make recognizable that which is unknown or unknowable” (Clarke 1999a:71). 
In essence, these affinities translate uncertainty into managerial objects of ‘knowable’ risks, upon 
which management can demonstrate some type of control. Once in place, these plans do little to 
truly reduce or solve the initial problem they sought to address but instead assume a much more 
political role within the organisation. Whether it be a concerned executive or an outraged public, 
fantasy documents serve little more than being a palliative mechanism that normalise dangers and 
disguise latent failures in favour of symbolic competence.  
 As much as organisations can buffer and detach from any form of substantive change when it 
comes to responding to organisational pressures, there are also other ways in which organisations 
can shift and change organisational understandings and practices. Building on the concept of 
means-end decoupling, a recent study explored in relation to the emergence of a need to improve 
risk culture within the banking and financial sector (Palermo et al., 2017). Following the financial 
crisis, pressures arose to redefine the role of financial institutions and shift the risk-taking logic 
exhibited prior to the crash, with one that emphasised control and prevention. In the face of two 
competing ‘risk logics’, one seeking to capitalise on opportunities and the other emphasising 
precaution and risk avoidance, an increase in institutional complexity was observed. The research 
demonstrated the dynamic interaction between the organisational practices that represented the 




‘means and ends’ as well as the target of intervention itself, the risk culture. This interaction led to a 
‘co-evolution’ of logics that were reconstructed and supported by shifts in everyday practices 
(Palermo et al., 2017:156). The above highlights the ways in which institutional pressures, pre-
existing logics, and routine practices interact and shape how organisations both function and 
understand themselves.  
Largely based on the initial work of Friedland and Alford (1991), the concept of ‘institutional 
logics’ has emerged to help further explain how organisations, and the actors that constitute them, 
identify with their work and how it relates to the world around them. In their effort to account for 
culture and symbolism and to push the discussion of institutional analysis beyond a purely 
structuralist argument, bringing ‘society back in’ to the fold, the authors suggest that institutional 
analysis of organisations must account for socio-cultural factors at a more micro level. Advancing 
this line of thought, scholars have evolved the concept of institutional logics, defining them as: “the 
socially constructed, historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules 
by which individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space, 
and provide meaning to their social reality.” (Thornton and Ocasio 1999: 804). In doing so, 
institutional logics provide a means to deepen the analysis of organisational practice and allow 
researchers to account for dynamics of a more micro scale across organisations, as opposed to 
those transpiring at the field level.  
How organisations vary their practices in response to institutional pressures to adopt 
legitimising practices has become of increased interest by organisational scholars. Recent research 
has expanded on the understanding that institutional pressures can result in organisational 
heterogeneity and, more importantly for this research study, practice variation (Friedland and 
Alford 1991; Thorton et al, 2012; Macpherson & Sauder 2013). Although the concept of 
institutionally driven isomorphism has not been abandoned, this recent research has begun to 
acknowledge the heterogeneous characteristics of organisations, the organisational dynamics of 
institutional pluralism and, practice variation across organisations (Pache & Santos 2010; 2013; 
Kratz & Block 2008; Greenwood et al., 2011; Dunn & Jones 2010) As such, the emphasis of a 
purely isomorphic response put forward by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) has increasingly come 
under pressure when forced to explain how organisations respond to and reconcile competing, and 
sometimes conflicting, institutional logics.  
Outside of a few examples, insights into how risk management may, or may not, vary across an 
organisation are few and far between (Arena et al., 2010; Mikes 2009; 2011; Woods 2009). Arena et 
al.(2010) explored the organisational dynamics of ERM across three private-sector non-financial 
companies. They found that ERM was shaped by a mix of organisational rationalities, experts and 
technologies. Three risk rationalities (compliance, corporate governance and pervasive 
performance) emerged that were seen to shape and guide managerial attention. From there 
different ‘risk experts’ then operationalised the logic and served to further shape how the ERM 
programme unfolded by ‘translating’ the programme through a spectrum of responses ranging from 




rule-based to more of a social learning style, indicating that although the adoption of ERM may 
appear isomorphic, its practice was not. Finally, risk technologies played a significant role in 
demonstrating the level of embeddedness afforded to the ERM programme. In the end, it was 
found that all three companies found little substantive benefit or use from the overly qualitative risk 
measurement techniques employed by the ERM programme.  
Further to practice variation, Collier and Woods (2012) focused on the adoption of risk 
management frameworks by four local governments, two in Australia and two from England. This 
time, similarities between nations were noted in the use of risk registers ranking risks according to 
likelihood and consequence, as well as clear identification of risk responsibility, and risk mitigation 
tools. These similarities were attributed to the interpretation of international standards such as 
COSO (2004) and ISO (2009). However, motivation for implementing the frameworks is where 
differences were noted. In the UK, political intervention from the State evaluators was seen to 
drive the adoption where in Australia, insurance companies played the dominant role. 
In further seeking to understand what can shape different types of practices, the idea of 
‘institutional logics’ has been used as a means to help understand and analyse the dynamic interplay 
between institutions (e.g. the insurance industry or state evaluators) and organisational practices 
(Lounsbury 2001; 2007). In a study of the adoption of recycling programs at universities, 
Lounsbury (2001) identified variation in the practice due to competing technocratic and ecological 
institutional logics. The level of organisational commitment to the programs was seen to be directly 
related to the dominant organisational logic; the technocratic logic resulting in a symbolic adoption, 
with a minimum allocation of resources, as opposed to the ecological logic in which the program 
flourished and enjoyed a more proliferate program adoption across the campus. Practice variation 
was further noted by Lounsbury (2007) in regards to money management practices related two 
separate mutual funds, on in Boston and one in New York. The research found that two competing 
logics, one based on performance and one on trusteeship led to distinct management practices that 
highlighted the structurally situated nature of organisational identities and corresponding logics. 
The above research emphasises the need to account for multiple and at times competing logics that 
play could play a significant role in how ERM is interpreted and applied across the different 
departments at the PLA. However, as much as competing logics can influence organisational 
practices, so too can competing institutional environments.   
A much as the internal dynamics can shape and organisation’s practices, so too can the 
institutional environment in which an organisation is located. The concept of institutional pluralism 
is defined by Kratz and Block (2008:243) as “…the situation faced by an organisation that operates 
within multiple institutional spheres”. Organisations that find themselves in institutionally pluralist 
environments are faced by competing, and sometime conflicting, pressures to achieve legitimacy on 
multiple fronts. Types of organisations that encounter have ranged from public sector organisations 
such as universities. Much of the early work on organisations coping with institutional pluralism is 
targeted at an industry/sector level and fails to fully account for the micro-processes and intra-




organisational dynamics associated with the existence of multiple institutional logics co-existing 
(Jarzabkowski et al. 2009). Other research has identified the emergency of ‘hybrid organisations’ as 
being representative of organisations that incorporate competing institutional logics and then 
manage them internally (Pache & Santos 2013).  
Lastly, a nascent theme arising from the neo-institutional literature on organisational analysis is 
that of the role of identity plays in guiding organisational actions. Further to this, institutional logics 
have been closely linked to the expression of individual and organisational identities (Lok 2010). It 
is the combination of logics and identity that provide actors the organisational scripts of what is 
expected to be done given who they think they are (Thorton et al. 2012; Albert & Whetten 1985). 
This linkage between understanding the acceptability of a course of action and then whether or not 
that action will be seen as legitimate given who the organisation is understood to be, is an 
important factor to consider when making decisions about how mitigate risks to that which the 
public values. For example, Lok (2010) demonstrated how a shareholder value logic became a 
prominent factor that shaped executive-level strategic decision-making. The study explored the 
transition of power from financial managerial experts to that of the informed and ‘voting’ 
shareholder. However, the societal pressures to demonstrate firm performance through a lens of 
shareholder value were at the same time both accommodated and resisted. This happened through 
a transformation of organisational identity at a micro level via the incorporation of ‘shareholder 
value’ talk and subtle shifts in organisational practices. This ‘identity shift’ allowed for a 
preservation of long-standing practices to be legitimised by a process of translation. Much like the 
notion of organisational decoupling, this type of strategy highlights how ‘problematising’ through 
the language of risk may indeed be more about actors resisting organisational change rather than 
demonstrated a viable reduction in adverse events. That being said, others have framed this as a 
positive phenomenon in which the “fundamental reorientation of the perspective of risk 
management shifts from facing apparent uncertainties using technical assessment tools, to using 
conversations devoid of fixed formulas to encounter questioned identities, indeterminate destinies, 
multiple and conflicting aims and myriad anxieties” (Holt 2004:265). 
2.5 Chapter Summary  
The prevalence of ERM, in public and private sector organisations, has been largely driven by an 
increasing societal expectation that appropriate corporate governance is in place and upheld. This 
expectation has been driven by advancements in the technologies organisations utilise and the risks 
in which they pose to the achievement of societal and organisational objectives. A series of large 
scale financial failures that were seen to arise from a lack of adequate corporate governance lead to 
a dramatic increase in the importance placed on internal controls. A resulting virtual explosion of 
auditing and accounting practices produced a managerial mentality that any and all aspects of 
organisational life could be amenable to control and in doing so holding those accountable for 
reducing the likelihood and severity of any future adverse events. In this sense, ERM became an 




indisputably moral, pragmatic and cognitively legitimate institutionalised practice for any 
organisation wishing to be seen in a socially acceptable light.  
However, the systematic and ‘standardised’ application of an enterprise-wide approach to risk 
management has posed new challenges to the existing functional, structural and cultural 
arrangements of organisations. For example, they can take the form of increased, and at times 
uncomfortable, levels of transparency that can lead to a heightened sensitivity to blame. This can in 
turn influence how public-sector organisations attend to the interplay between institutional and 
societal risks. Others noted the challenges with how individuals and groups assess and construct 
various risks, and the cultural and cognitive structures that can infiltrate and bias organisational 
assessments. Further to the cultural dimensions of risk management, the highly symbolic and 
ceremonial adoption of risk management tools and techniques opens the door for a decoupled 
practice that speaks more to optics rather than substantive change. Furthermore, research has 
highlighted other factors, such as the role of isomorphic pressures to adopt legitimising practices; 
competing institutional environments; and, the role of identity and institutional logics have in 
impacting how and why managerial practices are operationalised at the organisational level.  
What became very apparent throughout the literature review is the potential for ERM to 
decoupled from practice. There are a number of reasons and factors that suggest that a public-
sector organisation will seek to conserve its original core and cultural arrangement when faced with 
institutional pressure to conform (Meyer & Rowan 1977). In navigating these pressures, they may 
manage them internally (Pache & Santos 2013), employ competing logics to gain legitimacy on 
multiple fronts (Lounsbury 2001), shift identities (Lok 2010), or decouple means from ends 
(Bromley and Powell 2009). There is further cause to suggest that ERM will see little success of 
matching ‘paper to practice’ due to the interaction of different risks (Rothstein et al., 2006), rituals 
of verification (Power 1997), the risk management of nothing (Power 2009), and methodological 
challenges of ERM itself (Huber & Rothstein 2013). All of this points to a strong indication that 
the PLA will demonstrate what is described as ‘organisational conservatism’ when faced with the 
responding to the implementation of ERM. In demonstrating this notion of organisational 
conservatism, it is expected that that various departments of the PLA will see to conserve their 
‘technical core’ and also reinforce their identities as a means to increase in organisational legitimacy. 
Further to this, it can be anticipated that the interaction between identities and logics may work to 
subsequently legitimise a wide range of organisational norms, rationales and practices, of which risk 
management is one. It is with the introduction of the above concepts of institutional pluralism, 
decoupling, and identities, one can begin to understand how organisations use various 
institutionalised relationships to make sense of the world around them and in doing so, guide and 
shape what are appropriate courses of action.  
 
Furthermore, the literature review also reveals a gap in current understandings ofERM as it 
transpires in-situ. What are the actual costs and benefits for organisations that adopt ERM and can 




ERM practices actually be expected to reflect a ‘reality’? The current organisational literatures 
reviewed above provide the opportunity to gain greater understanding and more nuanced account 
of some of the mechanics behind theories like risk colonization, the creation of fantasy documents 
and the exploration of how organisations come to ‘risk manage everything’.  
Moreover, the literature on the sociology of organisations stands to be expanded on. Here, 
knowledge gaps on how the organisations respond, absorb and modify institutionalised practices 
can be filled. At a micro-level, what is actually involved in the decoupling of risk management 
practices from risk management policy, as well as ERM’s means from its ends? Furthermore, 
considering the subjective nature of how risk objects are constructed, identity may have a role to 
play at the individual, departmental and organisational level. The idea of ‘who one is’ could logically 
influence what risks become more or less relevant. As such, gaining access to the variety of 
narratives that are being constructed by the actions, documents and discussion that constitute the 
practice of ERM at the PLA, is paramount in order to present new scientific insights. In achieving 
the above, the research study aims to answer the stated research question of: How and why does 







Chapter 3 Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
The first two chapters of this thesis served to highlight the significance of the identified research 
problem, that of public sector organisations seeking to introduce ERM style approaches to risk 
management. A review of the literature focused on how ERM has come to assume such a 
legitimising role within organisational settings. It presented the past academic findings that 
demonstrate how organisations manage risk is dependent on a range of organisational arrangements 
and institutional dynamics. The literature review also suggested the benefits of applying a neo-
institutionalism lens in order to further understand how organisational logics and technologies 
shape, and are shaped by, the ongoing need to legitimise an organisation’s existence. However, 
what now becomes fascinating is how does introducing such an all-encompassing way of 
constructing, communicating, and responding to organisational threats, adverse events and 
consequences challenge, reinforce or change their pre-existing ways of understanding risk and 
themselves? Moving on from the previous two chapters, the third chapter is used to present an 
appropriate research approach, design, data collection method that could be seen to best generate 
new knowledge about the research topic. 
The goal of this research is to undertake a micro-level (i.e. sub-organisational) analysis of the 
dynamics associated with operationalising an enterprise risk management system by the PLA. 
Although the PLA has only recently adopted a formalised organisation-wide approach to managing 
risk, it can be argued that it has been applying a range of formal and informal tools and techniques 
to manage risk since the organisation’s inception over a hundred years ago. In acknowledging this, 
what becomes of interest is, will the PLA use the formal practice to simply gain legitimacy or will 
ERM actually challenges pre-existing rationales and ways of operating? Do employees 
reconceptualise existing procedures as now being representative of formal risk management 
activities or does the introduction of actually ERM generate new risk controls and ways of 
responding to long-standing issues? Does this ‘uniform’ approach to managing risk differentially 
manifest across the various functional areas of the organisation, and if so, how? And lastly, does the 
PLA conserve its technical core and if so, what role does its identity play in achieving this? In order 
to begin to explore these questions, an appropriate approach to the conducting the research.   
3.2  Research Aims and Approach  
The research sets out to discover, and locate within existing theory, the nature of one organisation’s 
experience of introducing a formalised, enterprise-wide approach to managing societal and 
institutional risks. This research study is focused on management processes common to an 
increasing number of public sector regulatory agencies (Power 2004) and in doing so, explores the 
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internal dynamics associated with managing both societal and organisational risks. It is the ‘typical’ 
nature of the organisationally legitimising adoption of ERM that is to be explored. The study also is 
focused on exploring the initial organisational reaction to ERM. In this regard, the research is 
looking to capture how the adoption of ERM is challenged or supported by the pre-existing risk 
management practices and organisational arrangements. Since its inception, the PLA’s daily 
operations have been focused on reducing accidents on the river, promoting economic growth and 
keeping its employees out of harm’s way. Many of these activities have already been interpreted as 
‘risks to be managed’, so what, if anything can the introduction of an enterprise-wide approach 
offer the organisation? 
In regards to focusing on the organisation’s response to ERM, the study is also concerned with 
how this reaction may vary across the sub-organisational units. Historically, the bulk of neo-
institutional organisational analysis focuses on how practices vary across a field rather than an 
individual organisation. This lack of research knowledge may have persisted partly because of 
significant practical and conceptual obstacles to addressing it. Obstacles include gaining access to 
what is often seen as sensitive information; obtaining and holding the confidence of a respondent 
organisation; and demonstrating sufficient authority and knowledge to maintain respondents’ full 
trust and co-operation throughout the duration of a study. In overcoming this, the outcome of this 
research is a micro-level account of the institutional dynamics of implementing an enterprise-wide 
risk management framework. 
In order to explore the PLAs response to ERM, the following research question is used to 
guide and shape the study: 
 
How and why do different areas of a public organisation respond to the introduction of 
an enterprise-wide approach to risk management? 
 
There are numerous ways of structuring an academic inquiry into how and why an organisation 
practices risk management. However, in order to generate new knowledge and novel findings, the 
approach should enable an exploration at the level of sub-organisational units (i.e. departments), as 
at the individual employee level. These ‘micro-level’ dynamics are representative of the interactions 
and interpretations of what it actually means to manage risk through an enterprise-wide approach.  
3.2.1 Adopting a Qualitative Approach  
The decision here to pursue a qualitative, rather than quantitative, approach follows directly from 
the nature of the research question. Quantitative methods are well suited to speak to capture 
amounts and frequencies, and typically when there are a great number of cases that are involved 
(Darlington & Scott 2002). However, this research is concerned with attributing meanings to 
actions and the understanding of organisational behaviour and formal responses to risk. As such, 
the ‘analytic induction’ offered by qualitative approach is best suited to this research study 
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(Flowerdew & Martin 2005). Why and how the organisation practices risk management is 
influenced by a complex interaction between an organisation’s composition (structure, culture and 
function) and its institutional environment. The socio-cultural dynamics across different areas of an 
organisation work to guide and shape an actor’s understanding of what constitutes a risk and how 
best to respond to it. As such, successfully exploring these interrelated issues would appear to be 
less suited to quantitative approach and rather, more amenable to data generated by qualitative 
means, such as semi-structured interviews, document analysis, and observing participants in-situ.  
Denzin and Lincoln (2011:3) define qualitative research as “a situated activity that locates the 
observer in the world and consists of a set of interpretive, materials practices that make the world 
visible” but note that each practice makes the world visible in a different way. Description in the 
qualitative research realm is not achieved by simplifying observed phenomena but by studying and 
representing them in as many dimensions and layers as their multi-faceted forms take (Leedy & 
Omrod 2011). The importance of adopting a qualitative approach to research in this study is that, 
as Winchester and Dunn (2010:7) point out, “The experiences of individuals and the meanings of 
events and places cannot necessarily be generalized, but they do constitute part of a multifaceted 
and fluid reality. Qualitative geographical research tends to emphasize multiple meanings and 
interpretations rather than seeking to impose any one ‘dominant’ or ‘correct’ interpretation”. As 
this research looks to understand risk management from the PLA’s point of view, a qualitative 
approach that is sympathetic to the multifaceted nature of reality is key; a significant facet being 
that of the researcher’s own views and role in regards to the creation of knowledge about the 
phenomenon. 
3.3 Case Study Design 
In adopting the qualitative research methodology, a case study design was seen as best way to 
compliment the inquiry. The study design entails a single case (the PLA), and will use sub-
organisational units based on departmental functions as ‘embedded’ unit of analysis. In describing 
what constitutes a case study, Yin (2009) proposes a two-part technical definition. The first part 
being that “… investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context 
and that the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident”. The second 
part identifies a case study as “relying on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to 
converge in a triangulating fashion, and as another result benefits from the prior development of 
theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis.” (Yin 2009:18). In conceiving of the 
case study method in this way, it distinguishes case studies as the appropriate manner in which to 
understand the real-life phenomena of managing risk in the PLA that accounts for the 
organisation’s contextual circumstances. The second part of the definition addresses the need to 
acknowledge this relationship and to account for it in the collection and analysis of the data. It 
represents the case-study as not simply a data collection and analysis technique but as an aligned 
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and over-arching method that can be used to address both practical, ‘real-life’ problems as well as 
useful in testing, expanding or generating theoretical concepts (Baxter 2010). 
In identifying what makes a good case study, it is really driven more by the types of questions a 
researcher is seeking to answer and less by the phenomenon in question. Case studies are especially 
well-suited to research targeted on a specific single organization, as its design allows the researcher 
to overcome issues pertaining to generalizability by emphasising analytical and theoretical 
dimensions over that of the more traditional statistical generalizability. As Vaus (2001:237) explains, 
“theoretical generalization involves generalizing from a study to a theory. Rather than asking what a 
study tells us about the wider population (statistical generalization), we ask what the study tells us 
about a specific theory. Case study designs are fundamentally theoretical. They are designed to help 
develop and refine theories”. 
Perhaps the most significant criticisms of researching a single case study is that a single 
occurrence is in no way representative of a general theory. Flyvbjerg (2006) seeks to dispel this and 
other myths about the validity of case study research in demonstrating the importance of learning 
from single occurrences. Flyvbjerg (2006:222) posits that although rule-based conceptions are a 
very powerful component of human knowledge, expertise is represented by an individual who: “… 
operates on the basis of intimate knowledge … Such knowledge and expertise also lie at the centre 
of the case study as a research and teaching method or … as a method of learning.” It is through 
the building of rich, detailed, and intimate accounts of single instances that expert knowledge of a 
subject can be amassed. As such, this case study looks to contribute to that building of knowledge 
through its nuanced account of ERM introduction into a single organisation.  
The identification of a suitable single case study for this research study was facilitated through 
King’s Centre for Risk Management, in that the PLA had recently sought advice regarding its 
efforts to operationalise its newly formed enterprise-wide risk management programme. In 
exploring this further, the researcher identified the PLA as an excellent case study candidate and the 
organisation was receptive to the idea of being open to participating in the research. The case of 
risk management at the PLA presents an opportunity to research a well-established organisation 
whose long-term intra-disciplinary risk management profile highlights the interplay of a pluralistic 
institutional organisational environment. Although the PLA’s core task is centred on the risks 
posed to navigational safety, it must balance them with the competing factors associated with a 
fluctuating global economy, rapid technological advancements and increasing demands for 
evidenced-based decision-making. All of this sets up the PLA to be an excellent case study 
candidate. However, this is not to say that this case does not present limitations or constraints that 
must be acknowledged and accounted for in order to ensure that a factual and true presentation of 
the phenomena is captured. 
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3.3.1 Accounting for Reflexivity and Personal Bias 
The term reflexivity has been applied to identify “the awareness of the researcher practicing 
research and the way this is influenced by the object of the research, enabling the researcher to 
acknowledge the way in which he/she affects both the process and the outcomes” (Haynes 
2012:72). In defining it in this way, Haynes acknowledges how a researcher’s methodological 
conduct and theoretical pre-understandings influence the way in which findings and conclusions are 
interpreted. Reflexivity can be seen to take place at a variety of levels throughout the research 
process, from the theoretical and methodological to the ontological through to the emotional and 
subjective. What is important is to account for this process as it transpires during the research 
process via comprehensive fieldwork notes, acknowledging theoretical assumptions about the 
subject and to record relevant thoughts and feelings about the overall process in general. 
Johnson and Duberley (2003) outline three positions a researcher can assume in regards to 
reflexive approaches to management research.  The authors describe a purely realist/objectivist, a 
purely subjectivist and a hybrid realist/subjectivist approach to reflexivity that highlight the 
importance of accounting for the relationship between researcher and subject. As this researcher 
assumes a social constructionist approach to epistemology and leans more to a realist view of 
ontology, the authors suggest that in this instance “key role of reflexivity is to negate the world as 
an objectively accessible social reality and denaturalize hegemonic accounts by exposing their 
modes of social organization and reproduction” (Johnson & Duberley 2003:1289). For 
management studies, they suggest that the researcher is positioned in a role of facilitator, tasked 
with reinterpreting an organisation’s problems in new ways. The subsequent texts generated by this 
reinterpreting process “…become the basis for reflexive action by enabling the development of 
knowledge and transformative strategies that are practically adequate for coping with and resolving 
an [organisation’s] own problems” (Johnson & Duberley:1292). 
3.4 Data Collection and Analysis 
In regards to case study research design, Yin (2009) identifies four types of validity a researcher 
should be concerned with: construct; internal; external; and reliability. Construct validity relates to 
correctly identifying the operational measures and is ensured by relying on multiple sources of 
evidence and then linking them together. Internal validity relates to being able to support that 
cause-effect type relationships developed through explanation building analyses directly to that of 
the collected data. Additionally, it must be able to address and/or refute rival theories of 
explanation. As noted above by Flyvbjerg (2006), external validity for single case studies such as 
this one require analytical generalizations to be linked to theory. Finally, reliability must be ensured 
through the researcher to design the research in such a way that if another investigator followed the 
same procedures they would arrive at the same findings and conclusion.  
By collecting primary data from three different sources the researcher looks to achieve a data 
triangulation that will enhance the research study’s validity. The first set of data was generated 
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through the review of risk management related reports and documentation. Examples of this type 
of data include processes of risk identification, analysis and reporting behaviours, such as risk 
registers, policy documents and monitoring reports; supporting policy and internal guidance on risk 
policies and more generic and informal risk reporting mechanisms such as the PLA’s annual report 
to stakeholders; as well as broader organisational operating procedures and handbooks. The second 
set of data was generated by directly interviewing those employees involved with managing risk. 
This primarily focused on all employees who had been identified as members of the ERM risk 
committees, as they were directly responsible for operationalising the programme. And thirdly, data 
was collected through participant observation of actual risk managing activities in which employees 
identified, analysed, and/or responded to risk during their daily activities e.g. meetings, pilotage 
activities, inspections and reporting practices. A thorough record of contextual details that 
surrounded each department, including information about the physical environment and any 
historical, economic, and social factors, was also sought, contingent on availability. 
3.4.1 Document Review 
The first source of data was generated through the reviewing risk management documents. The 
documentation that pertains to answering the questions of this research study was represented 
through formal risk management policies, risk registers identifying risks, risk assessments that serve 
to rate and rank risks as well as any monitoring or directly associated communication reports such 
as quarterly updates and even PowerPoint presentations. The intent behind reviewing these specific 
documents was to analyse how people are constructing and using documents to ‘officially’ capture, 
communicate and monitor the risk. This is done to not only show how closely aligned they are to 
the institutionalised description of risk management practices outlined in the international and 
national standards and guides but to also provide an understanding of how they articulate risk and 
where their values lie. The documentation allowed for cross-referencing of the oral accounts of 
how risk is and was managed at the PLA. 
A thorough review of available documents was conducted. In regards to risk management 
specific documentation, the researcher was able to gain access to five risk registers, a newly 
introduced ‘ERM’ risk policy, the risk management framework, risk committee terms of reference 
and membership, as well as some project specific risk assessments. Other available documentation 
that demonstrated their communication of risk, such as annual reports, and official 
communications (e.g. notice to mariners). Lastly, a review of statutory guidance documentation and 
legislative requirements, as well as sector-specific literature such as best practice documents and 
International Standards Organisation material provided insight into what ‘professionalised’ 
conceptions of risk management were being relied upon by the organisation.   
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3.4.2 Pilot Interviews 
Three pilot interviews were conducted with the PLA’s Chairman, the Legal Secretary, and the Head 
of Risk Management in order to explore the viability of the organisation as a possible case study as 
well as to gauge their receptiveness and interest in participating. These key ‘gate-keepers’ to the 
PLA served to confirm the suitability of the organisation. After a series of discussions, the 
management team pledged their full support of the project and welcomed the opportunity to 
participate. In addition to confirming access to the organisation, the initial interviews provided 
insight into the general status of the organisation’s risk management programme. A draft corporate 
risk register was also reviewed and provided insight into the organisation’s current 
conceptualisation of the key risk areas it is required to manage.  
Based on this initial exploration, it was decided that the best approach would be to use the 
PLA as a primary unit of analysis and to then identify sub-organisational units of analysis in order 
to deepen the exploration. As such, three sub-organisational units were identified that represented 
the functional areas of the organisation; Navigational Safety, Marine Services, and Administrative 
Services. In sectioning the PLA in regards to the type of work each area was focused on, allowed 
for cultural, functional and structural delineations to be made more easily. For example, Navigation 
Safety was primarily concerned with the risks posed to, and stemming from, the safe travel of 
public and commercial river traffic. Marine Services was concerned with the threats to the safety of 
staff, operational efficiencies, and maintaining infrastructure. And lastly, Administrative Services 
represented the corporate functions common to most organisations such as Finance, Human 
Resources, Legal, and Corporate Affairs. Carving up the risks in this manner also allowed for a 
clearer separation between societal and organisational risks.  
3.4.3 Semi-Structured Interviews 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with those employees who have a close working 
relationship with the identified risk categories. Dunn (2010) describes three types of interview 
methods most commonly relied upon when collecting qualitative data in an organizational setting; 
structured, semi-structured, and unstructured.  Structured interviewing delivers carefully worded 
questions in a precise and ordered manner to each respondent in as close to an identical manner as 
possible. In this regard, structured interviews lend themselves more to quantitative studies, in that 
they solicit more objective ‘yes/no’ types of responses. In contrast to this, semi-structured 
interviewing provides a more flexible and exploratory approach to the line of questioning that 
allows for the uncovering of contextual elements that may have influenced the respondent’s 
answers. Unstructured interviewing is where interview subjects provide an oral history that is 
prompted by a unique set of questions relevant to each participant. As such, semi-structured 
interviews were deemed the most appropriate given the need to explore the participants’ 
understanding of how and why to manage risk balanced with the need to guide and focus the 
discussion. 
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Although the PLA’s risk management policy states that all employees have a role in managing 
risk, employees were selected based on their role having a primary and direct impact on the risk (i.e 
an accountant would not be suitable to represent the management of an environmental pollution 
risk). The purpose of these interviews was to generate narrative accounts of the employees’ past 
and present experiences in managing the identified risks. Questions were designed to uncover the 
rationales behind the actions they undertake to manage risk, what is organisationally expected of 
them, and what tools and technologies were available to support those behaviours. The discussions 
focused on what the staff saw as the underlying values the organisation supports and if this had 
changed over time.   
A total of 41 interviews were conducted with 37 individuals. This provided a representative 
sample that included the majority of individuals that were tasked with operationalising the formal, 
enterprise-wide approach to risk management. The goal here was to acquire interview data from a 
representative population of those employees across the entire organisation who were directly 
involved in operationalizing the risk management framework. Each interview was on average 60 
minutes in length and were conducted face-to-face at the PLA’s offices at Gravesend, Denton Warf 
and Trinity House. Each semi-structured interview comprised 20 to 25 open-ended questions and 
were grouped into three sections. The number of questions asked varied due to the fact that in 
providing comprehensive answers, interviewees sometimes gave responses that spoke directly 
subsequent questions.  The first set of questions warmed up the interviewee through asking about 
their past career(s), what brought them to the PLA and what their current role was about. The 
second set then explored their understanding of enterprise risk management and the types of risks 
currently facing the organisation. The third set of questions then dove deeper into the mechanics 
and techniques that they relied on, how they had been introduced to, and asked to practice, 
enterprise risk management, and what challenge they faced in managing risks – through either their 
existing methods or through the new tools and processes associated with the formal program. The 
interviews then closed with an opportunity for the interviewee to expand on any of their responses 
or to speak to anything they felt might be relevant but didn’t get the chance to discuss.   
Four follow-up interviews were conducted with select individuals based on the complexity and 
findings of the initial interview. The follow-up interviews allowed for more in-depth responses that 
related to specific examples given during the first interview, such as risk-based HR strategies as well 
as emerging safety issues on the river that developed over the course of the case study. Three 
interviews were held outside of these PLA-based locations due to the interviewees roles in external 
organisations. Specifically, this was the external consultant hired to aid the implementation of the 
risk management framework, a member of PLA Board of Directors, and lastly, a Harbour Master 
from an alternate Port Authority, used to provide an external validation of the general issues and 
conceptions of risks being faced by the PLA. 
Data was gathered by the researcher sitting with each respondent, with their express consent, 
recording their responses. Each interview was recorded and transcribed by the researcher. Text 
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transcription was to enable various analyses including highlighting of key recurrent themes and uses 
of vocabulary; drawing analogies and observing patterns between different respondent accounts; 
and selective highlighting of personal narratives representing the lived experience of managing risk 
within the organisational setting. Field notes supplemented the interviewing processes and used as 
means to highlight specific portions of the audio file for future reference. All respondents gave 
consent for their words to be quoted on condition that persons would not be identified by name. 
Analysis of the data does not disclose specific sources although the nature of each respondent’s 
organisational position is sometimes evident from their response content, for example when 
describing a management strategy to deal with a specific type of organisational issue. 
3.4.4 Passive Participant Observations 
The third and final source of data was that of passive participant observations. Here the researcher 
assumes a passive by-stander position and looks to view the practice of risk management first hand 
and in action. Time and place form the essence of geographical research and observing the current 
practice of risk management within the bounds of the organization is critical data to collect. Here 
the researcher looks to gain complementary evidence that supplements the data collected from 
interviews and documents (Kearns 2010). The researcher sought out opportunities to observe key 
activities identified within the documents and interviews (e.g. risk assessment workshops) so as to 
observe the practice as it transpires. The intent is not for the researcher to immerse into the 
organizational environment but rather to remain a complete observer and view the action in a ‘fly 
on the wall’ style manner. The observer will be able to engage participants throughout the process 
to seek clarity on process and intent. The selection of participants to be observed will be 
determined through the interview and document analysis portions of the research. The goal of the 
observations is to compare the findings of the rationales and technologies with that of how it then 
actually transpires in an operational setting.  
Throughout the course of the study, seven specific instances were made available to the 
researcher that provided for the collection of participant observations. Three of these were in the 
form of public meetings that were routinely held every four months as a means of updating the 
public as to the status of current operations relevant to their local areas, as well as serving as an 
opportunity to discuss any issues, concerns or risks that they felt needed further attention from the 
PLA. There were also two opportunities to attend three internal meetings at the PLA that were 
specific to the process of managing risk. A Navigational Management Team meeting, that was held 
monthly, was attended. These meetings were used to review a ‘rolling-list’ of navigational hazards. 
A group meeting of the ‘internal risk register’ owners was attended in which they reviewed the list 
of risks they had assembled via the aide of an external consultant. And lastly, a meeting between the 
Chief Risk Officer and the Executive Board was witnessed in which an update was provided on the 
status and progress of the risk management program. The last of the seven participant observations 
was that of a risk management workshop focused on some enhanced risk management analysis 
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software used by the staff of the Navigational Safety department which was offered by the 
developers of the software program.  
In addition to the specific instances noted above, the researcher was also afforded desk space 
within the Gravesend head office. Starting in August of 2013 and lasting the period of a year, the 
researcher was able to work from a desk located in the navigational safety offices and was granted 
access to walk freely throughout the organisation’s offices. This provided the opportunity to 
overhear conversations and phone calls between employees that quite often mentioned, if not 
revolved around, the need to address specific risks. It also allowed the researcher to ask clarifying 
questions in relation to the documents reviews as well as those that arose during the interview 
transcriptions. Lastly, it was also helpful in that it gave the researcher the ability to truly get a sense 
of what daily life was like within the organisation, how different hierarchies were playing out, and to 
substantiate the cultural and institutional elements of ‘family’ that so often arose in the descriptions 
provided by employees seeking to describe what it was like to work at the PLA.   
3.4.5 Ethical Considerations  
Great care was taken to ensure the research adhered to King’s College London’s (KCL) ethical 
guidelines. This speaks to the need for securing voluntary participation and informed consent 
supporting the purpose of the study; not putting participants at risk, and preventing harm; 
protecting and respecting privacy; and presenting respondents’ views accurately (Creswell 2003). In 
line with current practice at KCL, ethical considerations were addressed with care. As the research 
involved the participation of humans, approval was sought from, and granted, by KCL’s ethics 
office. In the practical context of the interview, ethical considerations were handled in a 
conventional manner: Each respondent was sent, and approved before giving an interview, a letter 
of ethical undertaking (see Appendix B). This letter follows the standard required of all 
postgraduate researchers for KCL, with details specific to the present research project, and was 
lodged with the college’s ethics office before fieldwork commenced. Given the potentially sensitive 
nature of the risks, and the associated management activities, that were being discussed, care was 
taken to anonymise respondents as best as possible. All interviewees re-confirmed that they were 
content to be quoted on condition of anonymity. However, it was agreed upon with the PLA that 
the organisation itself would not be anonymised in order to provide relevant, geographic, context 
and historical background that would be highly relevant to the management of risk. Respondents 
were also given assurances on confidentiality of records, including secure storage of data; that audio 
and transcribed data are to be destroyed on completion of the research project; and that 
transcriptions and other work-in-progress analyses will themselves be stripped of any identifying 
features (e.g. “P11”). For research integrity, original data remained open to research supervisors’ 
access whilst this dissertation was being compiled.  
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3.5 Data Analysis 
The analysis of data associated with case study research can be conducted in a variety of ways. 
Leedy and Ormrod (2011:141) emphasise the need to logically organise facts about the case; 
categorise data into meaningful groups; examine data in relation to their specific meaning to the 
case; scrutinise interpretations for underlying themes; and, to be able draw conclusions that may 
have implications beyond the specific case that has been studied. Yin (2009) provides guidance on 
data analysis by recommending five techniques: pattern matching; explanation building; time-series 
analysis; logic models; and, cross-case synthesis. Yin (2009:130) also describes the significance of 
adopting an appropriate data analysis strategy and corresponding technique that will allow the 
researcher to “treat the evidence fairly, produce compelling analytic conclusions, and rule out 
alternative interpretations”. In keeping with Yin’s recommendation, a combination of explanation 
and Leedy and Ormrod’s (2011) analytic approach to case studies was adopted. In doing so, this 
meant that while the researcher examined the evidence, theoretical positions were revised, and the 
evidence was examined again from the newly created perspective. The final result was a set of 
findings that are fully supported by relevant data and are defensible. The following provides an 
overview of how the 5-stage process was followed: 
 
1. Organization of details: Data from the transcribed texts, field note observations and 
documents were reviewed in organised.  
2. Categorization of data: The data were then categorised into meaningful groups such as ‘telling 
stories about risks’, ‘professional judgment’ or ‘assessing risk’.  
3. Interpretation of single instances: Specific instances or ‘one-off’ occurrences of data, such as a 
vendor risk assessment workshop on a new software offering, were reviewed to understand 
if they could yield any specific insights. 
4. Identification of patterns: The data was scrutinized in order to identify underlying themes and 
other patterns that could characterize the case more broadly than a single piece of 
information can reveal. The completion of this step underwent a series of revisions as new 
data were collected and further insights were gained. 
5. Synthesis and generalizations: This resulted in the overall ‘portrait’ of the case being developed 
and, grounded within the literature, painted the picture of ‘organisational conservatism’ 
that was being demonstrated by the PLA.  
 
As risks are characterised by the probability and impact of specific unwanted events, the semi-
structured interview questions often generated recollections about either things that people didn’t 
want to go wrong or stories about things that had gone wrong i.e. accidents and failures. Stories 
were also identified that related to the history of the organisation, intra-departmental working 
relationships, as well as interactions with the public and industry. The use of stories to capture and 
communicated risk information is significant in that “They do not present information or facts 
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about ‘events’, but they enrich, enhance, and infuse facts with meaning” (Gabriel 2000:135). The 
analysis of stories associated with the perceived and realised risks embedded within them, provided 
significant insight into the organisation’s underlying values and culture. 
In the second stage of the analysis, three initial broad categories - cultural, functional and 
structural - were used to classify the data and describe the different organisational dimensions that 
ERM was transpiring. The data was then categorised according to various themes within the 
management literature such as ‘decoupling practice from policy’ or ‘risk assessment techniques’. 
This process was iterative insofar as it helped refine the analysis of transcripts, in turn yielding more 
nuanced underlying themes.  
For example, the following excerpt from Chapter 7 speaks to the embedded meanings that the 
‘risk story’ contained: 
“We introduced a warning system much like football – yellow means warning, red is a dismissal. Once 
you’ve got one group forced to adhere to a policy, they then look around and go ‘why are that bunch of people not 
wearing life jackets’. And in fact, that’s what they did. They would take photographs and I would get 
photographs of people not wearing lifejackets and they would say, ‘what are you going to do about these people? 
If you’re willing to force it [on] us, force it on other people” (P4) 
Here, not only are the broader themes of river safety, risk assessment and risk identification 
present, but the accompanying story sheds light on the hierarchical power dynamics, allocation of 
responsibility (i.e. risk ownership) and governmentality that shaped the values and expectations of 
the organisation. The third stage of the analysis provided the ability to highlight and explore any 
single instances of data being assigned to a stand-alone category to ensure they were not part of any 
broader related theme.  The continued refinement of each of the groups and themes helped identify 
the patterned ways in which the PLA was implementing ERM across the various departments (i.e. 
stage 4 of the analysis). These patterns spoke to issues like the cultural preferences of the Marine 
Services department to adopt an individualist stance when operationalising ERM, or the tendency 
of the Administrative Services department to externalise many of the risks they were tasked with 
managing. The generalisations began to articulate and support the findings that relate to 
organisational decoupling, the role of identity in managing risks, and how the tools and techniques 
of ERM are repurposed to achieve much different ends than the means were originally intended to 
produce.   
3.6 Chapter Summary 
The intent of this chapter has been to outline why the PLA was a good case study to explore a 
public organisation’s response to the implementation of ERM. The unique data set enclosed within 
the people, rationales, technologies and activities that comprise the organisation speak directly to 
the challenges of operationalizing a risk management process from a regulator’s perspective. The 
proposed strategy assumes that a qualitative approach to data gathering that places an emphasis on 
participant and researcher reflexivity is critical in generating an accurate portrayal of the everyday 
  Chapter 3 Methodology 
 
 
  Page 53 
practice of risk management by the PLA. The design of the research is one of a single ‘embedded’ 
case study. It justifies the use of a single case method by stressing the difference between statistical 
and analytical generalizability. It triangulates sources from three primary sources of data; semi-
structured interviews, document reviews, and participant observation. An explanation-building 
approach to analysing the patterns present within the data will be used to develop a rich and multi-
layered analysis of how the Port of London Authority manages risk in the way that it does. 
Approaching the research in this manner will allow for accurate, interesting and novel perspective 
on the under-researched area of the practice of risk management by public organisations. 
In the next chapter, an overview of the chosen organisation for the case study is provided. It 
provides an introduction to how the organisation came to be and it’s how its relationship with risk 
management has evolved over its 100+ years in operation. It provides a picture of both the current 
operating context in which it now finds itself along with the constraints and challenges that are 
unique to its remit and organisational mandate. It also provides a brief synopsis of the current 
status of its risk management efforts along with some of the internal and external drivers that have 








Chapter 4 A Brief History and Background of the PLA 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter provides an introduction into the case study organisation. It reviews how the PLA 
came into existence, some notable historical events and developments, the organisation’s 
composition and governance structure, and some current-day organisational challenges and 
operating constraints. The chapter also provides the background context of what the current state 
of risk management is at the organisation, as well as some of the institutional and organisational 
drivers of the practice. The chapter concludes with a roadmap outlining the empirical, discussion 
and concluding chapters that follow it. The intent of this chapter is to set the scene as to some of 
the defining factors that support why the PLA is such a viable and rich source of data.  
4.2 What is the Historical Context of the PLA? 
Dating back to pre-Roman times, London was a port long before it ever became the thriving 
metropolis that it is known it to be today. Roman settlers quickly identified the significance of the 
geography with the Thames estuary in that it is directly opposite the mouths of Europe’s primary 
trade river channels providing ease of access deep into the continent (PLA 2014). Although the 
significant growth of the Port of London can be attributed to location, it was also the social, 
economic and financial wealth of the City that could support and sustain the port’s development. 
Steady increases in trade over the centuries has continually placed pressure on the port’s 
infrastructure in order to meet the demands of increasing vessel sizes. As London neared the end 
of the 18th century, port trade was doubling every 25 years with imports in 1792 into England 
amounting to £17,898,000 and exports to £23,674,000 (PLA 2014). The capabilities of the port 
were being exceeded, with some moorings that were originally built to accommodate 545 vessels 
now harbouring over 1700 (PLA 2014). It is safe to say that the conditions on the river, from a 
safety standpoint, were quickly deteriorating, as was the ability for ships to move their cargo in and 
out of the port.  
The combination of a rapidly expanding British Empire, an increase in the size and number of 
vessels associated with international trade, and the competing interests of the private wharves that 
populated the Thames’s riverbanks, began to threaten both the safety and productivity of the Port 
of London’s operation (Brown 1978). The port’s economic viability was further strained by a steady 
decline in trading with India along-side a series of droughts in Australia that directly impacted wool 
imports. In addition to this external risk of economic downturn, the situation became even further 
exacerbated by the fact that the independent docks were also dealing with issues much closer to 
home in the form of labour disputes and the dangers resulting from a longstanding lack of much 
needed infrastructure improvements (PLA 2015). The culmination of these pressures resulted in 
the Government announcing the introduction of a Royal Commission in 1899, which over a period 




of two years, executed a review of the administration of the port and was asked to suggest 
appropriate improvements to ensure the promotion of trade and to uphold the public interest (PLA 
2014). The Commission’s report in 1901 recommended the official formation of a unified port 
authority would be required in order to ensure the Port of London would remain competitive (i.e. 
efficient and effective) and that improvements to the river would occur when and where 
appropriate (GB 1902). However, the recommendations were not initially well received and it 
would take several attempts until the Port of London Act was finally passed in 1909 (Watson 2009), 
which charged the Port of London Authority with the conservancy of 95 miles of Thames 
waterway, from the locks at Teddington to the North Sea (See figure 4-1). 
Figure 4.1: Map of PLA Jurisdiction: Teddington Lock to Thames Estuary. 
 
As much as the newly minted PLA would seek to impose order and structure to the 
increasingly chaotic river environment, it was not soon after that significant labour issues would 
bubble up to the surface. Although the resources allotted to the much-needed significant 
improvement of port infrastructure resulted in increasing international trade, the labour force soon 
began to question if they were receiving their fair share of the increased profitability of the port 
(Brown 1978). As such, the unionised dockworkers would conduct two major strikes between 1911 
and 1912 and although the PLA had limited ability to directly impact the working conditions 
present in the private docks, an agreement was eventually drafted. A considerable lack of trust was 
generated by the first strike and within the year, the workers were back on the picket lines after an 
inter-union dispute. From an early age, the PLA was forced to recognise the critical role that front-
line staff played in not only keeping ships afloat on the river but for revenue coming through its 
doors. 
The PLA has been forced to dramatically shift its operational focus on more than one occasion 
as well. The port has played a significant role in both World Wars, with substantial operational 
impacts being caused by a lack of available workers, loss of key infrastructure due to bombing, and 
dramatically reduced revenue from impacted trading routes (PLA 2015). Upon the completion of 
post-war building efforts, the significant rise in tonnage of the 1960’s gave way to what is perhaps 
the most significant threat the PLA has faced – technology. As a result of their lack of anticipation 
of modern container shipping, between the mid-60’s and 1980, one by one, the enclosed docks 
under the PLA’s jurisdiction would close due to lack of adequate infrastructure to accept the new 




containers. In addition to losing the physical ability to service the shipping industry, the docks were 
further crippled by the post WWII National Dock Scheme, which among other things, guaranteed 
unionised dockworkers a weekly wage. The financial burdens reached a breaking point at the end of 
the 1970’s when the port effectively reached insolvency. Government intervention in the form of 
grant money, as well as a voluntary severance scheme helped ease the financial constraints imposed 
by a surplus workforce and the PLA saw its staffing numbers more than halve from 3,245 in 1984 
to less than 1,500 just two years later (Watson 2009). However, despite the signification reduction 
in staff, as well as the financial buoyancy provided by government aid, the PLA was still facing 
considerable challenges in dealing with the implications that accompanied the technologically 
driven change. 
In addition to the direct economic implications, the advent of containerisation marked a new 
emerging class of operational risks to do with the suitability of existing infrastructure that the PLA 
hadn’t been forced to consider before. For example, as there were still berths left that were able to 
service containers, the ships now travelling the Thames were bigger, faster and more plentiful in 
numbers (Brown 1978). The pre-existing tools and technologies being utilised by the PLA to 
monitor traffic, survey the riverbed and direct traffic were simply not built to handle the newly 
enhanced capabilities of vessels. As navigational safety is a primary function of the PLA, the 
organisation had little choice but rapidly develop and acquire state-of-the-art technology that could 
manage the pace of change. Technological advances such as radio, radar, and weather reporting 
stations, had been implemented from the 1940’s onwards, all of which increased the ability of the 
PLA to service its industry. However, much like an error-inducing environment outlined by Perrow 
(1984) and Downer (2011) these innovative technologies also had the potential to increase system 
complexity and reduce the margins for navigational error.  
One example has been the introduction of precise computer-aided measuring capabilities by 
the hydrography department, which has considerably reduced the margins for error in accounting 
for appropriate keel depth along the river. The imprecision accompanying older, lead-line 
technology used to measure river depth, forced vessel operators to use buffers to account for 
improper measurements. Now, however, the confidence that accompanies computer measurements 
runs the risk of providing a false sense of security, with operators relying on centimetres of 
clearance when navigating the river.  In 1986, the existing data management system for the river 
was linked with modern radar technology to produce a vessel traffic management system (VTS), 
much like those used by air traffic controllers. Despite all of these advancements, however, in 1989 
the PLA bore witness to one of the largest peacetime loss-of-life incidents of that century when a 
passenger vessel – the Marchioness- and a dredger collided (Watson 2009). 
The sinking of the Marchioness is perhaps the most significant navigational safety incident that 
the PLA has ever experienced. On the night of August 20, 1989, the passenger vessel, collided with 
the Bowbelle, a dredger, resulting in the loss of 51 lives. An immediate investigation conducted by 
the Marine Accident Investigation Branch of the Department of Transportation found that the root 




cause lay with the failure of the captain of the Bowbelle to maintain a proper lookout (MIAB 1989). 
The PLA was required to further bolster its navigational aids by installing automatic warning lights 
on 19 bridges along the Thames. Increasing public pressure arising over concern and criticisms 
regarding the handling and identification of the deceased resulted in a second formal investigation, 
that was to review the entire incident again. However, this second inquiry found any criticisms of 
the PLA to be unfounded and came to the “…clear view that the PLA is an entirely suitable 
authority to continue to be responsible for the regulation of navigation on the Thames.” (Clarke 
1999:63). In providing ‘lessons learned’ from the incident, a recommendation was made that the 
PLA should issue formal warnings regarding the need to address the issue of limited forward 
visibility and the ability of a forward lookout to communicate with a Captain in the wheelhouse. 
However, this factor was not seen to play a role in the Marchioness incident in that the PLA had 
given the captain the of the Bowbelle a verbal warning, however it was not documented in the 
formal fashion that the report recommended (Clarke 1999).  
The subsequent years following the tragic Marchioness incident signalled a definable shift to 
the PLA’s approach to ensuring the safety of navigation. To manage these risks, a Safety 
Management System (SMS) was developed and is now used to manage, monitor and assess the risks 
on the River. As much as international trade dominates the type of traffic seen on the Thames 
waterway, public use of the river for leisure activities continues to grow and these two competing 
interests for access to the waterway remain the paramount concern. Having to deal with the public 
perception of risk, and the public opinion on how the organisation is managing them, indicates an 
emerging reputational risk that requires alternate strategies to mitigate its potentially damaging 
consequences. For example, the public’s expectation to have free access to the river despite 
dangerous conditions or location, such as in during times of dangerously fast fluvial flows or using 
stand up paddle boards in areas of high commercial traffic (see chapter 6). In these instances, 
research suggests there is chance that the PLA will begin become preoccupied with the reputational 
risks arising from the need to manage navigational safety risks (Power et al, 2009). These issues will 
be expanded upon in the empirical chapters that follow.  
The venerable age of the PLA now places the organisation as an almost taken-for-granted 
entity in regards to the operation of the ports, river users and vessel traffic and riparian boroughs 
that comprise its stakeholder base. The PLA’s ability to weather a variety of physical, economic and 
social ‘storms’ is a testament to its ability to resist and overcome a variety of un-foreseen events. 
However, how is the PLA now positioned when it comes to a world that demands increased 
accountability, transparent decision-making models and anticipatory regulatory frameworks that 
have the ability to not only identify, but also mitigate possible risks to a level that can be regarded 
as acceptable by a wide range of diverse stakeholders? 




4.3 What is the Present-Day Structure and Context of the PLA? 
Today, the UK port industry is the second largest in Europe and now handles over 500 million tons 
of cargo each year and over 60 million passenger journeys (BPA 2015). In the UK, there are three 
types or categories of ports: private, municipal and trust, of which the PLA is the latter. In being 
one of the over 100 remaining trust ports that have not been privatized, this type of statutory body 
does not have independent owners nor are they accountable to shareholders. Instead, the PLA is 
required to reinvest any surplus back into the port for the benefit of all its stakeholders. 
Stakeholders are classified into two categories – beneficiary and non-beneficiary. The former 
represents those who benefit directly from the use of the trust facilities, such as owners/operators 
of vessels and port employees. The latter represents a broader range of individuals with indirect 
interests in the port, such as local authorities, Government, special interest groups, and members of 
the public to name but a few (DFT 2000). Being a trust port thus presents the PLA with a specific 
set of complex challenges when it comes to managing risk and the societal expectations that comes 
with an increased level of accountability to wide range of stakeholders. 
Under the Port of London Act, the PLA is charged with taking such action as is necessary for 
the improvement and conservancy of the tidal Thames. To discharge this duty the PLA works to 
facilitate navigational safety through a range of activities including: the operation of a Vessel Traffic 
Service – i.e. air-traffic control for ships; undertaking hydrographic surveys; and dredging and 
providing aids to navigation. The PLA’s other responsibilities include the provision of pilotage 
services, security, managing aspects of the Thames environment and promoting the use of the tidal 
Thames for trade, leisure and pleasure. The PLA can routinely see over 200,000 passenger vessels 
and 30,000 trade vessels travel along the river over the course of the year (PLA 2014). Despite this 
high level of traffic, the PLA reported just 36 navigational incidents on the river in 2013, none of 
which resulted in a significant impact on public safety or on the environment (PLA 2014).  
4.3.1 Organisational Structure and Governance 
The internal organisational structure at the PLA is designed to be in accordance with best practice 
requirements that are detailed within the Department for Transport’s (2000) guidance document, 
Modernising Trust Ports II: A Guide to Good Practice, a document that sets out a benchmark for 
best practices and provides guidance for English and Welsh Trust Ports on, among other things, 
reporting, key performance indicators and stakeholder policy. The Guide also sets out the core 
governance principles of openness, accountability and fitness for purpose as well as outlines how 
port business is to be undertaken for the benefit of the whole stakeholder community, stating: “In 
pursuing that target level of return, it is in the interests of all stakeholders that a trust port should 
set its dues, evaluate its investments, and charge for its services, at commercial and competitive 
rates, neither exploiting its status as a trust port to undercut the market, nor abusing a dominant 
position in that market.” (DFT 2009:4) 




In addition to explicitly providing direction as to the expectations of how and when to engage 
a Trust Port’s community of stakeholders, it also provides direction delivering annual reports and 
accounts to the Secretary of State relating to harbour and associated activities. In particular, it 
directs the need to supplement accounts with a ‘business review’ that should “…discuss the risk of 
failure of business-critical plant and machinery and the strategy adopted to mitigate this risk, 
including methods of financing replacement costs” (DFT 2009:10).  
Compliance with the guides to good practice is left to the purview of an internal audit 
committee, with that committee assuming the responsibility for the oversight of implementation 
and adherence to all other codes of practice within their port. This being expected, the Department 
for Transport does however acknowledge that not all trust ports will be in a position to comply 
with every provision. 
Overall organisational governance of all trust ports is provided by a Board comprising a 
Chairman and up to three other non-executive members that are appointed by the Secretary of 
State for Transport. There are also up to four non-executive members that can be appointed by the 
Authority itself. In addition to these non-executive members, the organisation can also appoint up 
to four members of its executive team. The executive team of the PLA is comprised of 6 branch 
level directors and a Chief Executive Officer. The six functional branches are Navigational Safety, 
Marine Services, Finance, Environment and Planning, Human Resources and Corporate Affairs.  
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4.3.2 Present-day Organisational Operating Context  
The primary focus of the organisation in today’s world is that of ensuring the main shipping 
channels remain safe and free and clear of obstruction for river traffic. Trade is a major component 
of this river traffic with many of these vessels utilising the more than 70 individual terminals that 
line the Thames’s banks. Recent research suggests that while the PLA may not employ that many 
people (345), the Port of London’s “… economic contribution to the capital and surrounding 
regions amounts to more than 46,000 full-time jobs and £3.7 billion to the economy each year.” 
(PLA 2014:28). As noted above, navigational Safety is the first and foremost concern and priority 
for the organisation. More than eight million passengers travelled the river during 2013, an increase 
of two million compared to 2012.   
A significant source of financial revenue for the PLA is driven by trade traffic. The charges 
associated with guiding, monitoring, inspecting and licensing the vessels operating on the Thames 
generates the majority of the £48.7million gross income for the organisation (PLA 2014). As much 
of this traffic is understandably associated with international trade, fluctuations in a variety of global 
markets can greatly influence the number of vessels and in turn pilotage acts required to be 
undertaken in any given year. However, in assessing the level of trade reported in the past 5 years of 
financials for the PLA, no major fluctuations were reported and it would appear that trade has 
remained relatively stable during that period. The 2013 operating year saw a total trade tonnage of 
43.2 million, which is on a par with the previous two years of 2012’s 43.7 tonnes and 2011’s 48.8 
million tonnes. The majority of this trade cargo is attributable to aggregates, containers and trailers, 
and oil and crude products, with the largest increase being seen by the aggregate sector climbing by 
1.3 million tonnes compared to the previous year. However, in the same year, fuel tonnage saw a 
notable decline that was due to the closing of Coryton refinery that had been responsible for 
significant volumes of crude oil. In comparison to the national port scene, the Port of London 
remains in the number 2 position, just ahead of Milford Haven’s tonnage of 41.1 million tonnes 
and behind Grimsby and Inningham, which saw 62.6 million tonnes pass through their port (PLA 
2013).  
The river banks of the Thames also attract a wide range of public, municipal and commercial 
stakeholders that have an equally wide range of expectations as to what constitutes acceptable uses 
for the river. As such, stakeholder engagement garners a considerable amount of organisational 
attention. During the time of the study, the PLA hosted three annual public meetings to gain input 
primarily from residents who lived within the boroughs along the length the river. Each meeting 
was staffed with a well-rounded representation of senior management who gave presentations that 
spoke to on-going local concerns as well as PLA operations in general. The organisation is also an 
active user of social media, such as twitter, frequently posting a variety of notifications, fun facts, 
and pictures of significant or unusual vessel traffic for the feed’s subscribers. It also has 
comprehensive awareness and education programme, for example, engaging with over 9000 school 
children through a mobile trailer that is used teach them about personal safety on the river. The 




PLA also oversees a variety of sporting events - 84 in total for 2013 - along the river, including the 
PLA’s own Rowing Code competition (PLA 2014).  
All of this work and oversight undertaken by the PLA is part of its annual routine operations. 
However, as with every year, there are some significant organisational challenges, constraints and 
developments along the river that present challenges outside of the routine operations. 
4.3.3 Current Challenges and Issues 
Just as any mature port that continues to evolve, the PLA is, and will continue to, deal with 
significant changes and developments within and outside of its organisation. From an internal 
perspective, the organisation is faced with an ongoing need to provide the same (if not higher) level 
of service without compromising navigational safety, despite a considerable reduction of staff. 
Granted, the smaller workforce of 345 employees is a reflection of the fact that the PLA no longer 
requires a massive cadre of dock workers, however the threat of downsizing still looms overhead 
due to the continual advancements in technology. In addition to having to ‘do more with less’, the 
PLA, like many other public-sector organisations, are faced with an increasing demand for 
transparency and the need to empathically engage a diverse stakeholder base, often with varied and 
competing interests. On other fronts, the demands for leisure users to access dangerous sections of 
the river or promotional stunts seeking to capitalise on the market penetration presented by high-
traffic areas running through central London, the PLA is continually faced with novel and uncertain 
activities requiring some type of oversight or approval. Any of the above could result in a real or 
perceived threat to the credibility and legitimacy of the PLA organisation.   
Another major consideration for the PLA is that of the National Pilots Pension Fund (PNPF). 
In the UK, there are currently more than 600 marine pilots, with just under 200 being members of 
the PNPF. All port authorities in the UK, including the PLA, make contributions to the funds 
along with the contributions that they collect from the pilots they employ. However, at the time of 
the study the PNFP was running a deficit nearing £300 million. In a recent court ruling, the trustee 
of the PNPF has been granted a judgment that will see them able to recover this deficit from a 
number of port and harbour authorities in the UK, including the PLA. Although this recent ruling 
will have a much greater impact on the smaller port authorities and their lack of revenue generating 
capacity, it still poses a significant threat to the overall economic health of the PLA due to sheer 
number of marine pilots they rely on to service their customers.  
From another external perspective, major developments, both related and unrelated to the 
shipping industry, require the PLA to contemplate the associated likelihood of adverse events 
transpiring and the impacts of those events may have on the PLA’s mandate and organisational 
objectives. In particular, the recent opening of the massive £1.5 billion terminal known as London 
Gateway Port at the site of former Shell Haven refinery has the ability to now service the largest 
deep-sea container ships (See figure 4.3). Once fully operational, the new port could see the 
diversion of over 3.5 million standard shipping containers away from terminals further along the 




river, significantly reducing the number of pilotage acts and in turn, reducing profit for the PLA. 
This, coupled with other developments such as the adoption of a computer-based port-wide 
booking system, and a continued reduction of staff ensures that the risks facing, and to be faced, by 
the PLA are in no-way becoming any less complex, uncertain or ambiguous.  
Figure 4.3 Location of London Gateway Port Development 
 
In addition to these very tangible issues facing the PLA, the very nature of the societal and 
institutional risks posed to the organisation are changing. The role and expectations of regulatory 
organisations and how they go about the business of regulating is creating new risks for the PLA to 
manage. As noted above, the rise of reputational risks (Power 2007) is beginning to dominate the 
attention of senior leaders within the PLA. As a proxy for societal value, the risks posed to the 
reputation of the organisation are beginning to dominate and influence the decision-making 
processes. It is no longer simply about preventing a collision on the river but now consideration 
must be given to what effect that event may have on the reputation of the organisation. Fear of 
losing stature, or more generally, organisational legitimacy, has the ability to reframe everything 
from self-seeding trees on the riverbanks to service reductions because of strikes, as being 
measurable by a highly intangible metric of reputation. This new dynamic between societal and 
institutional risks is reframing the importance and expectations of ERM within the PLA.  
Furthermore, rapid technological innovations are also influencing the nature of risks being 
faced by the organisation. The increasing size and speed at which large trans-ocean vessels are able 
to operate, coupled with an increasing level of sophisticated navigational technology aides, means 
that the margin for error when navigating the Thames estuary have been substantial reduced. At 
times vessels can actually be operating within inches of the shifting riverbed. This is in stark 
contrast to the approximate hydrographic measurements of the pasts which would have much 
larger tolerances for error built into them. This increase in which the speed of operations are 
conducted is further fuelled by an increasingly demanding logistics chain that requires shipments to 
be rolled on and off transports as quickly as possible. Small delays in shipments being received or 




loaded can create significant issues downstream and it may well be nothing more than a matter of 
time for these extreme operating parameters to expose system shortcomings in a potentially 
disastrous manner.   
4.4 What Was the Status of Risk Management at the Time of the 
Research Study? 
As noted in Chapter Three, the PLA’s review of its formal risk management program provided an 
excellent opportunity for the researcher to explore and further the understanding of the PLA’s risk 
management practices. In speaking with the newly appointed head of risk management, it became 
clear that the organisation was experiencing an increasing demand for risk-related reports, 
presentations and management material that was attributed to the PLA’s non-executive Board 
members. The Chief Executive Officer, along with executive board members, had consequently 
become increasingly concerned with how the organisation would respond to these demands, as well 
as the ramifications resulting from any sub-standard practices. Despite the fact that many in the 
organisation felt that risks were already being managed adequately, staff overall expressed little to 
no concern with the adoption and operationalisation of an enterprise-wide approach to managing 
risk. If anything, the new approach was seen as an ‘evolutionary step’ rather than something that 
would replace or challenge existing ways of operating in that they positioned as an expansion of the 
existing system (i.e. Managing Risks to Navigational Safety) into new areas of the organisation.  
4.4.1 External Influences on Risk Management 
Much like any organisation, public or private, the PLA is no different when it comes to the meeting 
the ever-growing institutionalised expectation to formally manage risk. For example, there are 
already various requirements for port authorities to adopt best practices for risk management 
practices, as suggested by the Department for Transportation’s ‘Modernisation of Trust Ports’. 
Another example being the fact that since 2000, all port authorities have been required by the Port 
Marine Safety Code (PMSC) to develop and implement and safety management system that is 
explicitly designed to manage the risks posed to navigational safety. 
As with all organisations operating in the UK, a host of ‘non-maritime related’ acts and 
legislation also influence the various management systems that the organisation must maintain. For 
example, adherence to the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 and its associated reinforcing 
legislation - the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 - requires the 
organisation to have a formalised Health and Safety Management system in place. Specifically, 
organisations such as the PLA (i.e. those that employ more than 5 people) are required to have 
health and safety policies; risk assessment, monitoring and control measures; and, instructions and 
training for employees in the workplace and how they are being protected.  Similar external 
expectations exist for the administrative functions of the organisation when it comes to managing 
operational, financial and environmental risks through adherence to international standards such as 




ISO 9001:2015 standard for quality management systems or ISO 14001:2015 for implementing 
environmental management systems.  
Over time, many of the above expectations had been ‘hardwired’ into the routine operations of 
different departmental areas. Indeed, as will be shown in the empirical chapters, many of the 
employees felt that they had been informally managing risk since the formation of the organisation 
back in 1909. Minimising the likelihood of failure and ensuring that work was completed safety, on-
time and on-budget was something that was simply part of the organisation’s strategic and 
operational goals. The incorporation of the above noted legislative requirements, along with others, 
were referenced in a lengthy list of internal policies that all explicitly stated the need to reduce 
threats and consequences arising from the mismanagement of key organisational functions. PLA 
policies were in place for quality, drugs and alcohol, data protection and port security, in addition to 
the areas noted above such as health and safety and environmental issues. However, as integrated 
as these risk mitigation measures were, the use of risk-specific tools, technologies and language was 
something that the expanding formalised programme would soon be applied to.  
4.4.2 Internal Influences on Risk Management 
The current inception and implementation of the risk management policy at the PLA is not the first 
attempt to formalise an enterprise-wide approach to managing risk. In the early 2000’s, a 
rudimentary risk management program was launched that amounted to little more than a table on a 
single page, which comprised a list of 10 risk statements and their associated grading of high, 
medium or low. The PLA’s then head of the Legal Counsel was responsible for assembling and 
updating the list, which was primarily achieved through routine and ad-hoc interactions and 
discussions with senior management. The resulting list then served to provide assurance to the 
PLA’s board members that risks were being identified and responded to (i.e. managed). 
Acknowledging both the shortcomings and lost opportunity with such a limited risk management 
program, and supported by a recent influx of new board members that carried increased 
expectations as to what constituted a robust risk management approach, the PLA responded by 
enlisting the aid of an external consultancy to assist in strengthening and expanding the risk 
management programme.  
The newly operationalized PLA risk management framework and associated policies were by 
far the most frequent reason staff felt the need to formally account for managing risk. This change 
was often articulated as being driven by the PLA’s Chief Executive, as well as members of the non-
executive board, as described by the following senior manager: 
“In this year, we have got a shift from [employee name] to [employee name] and the CEO is very, 
very ‘environment orientated’ so I think there is also a shift in people’s attitudes. They realise that the 
chief’s execs interested in it and that he has an understanding of it and in that unspoken support 
people are starting to realise that we do need to make sure everything is good and that and I think 




that is definitely a positive step in that I think corporately we have probably left ourselves a bit at risk 
previously.” (P36) 
As a mechanism of providing assurance to the Board, the risk management policy outlines the 
expectations of staff tasked with managing risk at the PLA. In regards to managing the risks to 
navigational safety the newly developed risk management policy document provides the following 
direction:  
“Risk may be defined as uncertainty of outcome presenting either positive opportunity or negative 
threat. Invariably some risk must be taken to achieve our objectives and effective risk management 
will establish whether a risk may be avoided or reduced to as low as reasonably practicable 
(ALARP). Put simply a negative risk is anything that threatens to prevent the Port of London 
Authority (PLA) from achieving its regulatory responsibilities or business objectives.”  
Although there was consensus among the Board members about the need for a more 
formalised, expansive, and robust approach to managing risk consistently across the organisation, it 
was often noted by executive management that the push for expanding really came from one Board 
Member in particular. Unsurprisingly, the Board Member of note had just undertaken a similar 
exercise in the organisation that they worked in and felt that the PLA stood to benefit greatly from 
following suit.  
As noted above, the PLA had contracted the aid of a well-established and respected 
international management consultancy to develop and implement an enterprise-wide approach to 
managing risk. This consultancy had been tasked with modifying their existing ‘off-the-shelf’ risk 
management protocols and techniques to accommodate the PLA’s needs. Specifically, they were 
tasked with developing, in conjunction with the newly assigned Head of Risk Management, a risk 
policy, a framework, a set of risk registers, and an assessment methodology. They would also be 
available to conduct initial training and workshops with the newly created risk committees in order 
to help staff gain familiarity with the new risk management programme.  
The initial enterprise-wide programme consisted of a set of working documents and a selection 
of committee members. Specifically, there was: A Risk Management Policy; a draft Risk Statement 
and Philosophy; a risk Committee Terms of Reference; three internal committees; and, three 
permanent risk registers that housed ‘internal’, ‘external’ and ‘operational’ risks. Additional risk 
registers for more complex/dynamic issues, such as large one-off events like the Diamond Jubilee 
River Pageant or major on-going projects like the newly developed London Gateway Port, were to 
be developed and utilised on an ad-hoc basis. At the time of the researcher beginning the collection 
of primary data, three of the four committees had undertaken the inaugural meetings and had 
begun to populate their risk registers. Explicit scoring mechanisms had yet to be developed and 
introduced by the consulting firm and the emphasis was being placed more on familiarisation with 
basic risk concepts (i.e. likelihood x consequence associations), rather than debating the accuracy of 
any risk ranking matrices. As the roll-out and introduction had just begun, any heavily 




institutionalised practice of enterprise-risk management had yet to take root and staff responses to 
the professionalised conception of ERM were still seen to be relatively new and fresh.  
4.5 Chapter Summary  
The PLA is in no way a newly formed organisation and has over the years been faced with a wide 
range of challenges and adversity. The current focus of the organisation is that of one faced with 
increasing levels of uncertainty and an expectation that any uncertainty will be efficiently and 
effectively. The Board expects that an explicit and organisational-wide risk management framework 
be operationalised. This request is being framed by the staff as a response to the spend effort on 
the things that really matter (i.e ‘big’ failures) and at the same time the staff must differentiate ERM 
from their pre-existing efforts to keep people and ships safe. There are increasing expectations of 
the public to be engaged when it comes to the decisions being made about how the river kept safe 
and environment protected. Technology is increasing steadily and the PLA has often struggled to 
keep pace with the increase size and speed of ships. It really is not surprising that the Board is 
seeking further insight to just what the PLA is doing in regards to achieving its strategic objectives.  
The following chapters will now present the empirical data that was acquired through the semi-
structured interviews, document reviews and participant observations. Each of the chapters focuses 
on a specific functional area of the organisation and explores how the introduction of the ERM 
program plays out on a cultural, operational and structural dimension. It views these dimensions 
through both a substantive and a symbolic lens in order to gain a well-rounded understanding of 
the micro-dynamics of implementing an ERM framework. Chapter 5 presents the findings of the 
administrative areas of the organisation, an area perhaps least familiar with overtly or explicitly 
managing risk, but perhaps most familiar with audit style accountability frameworks. Chapter 6 
moves on to explore the empirical data generated by a review of the Navigational Safety area of the 
organisation; an area with a deeply engrained sense of collective risk management practices, albeit 
externally focused on societal risks and with its own set of entrenched tools and techniques. 
Chapter 7 is the final empirical chapter and is focused on the Marine Services Department. 
Although this area of the organisation also had a long-standing relationship with managing risk, its 
focus was much more from the perspective of managing risks to the safety of employees and 
organisation rather than the public or commercial operators. Chapter 8 provides a discussion of the 
previous three chapters’ findings, returns to compare these findings with the relevant literature. 
Chapter 9, the final chapter, presents a summary of the findings, identifies practical implications 






Chapter 5 Administrative Services  
5.1 Introduction 
For the purpose of this research study, the administrative function of the organisation is associated 
with the activities and focus of the Human Resources, Public Affairs, Legal, Financial, and 
Information Technology departments at the PLA. The objective of this sub-organisational unit is to 
provide support to other areas of the organisation and ensure that key functions not only have 
access to the resources and technology to enable them to undertake their roles but also to handle 
the administrative components such as billing, training, and communications. These administrative 
areas are common to most organisations, is handled through a bureaucratic approach to problem 
solving and is primarily transactional in nature.  
The types of issues facing this area of the organisation originate from both internal and 
external sources. Unlike the navigational safety and marine services departments, the issues that 
administrative services deal with are relatively slow to build up and unfold in a less sudden and 
abrupt manner. The decline of a major customer’s economic viability or the on-going reduction of 
staff is not something that would typically transpire as ‘sudden’ event, as opposed to the collision or 
grounding of a ship. However, a failure in this area of the organisation can be as severe, if not more 
so, in regards to the overall health of the organisation. There is not much they can do to prevent 
the external types of events that threaten the administrative services, so emphasis is naturally placed 
on mitigated the consequences as means to reduce the impact of any failures.   
In their supporting role, the administrative areas of the organisation are also focused on how 
possible failures, like financial shortcomings or the loss of key staff, impact the PLA’s ability to 
carry out its statutory function of navigational safety. Much of this type of work happens in the 
background of the organisation, and employees see their function as one that should integrate into 
the PLAs primary functions.  
As the number of stakeholders and demands for uses of the river continue to increase, the 
image and reputation of the PLA is becoming more important. They are finding themselves in need 
of balancing competing interests as to how the River should be used. In the past, the primary 
interaction with its stakeholders would transpire through the navigational safety team and its 
issuance of Notice to Mariners, official channels and methods of communication dedicated to 
interacting with stakeholders on specific issues is a relatively new development throughout the 
Ports 100 plus years of operation. The PLA’s participation in external groups has them currently 
engaged in 16 consultative and liaison committees that are led by the PLA, as well as participating 
in over 90 external bodies and associations. The importance of creating and maintaining strong 
social connections with the PLA’s local community of stakeholders is a key resource and tool in 
reducing the level of uncertainty associated with achieving their organisational objectives. 




5.2 Cultural Dimensions 
In comparison to the high-stakes and dynamic arenas of the Navigational Safety and the Marine 
Services departments, the world of financial reporting, succession planning, and pensions funds are 
comparatively less sensational with significant events being rather slow to unfold, and seen as 
somewhat inevitable. Operational failures in the world of administration were more aptly 
characterised as errors rather than those of ‘catastrophic or major’ which categorised the risks in the 
ERM register. Culturally, it was a well-entrenched understanding that navigational safety, and 
ensuring the continued economic viability of the river, was the primary focus of the organisation.  
As such, the role of the Administrative Services was supportive in nature and that their work, albeit 
important, indirectly contributed to the achievement of the primary mandate areas. This supportive 
relationship reinforced that although the majority of the administrative work transpired at a desk 
and ‘on paper’, it was still linked to the completion of the organisation’s mandate. If an 
administrative risk was to be realised, it’s consequence would be often linked, or emphasised, by its 
impact to group external to theirs. This externalisation of risk also held true for the threats and 
sources of failure, with many risks being seen as out of the groups control or direct influence.  
 The following section explores how the cultural factors of the Administrative Services area 
of the PLA influence the execution of the newly implemented risk management function. Up until 
the implementation of the risk management framework, the concepts of risk and uncertainty had 
not played a dominant or explicit role within the majority of this area’s day-to-day work. For the 
most part, the staff in the roles of Human Resources, Finances, and Legal for example, were used 
to planning on relatively predictable planning cycles and for the most part, the risks they chose to 
capture were representative of on-going issues that were well understood and being managed 
through existing practices. The following two sub-sections demonstrate how the concept of 
uncertainty intersected with this area’s understanding of the limits of routine control and what the 
function of Administrative Services should be expected to achieve given their role in the 
organisation.  
5.2.1 Fatalistic Attitudes and Externalising Threats 
Predictability and routines comprised the majority of day-to-day work that made up much of the 
work processed through areas like Human resources, Information Technology, even Public Affairs, 
for the most part. Uncertainty in the everyday workplace had been minimised through 
bureaucratised life, the processing of invoices, mandatory safety inductions, new employee on-
boarding or routine website maintenance, and served to establish a predictable cadence to 
organisational life in the Administrative Services area. As such, the idea of catastrophic failures 
suddenly arising from a misfiled report or delayed communication was not something that 
participants expressed as being something that had required explicit attention or oversight and or 
for that matter would be subject to additional measures of mitigation, as noted by the following 
respondent when questioned about risks that they have to manage: 




“there is no real plan in place to deal with it, I mean we have a lot of overhead with all the people in 
this organisation, so if you suddenly need less pilots, it is something you can address reasonably 
quickly even though there are costs involved in that… and that’s why we have contracts for new 
people” (P29) 
Here, the idea of a loss of key human capital was something that was framed as being out of 
their control and, in the unlikely event that it did happen, it could be easily dealt with by a simple 
shift from permanent full-time employees to one formed through contracts. There is no real 
acknowledgement of the implications of what the ‘costs’ would be outside of being suggestive of 
minor monetary implications. The relationship between threat and impact are simplified and stated 
in a linear relationship with no measurement of the likelihood or consequence of the event. For the 
most part, when respondents in this area spoke to the risks they managed, it was simply conceived 
of as an unwanted impact or something bad happening: 
“…if someone is going to get hurt in a big way, if we are going to damage our reputation, cost us 
something in money terms, those are how we see risks” (P29) 
In framing risks this way, the linkage or relationship between hazard and value, and the ability 
to influence the relationship, is somewhat compromised. As the use of calculative frameworks that 
utilise measures of likelihood and severity was not something that they had been required to 
incorporate into their existing practices, a sense of being at the whim of external forces became 
apparent and as such the source of failure often was seen as being external. For example, the 
likelihood of a failed audit and the possible impacts of that failure was not the type of failure to be 
recognised by the accounting group. Threats were time and time again seen as intangible forces 
lurking outside of the organisations walls, such as economic pressures, cyber-saboteurs, or legal 
challenges. As such, the impacts and threats that the administrative services were tasked with 
addressing were often much harder to foresee and for that matter measure; quite different to the 
easily observable nature of adverse events associated with ships on the river or the inherently 
dangerous work of maintaining industrial equipment. This lack of physical impacts in relation to 
what was primarily of value to this area of reinforced the political and social elements of the risks 
they faced and only served to increase the perceived uncertainty and uncontrollability of threats and 
impacts: 
“I think if we only had London then our mission statement would be much more focused because of 
the type of people we are dealing with, the mayor’s office, the riparian boroughs, government, you know 
all those political things that influence what you do. And that’s something that I am acutely aware of 
working the public sector. Everything is very much policy driven, and that policy is usually determined 
by either government or someone else. You have to pull it down and make it work. Here we have got 
a situation where we have got a very political environment upriver and then the business end down 
here and all the problems that both those things do, give or bring to the organisation” (P2) 




A review of the internal risk register reinforced a fatalistic attitude towards the types of risks 
the administrative area of the organisation was tasked with managing. The ‘Internal Risk Register’ 
was focused on direct impacts to the organisation and identified either the CFO or Director of 
Human Resources as being accountable (i.e Administrative services), and was comprised of 27 line 
items or risks. These line items were broken into four different sections based on the areas the risks 
were seen to impact: Loss of Employees; Significant Financial; Reputation; and, System 
Malfunction/Failures. The line items under each section were consistently broken out by columns 
into a title, description of the risk, pre-treatment risk assessment of probability multiplied by 
severity, a list of existing treatments, a post-treatment assessment of risk, a column reserved for 
reputational impact, suggested further treatment, and lastly a risk owner. Of the 27 risks that were 
identified, post assessments suggested that 17 were green or low, seven were yellow or medium and 
three remained high or red. The three remaining high risks were attributed to industrial action 
under loss of key employees, loss of major revenue source under financial and website failure due 
to denial of service attack from an external source. Out of the 27 line items listed, the failure or 
threat identified was only framed as being directly attributable to an internal source in two cases; 
employee fraud (Financial, and a PLA sponsored event (reputational). Two line items in the 
‘Systems Malfunction’ section referenced administrative or operational systems failing but did not 
attribute the cause to being internal in nature.  
In addition to the register listing risks that were dominated by issues outside of the control of 
the organisation, when ranking the pre- and post-mitigation assessments of risk, the influence of 
their controls on the 24 of the 27 line items were scored as either having no effect on the risk or 
reduced the probability or severity ranking by one point. The only line items to see a significant 
reduction in the scoring came from the System Malfunction section where the probability of a ‘total 
external power failure resulting in the loss of key systems’ was reduced from four to one due to an 
external generator providing power for three to seven days. This inability to considerably impact 
the pre-treatment assessment of risk reaffirmed the understanding that despite the staff’s best 
efforts, the overall control applied to a risk would be limited at best. This begs the question of how 
can members of staff be held accountable when they ‘clearly’ identified that their current process 
have little impact on these external sources of probable failure? 
However, from an alternate perspective, a single point reduction in either or both of the 
probability or severity rankings did significantly adjust the overall optics of the register when 
viewed from a color-coding perspective. As only three colours (red, yellow and green) were used to 
visually depict the ‘risk levels’ the efficacy of controls could be judged as being relatively robust in 
that 11 of the 17 yellow risks were moved down to green post-mitigation, and six of the nine red or 
high risks were moved down to yellow. The often-significant implications of subtle adjustments in 
probability and/or severity are indicative of any five-point matrix style approach to assessing risks. 
However, the PLA had yet to establish any consistent criteria as to what a ‘three’ on the probability 
or severity scale actually meant. So, this in essence becomes a game of optics and judgement in that 




overall risk-reduction becomes less about demonstrating control effectiveness and more about 
‘pushing issues into the green’ to get them off the radar or for that matter, and perhaps more 
importantly, retaining a red-ranking and focusing the attention of upper management and the 
Board. An issue that gained increasing significance when viewing the functional and structural 
implications outlined in the subsequent sections of this chapter, yet still had significance in regards 
to suggesting the illusion of controllability and in turn, the performance (i.e efficiency and 
effectiveness) of organisational activities. 
5.2.2 Creating an Illusion of Control  
As much as the fatalistic culture of the administrative services attributed negative impacts as lying 
outside of their direct control, staff were still realised that they expected to demonstrate some 
ability to control the threats they identified in the register. As noted above, the power of combing 
the scores of probability and consequence, pre- and post-mitigation afforded staff the ability to 
linking existing efforts to minimising adverse events and at the same time clearly defining the limits 
of their spheres of influence. As the assessment of the probability and severity of the risks was 
driven solely by the application of professional judgment and expertise, rather than actuarial data, 
participants of the risk assessments were at liberty to assign highly subjective scores to either factor. 
However, as the scoring of risk factors transpired in a group setting, several respondents spoke to 
how polarised assessments of frequency or likelihood would be challenged and could be a reason 
for so many of the internal risk register risk scores residing close to medium, with the severity or 
probability of a line items assessment rarely being more than one point apart. This is significant in 
that as the register essentially served as a ‘baseline’ assessment moving forward, the need to justify 
control effectiveness would not require validation through anything more than subsequent 
‘professional judgment’, as explicit metrics or key performance indicators were not identified or 
attributed. Essentially, outside of substantial and tangible impact or ‘realised risk’, controls could be 
seen as operating at an adequate level of performance.  
In addition to the lack of explicit performance metrics, the exercise became one more 
informed by gut reaction and perceptions over that of quantifiable facts or observable frequencies. 
As the academic debate about what actually constitutes a real risk in the first place continues to 
churn (see Slovic & Peters 2006), the subjective assessments as to what may or may not impact the 
PLA’s ability to achieve its organisational objectives was, at times, clearly influenced by biases and 
heuristics. For example, in speaking with senior members of HR, the application of availability 
heuristics in regards to the assessing the likelihood of the loss of key organisational due to a 
substantial lottery win or pandemic was a very real concern:  
“…whereas before I think people would have treated the idea of a group of staff winning the lottery 
and leaving as quite a frivolous thing or the chance of a flu pandemic or something along those lines, that 
would be treated quite almost dismissively and what you see now is a shift over to oh yes if someone dies or if 




two of the executives get killed in a car crash how would we deal with that? Whereas before, oh that’s never 
going to happen. So there is now an understanding and I think there has been…”(P2) 
The ability to actually influence the likelihood of these types of rare events occurring are highly 
debateable, let alone the ability to measure any type of reduction effort. As such, logic would suggest 
that any reasonable efforts to influence the risk calculation would have staff focus minimising the 
impact/severity of such an event. However, the risk register line items that referenced a pandemic 
or syndicate lottery win, actually did see reductions in the likelihood of the event transpiring as well 
as the impact of the event itself on the organisation after mitigation had been applied. Only after 
further probing was it discovered that the individual responsible for the inclusion of ‘lottery 
syndicate win’ on the register had actually incurred this event in a previous role, demonstrating the 
application of an availability heuristic – where an individual allows a recent notable event to 
influence (i.e. increase) the probability of the same even transpiring in the future. A similar 
argument of the infiltration of heuristics altering assessments can be said in the case of a pandemic. 
Here, the inherent ‘badness’ (high consequence/low benefit) of the event is allowed to amplify the 
scoring of the overall risk (likelihood and severity) associated with the idea of a pandemic 
transpiring. The significance of these heuristic in relation to creating the illusion of control is in that 
amplifying highly unlikely events in which control effectiveness is either hard to establish in the first 
place or difficult to measure when once in place, works to ensure that staff can remain relatively 
that their efforts to manage risk will remain relatively unchallengeable.  
This strategy of including highly unlikely events that suggested controls were working due to 
the absence of failures, was juxtaposed against another emerging theme in which staff identified 
events that clearly lay outside of their direct influence but had a much higher likelihood of 
occurring, if not already impacting the organisation. This time, by selecting risks such as loss of 
major customers, one that was clearly driven by factors far outside of the PLA’s realm of influence, 
a fatalistic attitude was assumed by staff in which they ‘braced for impact’, rather than assuming 
efforts to minimise it. If this truly is the case, then it is simply a matter of time before the PLA 
incurs a catastrophic loss that would bring into question the future operation/viability of the 
organisation. The following is an example of how staff would frame an event as being somewhat 
inevitable and that little can be done other than maintaining relationships that might serve as an 
early warning: 
“It does expose us but there is only so much you can do to that [financial] sort of risk, you have got be 
able to keep aware and know what is going on and keep in contact with the customers so that it 
doesn’t’ come as a huge surprise hopefully but they are third parties and they don’t have to tell us 
anything so it can always come as a surprise but hopefully we have the relationship that they feel that 
they can tell us before it happens.” (P29) 
Using the risk register to log this inevitability and justify the current ‘controls’ of maintaining 
positive customer relationships, little thought or effort was required to suggesting ways in which the 
impact of a customer loss could be minimised. Putting plans in place now to deal with these 




apparent certainties would only make sense, even if it was only to model out different scenarios and 
timeframes, the organisation would at least have some sort of consequence management in-place to 
minimise the short-term implications of major customers pulling out. As this loss of customer has 
actually transpired multiple times in the past, and the PLA is still completely viable, then the scores 
in the register simply do not add up. But rather, as it stands, if this happens again (and it will) and as 
long as ‘relationships with customers were maintained’ no one is really held accountable for the 
impact being realised by the organisation. This fatalistic attitude towards risk was also assumed by 
those in the IT department when speaking to the major failure of the website from something like a 
‘denial of service attack’, also attributable to an external source.  The risk again appears to be 
amplified by professional judgment, as captured by the following interviewee statement: 
“So, they relate really to the hacking side of things and coming in and from the outside, and I should 
qualify, that it is not really hacking that worries us most and this is more in the website arena but 
someone gets in and modifies something that puts out misinformation. It hasn’t happened before but 
reputation is quite important and I think it is perceived but cause these days a lot of have been hacked 
and interesting words put on there and probably in the grand scheme of things it would be very obvious 
that someone was trying to get their message across – so you can never say never on that side of things 
because there are vulnerabilities being found all the time” (P26) 
In one sense, it is understandable that an area of an organisation which is designed basically to 
support and respond to other areas of the organisation would default to seeing uncertainty as being 
outside of their control. However, as the idea of risk management is founded on explicating the 
ability of management to influence the likelihood and severity of future failures, the culture of the 
administrative services was forced to come face to face with reconciling their actions with the 
possibility of failure. It was apparent that the employees were well aware that identifying a risk 
meant that they would ultimately be responsible for how it played out. As doing nothing was simply 
not an option, the next best thing was to ensure their ability to truly anticipate and respond to the 
‘unknown’ was to symbolically acknowledge controls that would be hard to measure, implement 
and, in the end, be held accountable for.  
5.2.3 Section summary 
Faced with a new and somewhat foreign management practice, the staff of the Administrative 
services area of the PLA assumed a fatalistic attitude towards the risks it faced. A cultural 
conception of external forces dictating successes and failures was reinforced by participants 
attributing uncertainty to threats that lay outside of their immediate control. In order to depict 
these relationships, the employees utilised the external risk register to validate their 
conceptualisations of risk. Risk descriptions allowed for threats to be clearly defined as being 
attributable to sources such as pandemics, cyber-attacks, economic downturns and acts of bribery. 
At no time were the short-coming of staff skill or expertise identified as possible sources of failure 
that could impact the achievement of internally focused objectives. If something was going to go 




wrong at the PLA it would most likely be due to something that was simply outside of the control 
of the PLA’s administrative staff.  
However, this inability to directly influence the probability of adverse events directly impacting 
the internal operations of the PLA did not alleviate staff from their responsibility to demonstrate 
that risk was being appropriately managed. As noted, efforts to identify and link explicit controls 
with external threats became a symbolic exercise that framed the relationships in ways that 
ultimately satisfied the ideology of risk management rather than actually change the way they 
actually went about their existing work or routines. However, the risk management practice did 
present some substantive changes to the organisation, if not culturally but most definitely from a 
structural standpoint, as the following section will now begin to explore.  
5.3 Structural Dimensions 
The following section explores the research findings in regards to how the ERM program 
interacted with the structure of the organisation and any impacts to the relationships between 
different departments of the PLA. Historically, the administrative areas of the PLA assume a 
supporting role in regards to the achievement of the primary mandates of navigational safety, 
promoting the use of the river for trade and travel, and enhancing the environment. Their 
awareness of the importance of the organisation successfully achieving these mandated objectives 
were no less apparent than those actually charged with upholding the by-laws or piloting ships, but 
as the previous section identified, failures and threats would initially be realised by the organisation 
rather than the public or industry. Despite the direct impacts to the organisation achieving its 
primary objectives, the hierarchical nature of the Navigational Safety under the command of former 
Naval officer and the sheer size of the Marine Services department meant that those working in 
supportive administrative roles characterised themselves as being lower down on the decision-
making ladder.   
This administrative arm of the organisation could also be classified as the most heterogeneous, 
in that although each group within it was primarily seen in a supportive role and although 
bureaucratic, the nature of their work was quite diverse. Unlike the Navigational Safety or Marine 
Services divisions, those within the administrative areas saw a much wider array of possible 
receptors for the risks they managed. Where the alternate areas of the organisation were focused on 
protecting physical assets such as PLA infrastructure or the safety of people using the river, 
Administrative Services considered a range of human, financial, legal, reputational, and 
technological capital. Each of the areas responsible for these sources of organisational capital also 
brought with them specialised skillsets that were relatively non-transferable outside of their specific 
discipline. This was significant in that Administrative Services contained individuals who were less 
likely to make lateral moves across the operational areas of the organisation and also, it was an area 
of the organisation which had a routine ability to attract individuals outside of the competitive 
maritime profession.   




Lastly, this area of the organisation had the least familiarity with formally managing risk, a 
function that had up until then been housed firmly under the watchful eye of the Chief Harbour 
Master. Positioning the function of risk management under that of the Chief Financial Officer 
presented the organisation with a diffusion of responsibilities in that Navigational Safety had always 
been the main driver and user of risk management. This shift afforded Administrative Services of a 
substantial opportunity to develop and demonstrate an important functional attribute.  
The following section explores the implications of operationalising a risk management 
framework from a structural point of view. The findings speak to how the creation of this practice 
provides the administrative areas of the organisation a chance to reshape existing relationships with 
other areas of the organisation. Substantive changes arrived in the formation of committees, 
amassing expertise and knowledge and developing lines of responsibility and accountability. 
Additionally, alternate findings suggest how the ERM program enable this area of the organisation 
to reinforce and emphasise existing relationships and elevate the importance of the administrative 
functions through descriptions of risk and extrapolating the impacts of failures to seeming 
unrelated areas.  
5.3.1 Standing Up a Risk Management Infrastructure  
Organisationally, the function of risk management has been seen as being positioned as either a 
centralised or decentralised function (Smallman 1996). In a centralised model, the majority of risk 
management work is housed within a specialised department, their sole function revolving around 
the ability is to identify, analyse and control risks for the whole organisation. Conversely, in a 
decentralized model, the responsibility for risk management is spread across all the departments 
and is representative of the PLA’s explicit statement in their risk management philosophy of ‘risk 
management is everyone’s responsibility’. Although risk management was to be a shared 
responsibility, the coordination and oversight of its operationalisation was relegated to a single 
individual. Despite the familiarity and convenience of pre-existing risk management tools and 
process elsewhere in the organisation, the overall risk management function was still seen best to 
reside under the purview of the Head of Development, reporting to the Director of Finance. As 
often observed playing out in the private-sector, tasking the CFO with standing up the risk 
management function was seen as a natural and appropriate action. Selecting an individual within 
the organisation to ‘champion’ the function and be able to successfully operationalise the practice 
was something that appears to have driven by a very specific set of characteristics.   
According to the individual who had been identified as being the most appropriate individual, 
she felt it had to do with the length of her career at the organisation and her ability to build 
relationships with internal and external ‘customers’. Her 22 years with the organisation saw her 
starting in the finance department as an accountant, involved in payroll, internal audit, etc. and 
rotated around all functions of related to finance until finally settling in the invoices section and 
focused on learning about revenue sources. It is here where she felt she began to build stronger 




relationships with customers. From this position, she was afforded the opportunity to aid in the 
conduct of a variety of organisational studies, such as on exploring the pilotage function. It was felt 
that as the PLA’s Pilots serve as a frontline interface, the PLA should be much more aware of the 
role they played in interacting with their primary customers, the captains controlling the vessels that 
comprised the Thame’s trade traffic. It was significant in that the study explored how the function 
operated, was funded, what the covering costs were, rostering systems, and basically how best to 
optimise the pilotage function, with one of outcomes being recognition that they lacked an official 
interface with customers. In the past, the roll primarily was tasked to an Executive Committee 
member who, when available, marketed the Port of London to a wider ‘public/political’ audience, it 
was felt these activities were somewhat wasted in that the PLA felt it needed to work more directly 
with the terminal operators themselves. This change in how the organisation related to some of key 
stakeholders, shifted the focus to helping the terminals market their services and attract 
international trade. As the Corporate Affairs team was responding more to the ‘public/political’ 
stakeholders along the river banks rather than purely promoting the port, a new role of Commercial 
Development Manager was created, and is the role she remains in. The primary role of this position 
is to act as a facilitator between customers and port services. In doing so, she provides local 
knowledge and “acts as a conduit” with the ability to offer favourable options for new customers, 
engage in annual negations with existing customers. The current goal being more about retaining 
and maximizing existing customers rather than expanding to new trade markets, they look to 
enhance and develop what the terminals have attracted – an interesting take in reflecting on the 
previous section and the limits of control in managing uncertainty.  
The characteristics of the individual tasked with coordinating the operationalisation of the risk 
management framework clearly demonstrated how important the notion of strong internal and 
external relationships is in the PLA’s understanding of accessing information on uncertainty. It was 
her understanding that the board was uncomfortable with the risk management process but were 
not sure why – it just didn’t sit well with them. Their current approach consisted of a single risk 
management corporate register that was used to periodically report to the board and they wanted a 
person to review the whole PLA and how risk was managed. With this as a key objective, she was 
put forward most likely by the Executive Director of Finance. It was deemed that she had the social 
connections required to reach across the organisation and that she is broad-minded and open to 
change. It would be required that she was sensitive to how the politics plays and that she would 
remain in touch with the way they work day to day. It became obvious by these descriptions that 
for the PLA, risk management was not about hard-core analytics, quantitative accounts of failure, 
or technically sound assessments but rather that it be undertaken more as an ‘art of negotiation’ 
that must be both flexibly interpreted and applied.  
However, in these early days of the ERM program, it was very apparent that enthusiasm and 
support of that of ERM skill or aptitude was also a priority. Awareness and receptiveness to 
participate in the newly formed risk committees was an initial measure of the program’s success and 




for the vast majority of participants interviewed, the program was seen as benefit and positive 
addition to organisational life: 
“I was asked to join the internal risk committee… we all sat down, talked about the risks. What the 
risks were, and as the time has gone we now have a risk register that actually goes through what the 
risks are, we’ve graded the risks, like a traffic light system, the risk before mitigation, the risk level 
after mitigation and then if there is further things you can do, so that risk register one I am on is 
pretty robust now, we have been through that numerous times and every time we meet we look and see 
if it is still relevant, so everybody is thinking about risk much more than they ever were” (P29) 
Tasking the operationalisation of the ERM program at the PLA to a single individual was a 
choice driven by opportunity and constraint. On one hand, the Board was well aware that a 
significant amount of expertise had been amassed by the operationally focused areas of the 
organisation. Yet, these risks were for the most part being demonstrated as under control, it was 
the darker corners of the organisation that saw less tangible risks amassing that could benefit from 
explicating their decision-making processes. And on the other hand, there were few other areas of 
the organisation that could demonstrate the social connections to all of its internal and external 
stakeholders. If managing risk was to be truly a holistic practice undertaken by all, then the bearer 
of change must be able to understand a wide range of organisational relationships, cultures and 
functions if they are going to be able to adapt and modify the practice accordingly.  
5.3.2 Linking and labelling: Accessing the Power of a Risk  
From an organisational perspective, the constant pressure to accomplish more with less is not 
something unique to the PLA. Although one of the core tenets of ERM is its ability to allocate 
scarce resources to where they may be most effective in reducing uncertainty or adversity, it also 
served as a symbolic means to communicate the essential nature of the work undertaken by 
Administrative Aervices. Although there was never any indication from any part of the organisation 
that the function and expertise housed within the administrative services was in any sense less 
important or second-rate, the simple fact that the organisational mandate explicitly states that the 
safety of navigation is job one. As such, attempting to draw attention to the need for employee 
wellness programs or timely financial reporting, presented the staff, at times, with a challenge. 
However, with the introduction of a system that was actually focused on levelling the playing field 
in regards to how various issues could be driven down to some type of a common currency, the 
ability of ERM to explicate causal linkages became of significant interest to those seeking to elevate 
their work within the organisation. 
As much as the register served as an extremely explicit and blatant explanation of what could 
go wrong and what the implications of whatever went wrong would be, a number of staff members 
in the administrative services used the language of risk to link, and also liken, their work to that of 
the ‘higher priority’ tasks of the other two sub-organisational units. In reviewing the transcripts of 
numerous participants, how they talked about the risks they managed became just as interesting as 




what risks they chose to manage. For example, the following response from a participant in 
Corporate Affairs speaks to how their work must integrate into other areas of the organisation:  
 “The way I see the role of the corporate affairs team is to be completely embedded within the operation 
of the organisation so it isn’t a bolt on bit of the organisation that does pink fluffy PR, organise nice 
luncheons and that kind of thing it is something that genuinely works with the operational side of the 
business, understand where the issues are coming up… and manage the communications around those 
issues to try to ensure the reputation of the organisation isn’t damaged.” (P8)  
For operational areas to manage their issues effectively, the PR function is integral to achieving 
success. There was a need to link the efforts of different departments to the ‘greater good’ and that 
it wasn’t enough to achieve departmental objectives but success was better communicated by 
demonstrating how their success meant success for those managing mandate level risks. As such, 
different areas of the organisation ensured that they were able to tangibly link the work they 
undertook with the higher profile areas such as the navigational safety work of the organisation.  
Not only was it seen that linking one’s work to the higher profile work demonstrated the need 
for that administrative function: 
“providing that something is followed through, I think it is helpful to have it set out in a lot of these 
cases, because I have been concerned for some time that, for instance with the environmental 
information regulations people don’t realise within the organisation how vulnerable we are. So 
provided that is taken through and that the various managers pick up on these things and hopefully it 
gets some more publicity within the organisation because it has been recognised on these particular 
registers as being important” (P23) 
Another way the new policies and processes for managing risk interacted with the structural 
arrangements of the PLA was through the process of framing or labelling things as a risk. As with 
any organisation, there were issues that fell into ‘grey’ areas as to who was responsible for dealing 
with them, in that there was differing opinion on either what the problem was or how best to solve 
it. As such, this resulted some employee or area of the organisation most likely having a less than 
favourable opinion of the required resolution of the issues. In order to navigate these internal 
arrangements or relationships the word ‘risk’ became a very useful and powerful tool, as 
demonstrated by the following account of assigning responsibility for ‘after-hours’ activities:   
“… we have a rowing team and we have about 20 people and we are not just people from the PLA 
there are external people as well. We do races and we do training two or three times a week and there 
is a very real risk that you can drown. So, it was identified fairly early on that plus other sport and 
activities, football and golf among employees, that was going on that we exposed to possibly being sued 
if anybody did get hurt in anyway. So, we saw that we were very vulnerable, we put in place a 
committee to deal with sports, we now regulate it, we have put in place risk assessments and the 
biggest mitigation is I put in place insurance cover in case we do get sued. So, for something that has 
been going on for ever in the organisation, all of a sudden it was realised we were vulnerable, we could 




be sued and thankfully there has never been an accident but the other day the whole rowing crew went 
in the water and had to be rescued so it can happen. And we are now going to most likely go one step 
further and set it up as a separate organisation as a sports club so that we are removing it from the 
PLA so it would be the club that is being sued and not us” 
The above is an example of how something that had never really been ‘owned’ by any person 
or area of the organisation was, by being reconstituted through the language of risk, as a managerial 
object that posed a legal threat, could be processed and subsequently transferred outside of the 
organisation. There could be little push-back from those actually participating in the activity in that 
one, it was still ‘allowed’ to transpire and two, by the framing it as a legal issue few, if any, staff had 
the technical expertise to object. Another example of framing long-standing arrangements was 
found in a case of ‘unsolicited’ donation of gym equipment by past employees to the organisation. 
The space allocated to the equipment was not sanctioned but staff had little ability to challenge the 
location in that it meant singling themselves out as being a disrupter and against popular opinion. 
By labelling the equipment as a hazard and the usage as ‘risky’ the organisational discourse shifted 
to one of a ‘constant complainer’ to one focused on safety and the greater good: 
“There was gym equipment down here at marine house and up at Teddington Locke and it was only 
like a bicycle and a rowing machine and some weights and things. It had been put there originally for 
our divers having to train for their licences, to get fit and then it stayed there and people had brought 
stuff from home so it ended up being a mini gym but of course people were using it on their own, not 
supervised if you go down to your local gym they won’t let you go anywhere near it without an 
induction and signing all the form… so there was a risk that people could hurt themselves so in the 
end we made the decision to remove it, it was handled through the risk committee, it went through the 
register and we decided the only mitigating action was to remove it. We talked about mitigating it 
through supervision but it was all too much and we offer a reduced sports membership at a local gym 
some people were quite upset about it being gone but they have had to accept it” (P29) 
As these types of issues were ‘one-off’ situations that lacked any actuarial data that could 
substantiate the likelihood of a failure being realised, or any past event to signify the severity of 
what would be incurred other than anecdotal evidence, it was close to impossible for staff to 
challenge or argue with the attribution, or for that matter measurement, of risk being implied. And 
as Luhmann (1993) suggests, the growing need for the organisation to always consider and manage 
risk, meant that once the gym equipment or external event had been identified as a risk, there was 
no other option but to act.  
5.3.3 Section Summary 
As the administrative area began to familiarise themselves with the roles, responsibilities and 
techniques associated with the ERM program, the power drawn from risks ability to explicate 
relationships and to reconcile different types of value was recognised. In a practice that had yet to 




see a strict amount of rigor imposed on the analytical process or assessment techniques, the 
participants gravitated towards the innate ability of the term ‘risk’ to imply uncertainty and explicate 
relationships. The term relationship is possibly one of the key themes that emerged from the 
substantive and symbolic structural implications of the newly implemented ERM program. The 
organisation made a conscious decision to allocate the responsibility of this task to an individual 
with very little, if any, ‘classical’ risk management training. Instead, the task of standing up the risk 
infrastructure fell on the shoulders of a long-serving individual who held a deep level of personal 
‘capital’ with a wide range of internal and external stakeholders. Successful implementation would 
rely more on the ability of someone to engage and understand the staff rather than ‘dazzle’ with 
skill and proficiency.  
The ‘artful’ framing of the risk management function was seen to play out in the strategic 
application of risk terminology and language. Using the word ‘risk’ to frame and label longstanding 
organisational arrangements in order to address situations that may lead to unpopular resolutions 
meant problems that were allowed to persist in the ‘organisational ether’ could be made rectifiable 
by ‘risking’ the uncertain and unfavourable situations that had been accommodated for years, if not 
decades. This begs the question of was this a case of an organisation unearthing latent risks or was 
this more a case of awkward or unfavourable conditions being amplified and escalated to force a 
win for a few at the cost of enjoyment for the many? 
5.4 Functional Dimensions 
The following section will explore the findings as they relate to how the administrative areas 
actually carried out the work they were charged with and the types of problems the sought to 
resolve. The administrative departments such as Human Resources and the Pension Fund 
managers were most comfortable operating in a well understood set of cyclical practices such as 
budgeting, annual reporting requirements and quarterly stakeholder meetings. If anything, the 
predictability of administrative functions begged the question of how an enterprise risk function 
would add substantial value. The majority of their work relied on a repeatable, transactional type of 
interaction that valued repeatability and routinization. They also drew from well-established tools 
and techniques that are highly institutionalised and are common place in most legitimate 
organisations, public or private. In fact, the practice of risk management could in of itself be seen as 
a functional administrative service and as demonstrated by the previous section, one that the PLA 
sought to incorporate into this area of the organisation.  
As noted in the previous sections, the need to protect diverse areas of capital was an area that, 
according to their own assessments of risk, could benefit from increased mitigation efforts. In 
order for the PLA to claim a legitimate place in the broader social structure, two fundamental 
assumptions must be true. One being that the organisation requires a port to preside and hold 
authority over in the first place, and two, the organisation must employ individuals with knowledge 
to do so. If either of these two components are removed, the legitimacy and relevance of the PLA 




will be called into question. The findings highlighted in this section speak to how the tools and 
language of risk management influenced the functional execution of the administrative services 
work. In addition to this, and from more of symbolic standpoint, the role of reputational risk is 
explored and how this rise of this newly formed source of capital was used to substantiate and 
justify actions of just about any and all activities conducted throughout the organisation.  
5.4.1 Integrating Risk Management  
“You know on the face, it doesn’t look too bad but you think to yourself, wait a minute if I can’t 
recruit a Chief Harbour Master, does anyone else know how to manage this process?” (P2) 
Despite the lack of familiarity with the tools and techniques of risk management, areas like the 
Human Resources and the Public Affairs departments felt that the incorporation of risk 
management seemed like a logical and natural progression. They felt very comfortable in adopting 
the practice and saw it as an opportunity to enhance their current programs and operations. For 
many, risk management offered the ability to articulate very real threats to the organisation’s 
continued well-being. The PLA is under continued pressure to ‘do more with less’ and it is well 
known the significant reductions of staff members the organisation has undergone over the years 
and with it, the vast amount of area-specific knowledge housed within those individuals.  
Perhaps where the introduction of risk management has made one of the most substantial 
impacts on how those within the administrative services area accomplishes their functional work is 
in the Human Resources department. As a direct result and reflection of the global downturn, as 
well as the evolving role of the PLA from port operator to more of a custodian of the river, the 
PLA has seen a sizable reduction in the number of individuals it employs. In its mid-century 
heyday, the PLA was employing thousands of staff and enjoying a prominent position as significant 
employer within London. In these earlier times, there was an abundance of available workers and 
specialised skills would be learned on the job as individuals worked their way up the career ranks. 
The heavily unionised workforce commanded a stable position and attracting and retaining 
individuals was of little concern to the PLA. As with any industry or sector, times change; the 
advent of containerisation, the introduction of the pilotage act leading to the dissolution of Trinity 
House, and an increasing reliance on technological advancements has greatly reduced the need for a 
large workforce. The old ways of managing the PLA’s human capital are easily outdated in current 
world that sees a much more transient workforce.   
The majority of information in regards to navigational safety was contextually specific 
experiential knowledge (hazards on the river, tidal conditions, longstanding relationships with ships 
captains, etc.) and as such, was housed within key staff members. In being so, the loss of an 
employee would result in a loss of intellectual capital that could pose a very real threat to the ability 
of the organisation to execute on its key objectives. Where before they could rely on ‘strength in 
numbers’ now the PLA must invest a great amount of time in effort in attracting, training and 
retaining much fewer individuals, and ensure that the amassed knowledge stays with the 




organisation despite fluctuations in the workforce. So, it came as no surprise that in facing the 
increasing uncertainty in the PLA’s ability to protect this ‘human capital’ the HR department 
showed an elevated interest in incorporating risk information into their decision-making processes.  
“Future challenges, within the organisation itself, we are desperately trying to get ourselves sorted, in 
the sense of getting all our records sorted so that they are accessible, licensing, all departments, the 
problem is you have an organisation that was very, very large in the past and is now reduced to such 
an extent that the difficulty is in knowing what is out there and trying to pull it all in so it is all 
accessible to new people who come in, will have access to what the position is.” (P23) 
In response to the issues of managing a healthy and skilled workforce the director of HR had 
gone as far as integrating the concepts, and at times terminology, of the risk management 
framework directly into the newly developed HR strategy. Couched in the concept of taking a 
‘progressive’ approach to how they managed their workforce, the HR department sought to 
modernise and supplement their current management efforts with a newly design ‘6-point’ strategy. 
This new concept was in response to the emergence of issues that were classified under 6 different 
themes or objectives: developing high-performance culture; promoting diversity and equality; safe 
and healthy environment (less about accidents more about long-term wellbeing); Efficient; 
Effective; and finally, sustainable employment arrangements. The resulting strategic document, 
much like their risk management documentation, outlined specific roles in regards to governance 
roles and responsibilities, especially in regards to the accountability of the Board. It also identified 
who would be ‘owners’ of policy delivery, key performance indicators acting as ‘controls’, etc. In 
essence, much of the language that was prevalent in the internal risk literature and guidance material 
was easily recognisable within HR’s strategic document.  
In one sense, risks were explicitly identified and incorporated into the strategic document as 
they relate to the achievement of each of the 6 different objectives. This represented the integration 
of risk management into the ‘routine’ decision-making process and had staff think about what 
could reduce the likelihood of achieving an objective and in the case that failure to achieve 
objective did occur, then what were the ‘knock-on’ impacts of this to other areas of the 
organisation or higher-level goals. This was in-line with how the Head of Risk Management had 
conceived of and hoped that risk might be used to inform strategic and operational decision-
making. However, what was also beginning to happen was how the HR department was now 
incorporating the language and associations of the risk management processes 
(identify/analyse/treat/monitor/etc.) and how the pre-existing problems of ‘staff well-being’, and 
‘a positive work environment’ would now begin to shift from being ‘issues’ to that of being a ‘risk’ 
which is amenable control. This demonstrates a fundamental shift in how the organisation is, even 
in risk management’s nascent state, beginning to modify their understanding of how best to 
address, frame and communicate their performance, or for that matter, failures, through the notion 
of uncertainty.  




Another example of this merging or grafting of the risk function with more traditional 
approaches to problem solving was also found in the HR department. HR was developing goals 
around framing the risks to employee health less about accidents (slips/trips/falls) and to one that 
sees a ‘lifecycle’ approach that seeks to “manage an aging workforce” where risks are slower to 
unfold and perhaps more easily attributable to explicit programs to reduce the associated risk. 
Shifting the frame of the undesirable event away from acute and sudden events to ones that unfold 
slowly, also reframes the associated threats and benefits that comprise the problem. Programs 
focused on ‘days since last accident’ now shift to spending their time and effort on more ‘holistic’ 
issues that are tied to succession planning, knowledge retention, and staff attrition.  
 This need to embed or merge the management of risk with how routine work transpires is 
reflective of how risk is managed in the other areas of the organisation. For example, and as will be 
explored in the following chapters, risks to navigational safety were routinely characterised as an 
intrinsic part of what the organisation ‘just simply does’. Similarly, the Marine Services department 
was also seen as intrinsically ‘risky’ work and that managing risk was largely about relying on first-
hand experience and accumulated wisdom (i.e. professional judgement). The difference for 
Administrative Services was the ‘newness’ of explicitly acknowledging the management implied a 
lack of familiarity with tools and techniques. Adopting and integrating the risk management tools in 
a mimetic fashion to how the other ‘competent’ areas of the organisation helped compensates for 
this area’s self-perceived lack of legitimacy.   
5.4.2 The Rise of Reputational Risk  
Time and time again, the notion of an organisational failure impacting the reputation of the PLA 
was raised by interviewees not only from the Administrative Services area, but from all areas of the 
organisation. The notion of preserving the PLA’s reputational capital was so dominant that it 
almost played a more significant role than managing the primary risks to society. The rise of 
reputational risk has been under examination for some time and as Power (2007:135) notes “The 
imperative of managing reputation means that the internal governance of the enterprise must 
become explicitly more outward facing and formal…”. This continually growing obsession with the 
notion of ‘reputational risk’ became clearly evident in the finding of this research study. Staff were 
often more concerned with the risk of generating negative attention from sensationalised failure 
rather than the original impact to financial, social or organisational well-being. 
It can be said that on whole, the Port of London Authority has enjoyed a relative positive and 
stable reputational standing within the eyes of its local and international stakeholders. This has been 
achieved in the absence of any formal governing body, official ranking system, or comparative 
industry metric, such as those experienced by universities, government agencies, or industrial 
sectors. For the PLA, reputational risk was seen to relate to all areas of the organisation, with any 
activity or action being a source of potential risk to how the organisation might be perceived. Each 
of the risk registers used for the internal, external and operational cataloguing of top risks, had a 




column set aside for ‘reputational impact’ and in doing so, each row that contained a risk also had 
an associated description of the significance of a risk line item being realised. The notion of needing 
to manage reputational risk was noted by the majority of interviewees at some point within their 
interviews regardless of the area that they were working within, however those in administrative 
services were notably more preoccupied with the concept. The Public Affairs staff were front and 
centre in managing these risks and saw reputation as an amassed source of capital, as noted by the 
following participant:  
“You build up your capital and you build up your relationships so that you can get information to 
them and they will read it and they can say, yeah I know [me] for the last 7 years, so he has shared 
the reality with me so thank you very much. That is the benefit of building up the capital but you 
build that up to draw it down when you need it and you never know when you are going to need it” 
(P8) 
It was evident through a variety of participants that it was the idea that an organisational failure 
would be exposed to the public and really boiled down to the idea of external perception be outside 
of the direct control of the organisation that seemed to drive the obsession with reputational 
impacts as P8 goes on to state:  
“So, that side reputational could have a huge impact on the PLA if it was judged that the vessel had 
sunk on some part of the PLA the reality is that is more likely to be that the PLA could well 
burnish its reputation because the ship stuffed up in some way and we are then the ones who are then 
responsible for getting it out of the way, so we could then be the heroes.” (P8) 
Some of this could possibly be attributed to availability and affect heuristics, in which 
individuals amplify or attenuate the salience of specific events. In speaking to affect heuristics 
people tend to judge the significance of a risk in relationship to its ‘goodness or badness’ or when 
speaking of availability by the believability in the event transpiring, often by recalling synonymous 
types of historical events. For the staff of the PLA, the most cited significant event was the sinking 
of the Marchioness and the associated loss of lives, as noted in Chapter 4. Despite this event having 
any significant long-lasting impact on the credibility of the PLA, it was repeatedly used to justify or 
substantiate the need to ‘manage a risk’, P8 speaks to this in the following excerpt: 
“The biggest reputational risk that the PLA has faced in recent years is the sinking of the 
Marchioness…because we are responsible for facilitating safe navigation on the Thames, which 
actually if you listen very carefully to the words means you can’t legislate for idiots… but we can create 
an environment in which you can be safe” (P8) 
This sentiment was echoed by P29 
“We are a very risk averse organisation… don’t’ like risk… because there only has to be one thing 
going wrong and the PR damage that it can do to you as an organisation is huge. I mean the 
Marchioness is an example. That is 25 years ago and we still get criticised about it today” (P29) 




However, others felt the need to manage reputational risk was driven down by the PLA’s 
Board members. In a sense, the staff were not as much managing a risk to the PLA’s reputation but 
rather that of the individual Board members, who would be ultimately held accountable for a 
catastrophic consequence, such as a fatality: 
“Our board insists that every risk has a reputational assessment, so there is a little box on the register 
that says reputation… so serious death or injury to an employee or member of the public… and it 
doesn’t mean that the PLA was found as being guilty of a transgression… just the fact that it 
happened and it was on PLA territory it is just as damning.” (P1) 
As the performance of the other departments was supported by the administrative activities, 
the idea of reputational risk allowed organisational actors providing Public Relations, Human 
Resources and Information Technology services an opportunity to further demonstrate the 
significance of their work.  
 “I know that from the PLA side of things that reputational risk is pretty high, losing money, 
dealing with the aftermath of a particular shipping line pulling out. For us, filling in and being like 
why am I there because of the risk of losing systems and losing equipment, in the vein of business 
continuity – ‘we’ve lost the ops room here what do we do?’ – we pump a lot of that data up to 
Thames barrier, so if we did lose it we could operate core systems from up there.” (P26) 
At the end of it all, it really came down to reputational risk management meant that you simply 
did your job well. The absence of failures, or anything to attract attention, meant that essentially the 
risks to the organisation’s reputational capital would remain low. It also framed reputational risk as 
not being attributable to a bad strategic decision but rather an operational shortcoming. This idea if 
employees simply do what they are supposed to do, and use their professional judgment, then risk 
will ultimately be managed is aptly summed up by the following statement: 
“risk comes down to the individual in an organisation like this because we trade mainly on our 
intellectual capital so I think for me nirvana is when we have anyone in the organisation realising that 
risk starts with them” (P1) 
5.4.3 Section Summary  
The above two sub-sections begin to paint a picture of how risk management in the administrative 
services area, as it relates to their functional roles, was driven by its ability to integrate with the 
existing functional understanding of what those areas meant to the broader organisation. In both 
cases of the Human Resources department and the Public Affairs department, the idea of managing 
risk was conceived of as needing to be integrated into existing practices. For the HR department, 
this had more substantial implications for how they went about framing their issues and 
conceptualising their problems. Managing risk for them meant that they required a whole new HR 
strategy that could account for the need to manage the associated risks, if not actually transforming 
existing issues into risks, much like the case of the gym equipment or extra-curricular activities. For 




them to be successful, they saw felt that risk management should be woven in to their six-point 
strategy and in doing so they could kill two birds with one stone.  
For the Public Affairs department, risk management afforded them the ability to symbolise all 
organisational activities as posing a risk to reputation. The creation and acceptance of a broad, 
organisational measure of ‘reputational capital’ meant that an uncertainty attributed to achieving 
their department’s objectives, largely resided all staff doing achieving their outcomes. The absence 
of any publicised failures meant that, for the most part, the organisation was being perceived as a 
legitimate and well-performing entity. This is not to suggest that on-going activities that further 
strengthen public and political relationships wasn’t relevant work but if reputational risks were to 
be realised, it would most likely not have been attributable to shortcoming of Public Affairs’ 
efforts.  
5.5 Chapter Summary  
The emerging theme that becomes clearly evident in exploring the role and influence of risk 
management within the administrative services is the overriding obsession with the external. Firstly, 
the need to conceive of threats as being external to the departments (or better yet the organisation) 
allows for the originating source of failure to reside primarily outside of the Administrative 
Services’ control. If something was to go wrong or threaten the staff or functioning of the PLA it 
would most likely come from an external pressure or force that was not the responsibility of the 
organisation to manage.   
The uptake of ERM also presented the organisation with some substantive structural changes 
that afforded the administrative services with an increase to its overall responsibility. By housing 
the general responsibility for the operationalisation of the program within the administrative 
services area, this area of the organisation was able to elevate its position within the organisational 
and at the same time begin to claim a new area of expertise that could further differentiate the 
department’s offerings.  
Lastly, the findings also demonstrate how the practice of ERM actually influenced how the 
organisation undertook and executed its current functional activities. On one hand, the language of 
risk enabled the organisation to frame market conditions as a negative externality that required 
action on behalf of the PLA in order to preserve future prosperity. Yet at the same time, the 
program could also be used to articulate the need to manage further internal reductions in resources 
at the sake of losing key internal sources of ‘risk knowledge’ and in essence, compromising the 
functional ability of the PLA to effectively manage navigational safety or efficiently conduct marine 
operations.  
Furthermore, the newness of the requirement to explicitly manage risk, and the lack of 
familiarity with assessment techniques and management strategies, could be used to explain away 
the apparent lack of proficiency in executing consistent and robust risk calculations. However, the 
following chapters go on to explore areas of the organisation with much longer standing 




relationships with the very same concepts and tools and yet, as will be identified, similar 
methodological, cultural, and structural arrangements have just as great an ability to interfere with 
‘pure’ and unfettered calculations of ‘objective’ risk.  It is as though the organisational actors are 
fully aware of their limitations, lack of control, and shifting uncertainties, and that to infer some 
type of controllability over forces far more complex and dynamic than any line item in an excel 
spreadsheet could ever hope to accurately capture is time ill spent. So why embrace such an explicit 
and mechanical process if any tangible gains in efficiency or effectiveness are limited at best? Does 
this newly operationalised practice represent little more than a new set of clothes for the 
organisation’s elite or do these color-coded spreadsheets and probabilistic assessments of future 
failures serve other purposes, greater than the sum of its parts? The following two empirical 
chapters will continue to explore and uncover other relevant findings that begin to shed light on 
just how the practice of risk management was being employed at the PLA and if the means actually 







Chapter 6 Navigational Safety  
6.1 Introduction 
On the surface, the introduction of an enterprise-wide approach to managing risk had little overall 
impact on the pre-existing Navigational Safety department’s understanding of how best to manage 
the risks they were faced with. This is not to say that there was either little interest in, or support 
for, the expansion of formalised practices to managing risk across the organisation. But for the 
most part, the general consensus was that this area of the organisation was inherently risk-based 
and therefore had been managing risk, successfully, for decades. As such, compliance with the 
newly introduced policy on risk management was a foregone conclusion and served more as a 
secondary communication tool, pushing information out to the rest of the organisation, rather than 
being seen as any type of substantive change to how risk should be managed. However, as little 
interest that was payed to the formalisation of risk across the enterprise, the Navigational Safety 
department did provide some significant findings as to how risk was being conceived of and the 
challenges to increasing the adoption and acceptance of a more holistic approach.   
The Chief Harbour Master’s office was located on the top (third) floor of the PLA’s main 
headquarters at Gravesend. The large corner office was all windows, on the interior and exterior 
walls, and everyone knew when he was in the office, either through a visual account or on that of 
his commanding voice. His direct reports, an Upper, Central and Lower Harbour masters, were 
assigned corresponding sections of the river to that of their title. The Central and Lower Harbour 
Masters worked out of Gravesend, while the Upper Harbour Master was stationed at the Trinity 
House Building in central London. The VTS team also worked out of Gravesend with multiple 
offices throughout the building. The dynamic within the Navigational Safety team’s office was very 
collegial and in speaking with the staff during their breaks, they often prided themselves on the 
sense of family working at the PLA brought about. Much of the Harbour Master’s time was spent 
in office meetings with various stakeholders rather than being actually out on the river. Meetings 
were usually in regards to large commercial projects, municipal development issues, working public 
interest groups as well as host of different committees. The more ‘hands-on’ work, such as vessel 
inspections and responding to incidents was left to the Deputy Harbour Masters. All of which 
often revolved around the identified need identify, analyses and respond to the risks posed to 
navigational safety. 
This area of the organisation already considered themselves experts in the field of managing 
the risks to navigational safety. Unlike the administrative areas that focused more on the calculative 
aspects of the risk assessment process and understanding the likelihood and consequence of 
different events transpiring, those in the navigational safety department felt they had being 
calculating risk ‘for centuries’ and was a taken-for-granted skill.  Instead, the navigational safety 
department was far more concerned with their ability to identify risk and to subsequently marry 




them up to compatible risk management treatments or controls. Effective risk management wasn’t 
threatened by the ability to appropriately analyse or assess risk, professional judgement saw to this, 
for the navigational team it was all about the concept of control, what could be controlled, and how 
well they could control it.    
The Navigational Safety Department also placed an extremely high value on its demonstrated 
ability to minimise adverse events and how this ability stems from the direct application of 
professional judgment. The structural implications of introducing risk management emphasised 
again how the PLA was an authority and industry leader in managing navigational safety risks. It 
also reinforced the existing organisational structure and how the department would be expected to 
conduct its business, the resources it required, and the simple fact that risk management was 
something that was inherently their job. If anything, the calculation of risk was perhaps seen as the 
potential weakness of risk management as it relates to upholding and protecting its role as an 
authority. From a functional perspective, the organisation was cognisant of how the calculation of 
risk and the participatory nature of the risk assessment process, opened up the senior management 
to possible challenge. The intent of the following chapter is to explore and uncover the relevant 
findings regarding how and why those working in the navigational safety department encountered 
and responded to risk.  
6.2 Structural Dimensions 
The following section explores the role risk management had in influencing the organisational 
arrangements as it pertained to the Navigational Safety department. As will be evidenced in this 
sub-section, the need for any ERM system of managing risk had been usurped by the fact that the 
management of risk had essentially been integrated into the majority of the functional areas of the 
department by way of implementing a Safety Management System (SMS). A result of adhering to 
the guidance contained within the Port Marine Safety Code (PMSC), the need to identify, measure, 
analyse and treat navigational safety risks had implications for what constituted a risk and how 
easily the organisation could respond or modify their existing approaches to managing it. The 
primacy and centrality of the navigational safety being a core mandate positioned the other areas of 
the organisation as a secondary or supporting function. As a goal of ERM is to enable the 
organisation to identify and acknowledge how risks might be connected across an organisation, the 
domination of risk by a single department meant other risks, like HR or financial, would be hard-
pressed to challenge the pre-existing risk infrastructure required to manage navigational safety. 
Challenging how the department managed a specific risk would require the organisation to entertain 
alternative structures, relationships or technologies, not to mention the implications of sunk costs 
to existing controls and equipment that had been previously justified through prior assessments of 
risk.  
The role of managing risk also had implications from a symbolic perspective in the way that 
the organisation positioned itself to external stakeholders. Risk became an important means of 




legitimising the Navigational Safety department’s place among the broader societal backdrop of the 
river. Who the PLA was, was inextricably tied to the risk that it was statutorily obligated to manage. 
Risk became a topic of discussion and ongoing dialogue that the PLA relied on to engage a wide 
range of stakeholders. As such, risk was a common connection that was used to reinforce the 
PLA’s authority as well as capture the publics concerns. It provided them a common ground to 
both capture and demonstrate responses to issues and problems. Not to mention, the ability of the 
PLA to use the explicit metric of risk as a means to further substantiate the performance of the 
organisation, often through the apparent lack of realised risks on the river. As will be evidenced, the 
inherent challenge function associated with an effective ERM practice becomes limited when the 
management risk serves as means to also communicate a department’s organisational and societal 
legitimacy. 
6.2.1 Hardwired to Manage Risk 
It was no surprise to hear from interviewees in the navigational safety department that they felt that 
their role of ensuring the safety of navigation was upheld on the river was basically the reason the 
rest of the organisation existed: 
“Our Number 1 job is the safety of navigation, and in order to make it safe for ships to go in and 
out, you need other stuff. The hydrographic surveys to chart the depths because of the tides here, the 
shifting sandbanks and everything else, we have a very sophisticated hydrographic survey ability… 
Things like Finance, HR, Information Systems, all of those are built up effectively to support the 
safety of navigation.” (P3) 
This commonly shared and taken-for-granted understanding, was something that staff often 
tide back to reason as to why the organisation had come to be and that not much had changed 
when it came to why this function was still required, as noted by the following interviewee: 
“We were set up in 1909 as this public trust, although we aren’t allowed to use that word much 
anymore, but to hold in trust in an act of sort of Edwardian municipal socialism as a direct response 
to the chaos of Victorian capitalism that actually sorted the docks and built the docks, we need to 
have this arrangement to create order from the chaos that was to improve it and I think our roles as 
guardians of the river throughout its entire length still remains” (P7) 
This type of understanding meant that staff simply did not question the expansion of the ERM 
program, nor the need to adopt other, more comprehensive safety management systems. However, 
the adoption and hardwiring of risk management into the structural fabric of the department had 
implication for how decisions on resource allocation should and would be made. For example, the 
need to reduce the likelihood and severity of navigational incidents both reinforced, and was 
reinforced by, the existing functional structure of the department. The organisational functions that 
were structured under the Chief Harbour Master were inherently designed to identify and monitor 
the possible hazards and associated adverse events resulting from ships’ movements up and down 




the Thames. This had been hard-coded into the organisation’s ‘DNA’ over the years and was an 
explicit expectation of the principal guiding document, the PMSC. In this document, the need for 
every port authority to uphold and maintain and effective SMS. The SMS set out the expectations 
for a port authority to ensure it maintains a set of highly functioning and explicit control measures 
that comprise a broad systems approach to managing safety risks. The systems components fall into 
the two broad categories (seen as risk control measures) of ‘documentary’ and ‘hardware’. 
Examples of documentary controls are that of the regulatory framework, operating manuals and 
procedures, notices to mariners and emergency plans and procedures. The hardware components 
comprise elements such as radars, VHF communication, tide gauges, moorings, and harbour 
service craft. In directly linking the organisation’s functional areas to corresponding controls, 
rationalising any modification to either the software or hardware components of the SMS, the staff 
felt it should be supported by some type of risk assessment that would validate the expenditure.    
“So, fundamental to this whole thing, is risk assessment. So, if we have a bylaw that says thou shall 
not do this or thou shall not do that, it’s not because the Chief Harbour Master thinks that’s the way 
it should be. There should be a risk assessment process that leads to that bylaw being developed as a 
risk control measure and that might be a bylaw or a direction or some other thing. The risk control 
measures will therefor vary enormously.” (P3) 
An example of how risk assessment influenced resource expenditures was described by one 
interviewee who spoke of the evaluation of the need for building a new tower to house one of three 
radars along the course of the Thames that was at the time, situated on a building in a poor state of 
disrepair. Although the building was slated to be torn down, it was just two years prior, costs had 
been incurred to upgrade the tower. As such, a reasonable course of action would be to justify the 
cost of the tower upgrade in that it supports protects the prior investment and provides increased 
coverage of the river along with increased resiliency in the event that one of the other radars fail. 
What could have been a rather straight-forward cost/benefit analysis, required a supplementary 
risks assessment as proposed by the Chief Harbour Master. The corresponding subjective 
assessment framed the corner as ‘risky to small vessel traffic’, and as such, unquestionably justified 
the expenditure – no more questions were raised.    
A similar example was also put forward by another respondent when talking about the PLA’s 
spill response capabilities. One of the primary environmental risks had been associated with the 
transportation of crude oil to the Coryton oil refinery. As the refinery had recently closed, the 
transportation of heavy crude was no longer a substance that would be a potential contaminant 
requiring clean-up. The essential elimination of this risk resulted in the PLA no longer requiring the 
specialised equipment used to clean up a crude oil spill. However, in removing this risk from the 
rolling hazard list, a new risk ‘emerged’ in regards to heavy fuel gas; a risk that had been on the 
register along-side the crude oil spill but with little attention being afforded to it.  




“That level of risk was always there, but you could argue that it has risen in that it ships have gotten 
bigger but really, with the crude oil being gone, you can now refocus on something new. Again, we have 
to rely on the fact that the ships are properly constructed and piloted appropriately, and our limited 
response capability was focused on crude but now we can demonstrate we can clean up heavy fuel oil 
and we changed and refocused our oil spill response capability and acquired new kit to deal with it.” 
(P10) 
In the above scenario, the risk wasn’t even re-assed but it was purely by virtue of a higher risk 
being eliminated that resulted in the rationalisation that fuel gas would now be new focus of spill 
response capabilities. What had been an acceptable level of risk was now deemed to be too high 
and required additional resources to mitigate the consequence of a possible future spill. The 
acquisition of new equipment had reassured the navigational safety staff that the risk now remained 
low as evidenced by the following operational risk register line item. 
Figure 6.1 Operational Risk Register Detail  









Current Risk Management Strategy 

















pollution of the 
water, air or land 
(caused by PLA 






being heavy fuel 
oil from a large 
commercial 
vessel. 
2 4 8 
Oil Spill Contingency Plan audited and 
approved by MCA 
Spill equipment, equipment readily 
available (TOSCA) 
Merchant Shipping Act powers to 
regulate bunkering 
Oil Spill incident training regime 
Maintain tier 1 and 2 response 
effectiveness and capability  
VTS 
 
1 2 2 Low 
 
In viewing the above, the residual risk associated with the implementation of controls is scored 
as low. The identified control measures reduce both the likelihood and severity of a spill. However, 
this line item also appeared in the ‘external’ risk register as a line item under the ‘environmental’ 
section of the register. 
Figure 6.2 Environmental Risk Register Detail 
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This discrepancy in assessment of risk highlights some significant issues with the current 
structuring and oversight of risks within the organisation. When questioned about the difference in 
scoring, the staff felt that it was due to the different perspectives on the types of controls and that 
the environmental group would inherently view this as higher risk due to the nature of the risk. It 
would be natural to assume that those overseeing the environmental issues would place a greater 
value on these types of risk which is supported by their inherent risk assessment. They could also 
be less familiar with the level and effectiveness of the controls they did not recognise, which could 
also support the higher residual risk ranking. However, there was no indication from staff that this 
would be reconciled, perhaps undermining one of the critical functions of the risk assessment 
process, being that of challenging assumptions.  
Overall, although the Navigational Safety department was receptive to the implementation of 
an ERM style of risk management at the organisation, the impact on their existing infrastructure 
was not something they saw as either a threat or for that matter, something to be overly concerned 
with. The existence of well-established risk control measures, along with supporting reporting and 
monitoring protocols that had been basically hardwired into the organisation meant that there was 
little need, or room, for improvement. The following section will now move on to expand how the 
role of risk management shaped interactions with external stakeholders, as well as how it influenced 
the organisation’s understanding of its identity.   
6.2.2 Managing Risk Relationships 
Risk management also played a significant role in how the internal structure and function of the 
navigational safety department related to the ‘outside world’. As much as the pre-existing explicit 
risk management framework driven by the SMS substantively shaped the organisational structure, it 
also served a broader purpose in regards to its symbolic significance. The ability and obligation to 
manage risk on behalf of the river user opened up a variety of ‘risk dialogues’ that could both 
express, and legitimise, the organisation’s identity and actions.  
The centrality of risk within the Navigational Safety department meant that it played a very 
symbolic role in how the organisation understood its broader public-value and corresponding 
‘corporate’ identity. As much as adopting the institutionalised practice of risk management itself can 
be seen as means to achieving further legitimacy (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Suchman 1992; 
Power 2004), the actual practice of risk management afforded an opportunity for the PLA to 
further establish its place a legitimate harbour authority. The management of risk essentially 
enabled the navigational safety department to explicitly demonstrate and communicate key 
messages to directly, and indirectly, impacted stakeholders. It was widely accepted that ‘proper’ risk 
management included communicating with various stakeholders along the riverbanks. Not so much 
as a means to assess or analyse the risk but rather as a means to solicit feedback on treatment 
options or to possibly discover new hazards or issues worth possible investigation. It also worked 




as a feedback mechanism to informally gather key intelligence on what the broader public placed 
value in and on.  
 The primary mechanism to solicit and collect input from the public was achieved through 
quarterly meetings that happened down the length of the river throughout the year. risk 
management was a tool that was used to engage a wide range of stakeholders who sought to access 
and navigate the river. The need to assess the majority of activities, new or existing, that would 
transpire along the river ensured that the navigational safety department would have some say in 
what could, and could not, be allowed to happen. The significance of this relationship was well 
understood and that it formed a key link to managing risks to their reputation: 
“When you are up that end of the river, the potential for low-level chatter, or that we have to deal with 
23 local authorities and we have to deal with the mayor it doesn’t take long for disgruntlement to 
spread into something that could be a little more problematic, it wouldn’t threaten the PLA but then 
who is to say that given a few years it wouldn’t be something else… all you need is a few people 
standing up at a public meeting or a stakeholder forum when the entirety of the board is there asking 
who are you accountable to, and that this is a disgrace, that won’t go down well” (P7) 
However, the potential of public opposition to PLA decisions and activities did not mean that 
the Navigational Safety department was averse to external challenge, and in fact it used the role of 
the organisation to reduce challenges to the controls it introduced. By closely aligning the need for 
the organisation with reduction in adverse events and increased safety, the PLA could position the 
intents and purposes of the organisation in a favourable light. One such case involved the seasonal 
increase in fluvial flows along the river that resulted in high-water moving at dangerously high rates 
of speed. This posed a real problem for the PLA in that technically, the Public Rights of Navigation 
on tidal waters affords individuals unfettered access to the river, even during dangerous times like 
those encountered during increased fluvial flows. The problem arose when although the majority of 
river uses were not interested in accessing the river during these times, some individuals had less 
choice in that they were competitive athletes adhering to strict training schedules.  
The problem was less from highly-skilled rowers navigating a more demanding river but rather 
the signal their usage of the river gave to those less familiar with the increased danger the river 
posed during increased fluvial flows. As the PLA was not able to bar the athletes from using the 
river, they did have the ability introduce a warning flag system that had a rather powerful indirect 
effect. The ‘primary’ intent of the color-coded flagging system was to indicate to all potential users 
that the PLA advised against entering the river due to unsafe conditions. Initially, this flag was 
ignored by the athletes and they continued on with their training, an exercise that also indicated to 
the less-trained individuals that people were out on the river and as such, they could use it too. This 
quickly lead to inexperienced individuals requiring rescue on multiple occasions. However, as the 
insurance companies who provided coverage for the athletes caught wind of the PLA’s cautionary 
advice being disregarded, they pulled coverage for many athletes during this time, resulting in their 
inability to access the water either. The knock-on effect being that no individuals on the river 




coupled with the warning flags meant the likelihood of less experienced users getting into trouble 
was greatly reduced. This scenario is reminiscent of the ‘opposing maximiser’ approach to 
managing risk put forward by Hood (1996) where rather than using a ‘homeostatic’ pre-defined 
acceptable risk limit to measure the need and amount of control required to bring risk into check, a 
more ‘collibrative’ mechanism is employed that serves to leverage opposing stakeholder values a 
means or bringing risk into an acceptable balance. In this respect, rather than having to establish 
explicit risk tolerances and possibly opening up the debate as two what is and isn’t consider too 
risky, the PLA can rely on the pre-existing relationship between the athletes and the insurers to 
reconcile what should be considered an acceptable course of action.  
Relationships with commercial entities were also channelled through the collaborative risk 
management process. Along-side the three corporate risk registers, the PLA also created, when 
deemed necessary, corporate registers for longer-standing projects or events. The need to 
collectively assess risk with external parties provided the PLA an opportunity to establish more 
personal and direct relationships with those who were conducting activities on the river. The 
process was as much about gaining insights as it was about gaining familiarity with the parties 
involved. It also served to reinforce who the PLA was and what their role and relationship would 
be. For example, the Chief Harbour Master spoke of the need to plan for possibly one of the 
largest events to ever take place on the river, being that of Queen’s Diamond Jubilee River Pageant. 
The initial proposed event, and what the PLA originally agreed to overseeing, was planned to 
involve 2-300 hundred vessels. However, an announcement by London’s Mayor later announced, 
to the PLA’s horror, that the Pageant would include upwards of 1000 private and commercial craft. 
Despite the massive increase in complexity required to coordinate that many vessels at one time, 
the Chief Harbour Master relied on his tried and trusted paper-based risk-register as a means to 
engage and capture vital information from a team of over 100 experts involved in the planning 
process.  
“The reason it worked is that we were rigorous in our hazard identification and assessments, and that 
we remained open minded in that risk assessment is an inclusive process and not something that you 
do in an ivory tower. You need to get people who know, it’s no use me talking about the risks of a 
harbour service, you need to get the lowly deck hand and the boat driver up here and say listen, we are 
having a discussion on the risk assessment of your launch and you need to tell me some stuff.” (P3) 
These ‘bespoke’ risk registers served as an opening opportunity for major stakeholders to 
gather and exchange information on the common ground of shared values and goals, being that of 
navigational safety. The resulting dialogue that was generated by the risk assessment process, was 
also used to inform, albeit informally, the explication of an agreed upon ‘risk tolerance’ for the 
event:   
“The risk appetite for the event was agreed upon beforehand. It was collectively agreed that one serious 
injury to one person was unacceptable. So that is what all of the risk mitigation was aimed at, 




avoiding a serious injury, that was the non-negotiable. One serious injury would ruin the entire day.” 
(P3) 
Although more technical and advanced intelligence and software was at the disposal of the risk 
management team dedicated to assessing and treating each individual line item, it was felt that the 
simple and basic nature of the spreadsheet approach ensured people were able to share their 
expertise in a non-judgmental manner. It was much more about getting the information out of 
people’s heads rather than arguing over likelihood or severity scores. This use of a simple, straight 
forward and pragmatic approach to managing an extremely dynamic and high-profile event suggests 
that in the end, shared understandings of what can go wrong may be more important than the 
quantitative score that could accompany them.   
6.2.3 Section Summary 
The high-level of pre-existing risk management controls and management systems that was dictated 
by the PMSC presented a challenge in regards to how the employees of the Navigational Safety 
department interacted with the enterprise-wide management of risk. The amount of integration of 
key risk management activities, such as hazard identification, risk assessment and analysis, as well as 
monitoring and of course risk controls, left the ERM framework with little more enhancement to 
offer. The organisation hard-coded the controls into the structure of the department and in doing 
so, risk was positioned as means to justifying decisions and securing resources. As such, the 
enterprise register became an opportunity for the Navigational Safety department to communicate 
to other areas of the organisation, as well as external stakeholders, why their controls were needed 
and the important role that the Navigational Safety department plays in the PLA.  
 The Navigational Safety department emphasised the value created through engaging 
stakeholders in risk-based dialogues, both through the exchange of information through public 
meetings, as well as through the creation of shared specialised risk registers. By engaging with 
stakeholders in structured discussion that centred on risk, the PLA was able to communicate their 
identity and substantiate their relationship with a broad range of stakeholders. The need to manage 
the risks posed to navigational safety was a commonly understood and shared goal among those in 
which the PLA would interact with. Using this a shared objective, meant that the PLA could 
reinforce the benefit its rules, requirements and oversight could bring about and at the same time, it 
acted as a successful mechanism to minimise the likelihood of external challenges to their authority. 
The following section expands on the role risk management played in justifying the decisions 
being made by the department, as well as how they could further protect these decisions from 
external scrutiny. Just as the practice of risk management had been well-established as a central 
organising principle, the role of experiential knowledge was equally foundational in supporting the 
vital risk assessment process. 




6.3 Functional Dimensions 
At this point, there is no denying the fact that the Navigational Safety department relied heavily on 
the risk assessment process in determining how best to respond to potential threats to safety on the 
river. Risk assessments represented a key piece of decision-making information that was critically 
relied on to justify actions regarding how best to ensure failures did not, or could not, transpire. 
The centrality of the risk assessment process in regards to justifying and upholding the ability of the 
PLA demonstrate its right to be called an authority further emphasised the need for high-calibre 
risk assessments. As much as the risk assessment process could open up lines of communication 
and engagement with stakeholders, so to could it expose the decisions to increased level of scrutiny. 
Further to this, there was an institutionalised expectation that a formal risk assessment process 
capable of producing explicit and auditable records be generated by way of adherence to the 
PMSC’s requirement for Safety Management System. For these reasons, the Navigational Safety 
Department relied on some relatively advanced marine-focused risk assessment software.  
This software, which had been co-developed by a marine safety consulting firm and the PLA, 
was used to bolster the heavy reliance on first-hand accounts and highly experiential data that was 
seen as being the best and most reliable source of risk information. Just as the organisation had 
seen risk as being hardwired into the organisations structural composition, so too was it an intrinsic 
part of how individuals themselves. Often referred to as ‘applying professional judgment’ the 
employees of the Navigational Safety department used the knowledge amassed over their careers 
patrolling and overseeing the activities on the river. One of the well understood benefits of ERM is 
that ability to shed light on how risk have been assessed and understood by an organisation. This 
explication of the calculative process has been seen to have the effect of basically ‘turning 
organisation’s inside out’ (Power 2007). However, as much as the PLA acknowledged the benefit of 
open and free exchanges of information pertaining to hazards and risks during their collaborative 
risk assessments, the actual calculation and storage of the information used to inform these 
assessments turn out to be less transparent.  
6.3.1 Gut Feel and the Reliance on Experiential Data 
Much like the notion of risk management was well-woven into the functional composition of the 
organisation’s structure, so to was it tightly integrated into how they conducted the business of 
overseeing navigational safety. It was a deeply held and repeatedly expressed belief that the staff of 
the Navigational Safety department felt risk management was something inherent in what they did 
and was simply part of doing their job, and had been for as long as can be remembered: 
“We are a 2000-year-old port, we’ve now been told that we need to implement a safety management 
system based on risk assessment but we are where we are, we’ve got 2000 years of experience so we 
have got a lot in place already” (P10) 




This inherent notion that risk management was imply what they did, meant that the staff’s 
ability to naturally identify and know what is and is not a risk came down to their professional 
judgment. Just as the functional aspects of the department’s structure revolved around the 
collecting, monitoring and responding to risk, the knowledge and assessment of any risk was 
amassed over a lifetime’s career of different experiences. This experiential source of knowledge was 
the primary source of information used to substantiate the departments understanding of what 
would be considered a risk and subsequently, how much risk was involved. In observing the 
Navigational Safety Management team’s quarterly meeting dedicated to reviewing a rolling list of 
navigational hazards, it became quite clear that the review process was more about recounting 
stories than technical analyses. Personal histories and accounts of past events and near misses was 
by far the most frequently cited source of information used to inform both the likelihood and 
severity and the senior management team would bring up a specific line item and then either 
validate or disqualify it through reference of a personal experience or anecdotal story. This 
approach was substantiated by the following interviewees response when speaking to how the 
department approaches risk assessment: 
 “… a lot of the hazards that we review, and you know, we will sit around the table and say right, so 
when was the last time that we had this happen? And some of us have been there 20-25 years and we 
say I can’t remember that, but it is a credible set of circumstances that could very well happen 
tomorrow but because we have compulsory parties, oversight from VTS, because we’ve got charts and 
buoys and everything else…” (P10) 
However, this reliance on first-hand experiences driving the understanding of how risks should 
be viewed could undermine the very challenge function that risk management seeks to elicit. Such a 
strong over-reliance on subjective data opens the door for the application of biases and heuristics 
which have been noted to have both negative and positive impacts when it comes to making risky 
decisions under some level of uncertainty. This could result in the application of the ‘familiarity 
heuristic’, in which an individual would recall past behaviours as representative of what would most 
likely transpire again in a seemingly similar scenario. On one hand, relying on this type of mental 
short-cut could drastically underestimate the level of risk posed by a given scenario, simply due to 
the fact that relevant information was either not accessible at the time a decision was rendered or 
even perhaps disregard due to it not fitting the applied mental model. On the other hand, benefits 
can also be rendered from the application of these same types of short-cuts can provide close to 
similar assessment of risk and at a fraction of the effort required by their more laborious, 
quantitative counterparts (Kahneman 2011).  
Time and time again, respondents stressed the importance of relying on and applying first-
hand knowledge and experiences when it came to assessing and responding to risks. This deference 
to expertise was preferred over the option of exploiting sources of information that were collected 
through alternate means, such as reports of incidents submitted through established protocols or 
that of local, national or international incident databases. Although third-party data was 




incorporated into the discussions and assessments of risk, first-hand accounts of incidents were 
viewed to be the ‘most reliable’ source of information. Perhaps one of the best representations of 
the navigational management team demonstrating the preference for incorporating first-hand 
experience into the decisions on navigational safety risks was provided through the increasing 
popularity of the recreational activity of Stand-Up Paddle-boarding (SUP): 
“People have more free time on their hands than they did in the 1950’s, people want to come up with 
weirder and wackier ways to enjoy themselves in their time off, the new one for us is stand-up paddle 
boarding… which is crudely, standing on a surf board with a single paddle… I have to say I’ve done 
it and its really great… and so what we have got is a new type of water-sport activity that we don’t 
really understand that well, its fairly new, there is no national governing body… you don’t have the 
clubs like rowing or the national body so the risk level is much higher” (P25) 
As the above quote speaks to, the lack of familiarity with the activity drove the perception of 
risk, rather than the actual physical activity itself.  
“I’m not sure a risk assessment is right if it says something fundamentally different to what your gut 
feel is. Unless your gut feel has changed while you are doing the risk assessment but if the risk 
assessment hasn’t prompted you to think about anything any differently the risk assessment should 
say what your gut feel says.” (P25) 
The reliance on first-hand experience as the primary, and at times only, source of data meant 
that information sources that drew from aggregated data, like national or international statistics, 
were seen to have less relevance due to the geographic or social contexts being underrepresented. 
In the case of Stand-up Paddle Boarding, a ‘true’ understanding of the risk could not be undertaken 
without the witnessing of the event first-hand. In this regard, local area knowledge was always seen 
as being a more accurate, although subjective, conception of what could and will go wrong. As this 
information was not on-hand, the Chief Harbour Master took a trip out to the recreational portion 
of the river to gain first-hand experience of what was involved, after which an assessment of the 
risk associated with the activity was derived. The activity was seen as an acceptable activity, as long 
as it remained in the recreational portion of the river. Any usage of this type of craft in the centre 
of commercial end of the river, was deemed unacceptable.   
As much as the Navigational Safety department relied on this type of subjective risk 
assessment process, it was understood that the possibility of improving the accuracy as well as the 
credibility of them was possible through alternate means. Along this vein, the organisation had 
been tackling the incorporation and application of risk management software for over a decade. As 
intuitive as the software was for the average user, its formalised and quantitative approach still had 
trouble resonating with those required to use it.  




6.3.2 Introducing Objectivity and the Challenge of the Black Box  
Unlike the administrative services and the marine operations departments, the role of technology 
took a much more prominent position when it came to the assessment of risk for the navigational 
safety department. Risk registers and collective discussions were used much like the other areas, in 
order to capture and rank the risks and colour code the various scores. However, this was 
supplementary to a much longer standing risk assessment mechanism that had, since the early 
2000s, utilised a computer software package. Known by its product name of HAZMAN, the 
navigational safety department was the only department to employ specialised risk management 
software that was dedicated to assessing the risks to navigational safety. The software of choice was 
co-developed by the PLA and external consultancy company that specialises in maritime risk 
assessment. The resulting product, now in its second iteration as indicated by the name of 
HAZMAN II, is a risk assessment software program that:  
 “…Uses a web-based platform [that] incorporates a stylish and easy to use interface, with a high 
degree of flexibility and can carry out a range of different risk assessments anywhere in the world.” 
(Marico 2015)  
The software basically acts as means to demonstrate adherence with the Port Marine Safety 
Code’s requirement for a documented Safety Management System that is ‘based on risk’. 
Essentially, the computer program allows a trained user to input frequency and consequence data 
into standardised fields that can automate the scoring of risks for ‘most likely’ and ‘worst credible’ 
scenarios. The following provides a screen shot of the input page for scoring these two metrics. 
Figure 6.3 HAZMAN II Risk Scoring Screen Shot 
 







After providing the above inputs, a user can then be afforded a ‘dashboard’ view of the 
navigational risks the port is faced with in what is suggestive of a very technical, objective and 
quantitative portrayal of the risks being managed by the organisation. 
 
Figure 6.4 HAZMAN II Risk Assessment Overview User Interface Screen Shot 
 
As intuitive and graphically engaging as the software program was, none of the staff, outside of 
the single individual tasked with inputting the data on behalf of the department, saw any significant 
benefit by using it, as noted by the following interviewee:   
 
 “So, what the HAZMAN system does is you go into with likelihood consequence and then what is 
the worst possible what is the most likely and you look in terms of people, environment, cost and 
reputation. Those are the four things. The problem that we have had with that system is that when 
you get the numbers out and they are ranked it is quite often difficult to see how the numbers were 
derived. So, there is always going to be an element of judgement that goes into the process I think, 
always. Because you are going to have to take a look at the ranking that has been produced by that 
and you are going to have say ok does this hazard… is it really, actually number one or is this one 
down here number one.” (P3) 
 In witnessing a special training day devoted to further ‘rolling out’ the software to the 
deputy harbour masters, and others in the navigational safety department, the software consultancy 




firm provided the staff with an in-depth overview of how the software worked and how it could 
further benefit the risk management efforts in the department. It soon became apparent that the 
staff were less than enthusiastic to engage with the software. Although participants expressed that 
they were impressed by the apparent sophistication, they soon began to question how this could be 
incorporated into the daily decisions on risk. The term professional judgment was often used to 
suggest that although this type of process was clearly sound, it was sub-optimal to their current 
subjective techniques.  
This lack of interest in the more quantitative risk assessment, could be in part due to a general 
resistance to change, however this was not an overly new element. As stated, the software had been 
around in multiple iterations for over a decade. A more telling driver behind the lack of interest in 
the process could have be due to the ‘tone-at-the-top’. Although it was stated that the use of this 
software was encouraged, and for that matter expected, by the board of directors, several 
statements made by the Chief Harbour Master suggested that a more symbolic adherence to the 
control measure be assumed. When the scores that were outputted from the software program 
contradicted prior subjective assessments, the statement was made to the effect of ‘you must 
remember, is always a matter of professional judgment and common sense must be applied’. This 
underlying opinion was further encountered during an interview:  
“The problem with the quantitative, objective approaches to risk assessment is that you don’t get 
people thinking about it in the right way, you don’t get them owning it. You sit in a group and they 
are just watching a series of numbers, it doesn’t mean a lot, whereas if you go about thinking about it 
in a subjective way, then everyone buys into it whether it is the deck hand or the chief harbour master 
or the chief executive they are all participating in the process to identify, assess the risk and the risk 
control measures to reduce down to an acceptable level and they all buy into that” (P3) 
What is perhaps most interesting by this rejection of more elaborate and quantitative means of 
risk assessment is that instead of being applied as a black-box that could further protect and 
obfuscate the process, it was seen as hindrance and one that could actually compromise it. Rather 
than relying on technological means to protect the calculation of risk, credibility was housed within 
the experiences of those assessing the risk, and as such, further protection was not seen as relevant, 
if anything it could pose a threat to replacing an individual’s capability, a theme that is made clearly 
evident in the following chapter. 
6.3.3 Section Summary 
The challenge here for the enterprise approach to managing risk is again the notion that the 
individuals in this area are already inherently analysing risk via the application of their past 
experiences in assessing likelihood and severity of future events. This subjective data that the rely 
on is not amenable to explicit audit trails and although statistical data exists, credible risk 
assessment is viewed as being best achieved through the use of first-hand accounts and experiential 
data sources. Upon reflection, if could be argued that the enterprise approach had yet to formalise 




specific criteria for measuring the likelihood or severity of risk, and as such this would be rectified 
once a standardised approach was practiced uniformly across the enterprise. However, the 
Navigational Safety department had been conducting ‘formal’ assessments for risk for well over a 
decade and had yet to establish or rely on explicit criteria for quantifying their assessments. The 
likelihood of what was already positioned as a supplementary process has less than favourable odds 
in initiating a substantive change.  At the end of the day, gut feel and intuition were the only reliable 
sources of ‘true risk’, and any notion of risk acceptability would remain for the most part implied 
and ad-hoc rather than a firm and explicit measure.  
In a somewhat surprising finding, the use of technology to further refine the risk assessment 
process was utilised less a means to protect risk informed decisions and rather as a threat to them. 
The lack of subjectivity failed to resonate with participants who had long relied and appreciated 
‘real world’ accounts of how dangers and failures unfolded. The uptake of more quantitative means 
remained highly ceremonial in nature and served more as means to satisfy coercive institutional 
pressures rather than provide further accuracy of assessed the risks.  
The following section explores how a ‘culture of control’ underpinned the structural and 
functional dimensions of this area of the organisation’s response to formalisation of enterprise-wide 
approach to risk management. It is the underlying values placed that staff tied to a port authority’s 
ability to control its environment, and those within in it. A theme of ‘deep integration’ continues to 
be supported from a cultural standpoint and is reflected in how the process of risk management 
was used to validate its actions and reason for being.  
6.4 Cultural Dimensions  
Culturally, the tremendous value of risk management was a deep and taken-for-granted assumption 
among those who interviewed from the Navigational Safety department. Substantively, the ability to 
effectively manage risk was directly correlated to an individual’s ability to apply professional 
judgment in regards to the likelihood and consequence of hazardous events, such as the contact, 
groundings or collisions of vessels on the river. The ability to amass, access and apply relevant first-
hand accounts and experiences in order to generate valid assessments of the ‘real’ risks and how 
best to manage them produced significant findings regarding how and why the organisation applied 
the management practice. Heuristics, biases and the fallibility of experts shape not only the 
understanding of what a risk is but also its measure and subsequent response. Linking this 
management practice so closely and synonymously with an individual’s skill sets up specific 
challenges that can work to undermine, rather than enhance the achievement of risk management’s 
objectives. 
Exploring the symbolic implications of risk management for the culture of the Navigational 
Safety department, historical failures or catastrophic proportions reinforced and overshadowed 
existing organisation conceptions of risk. Significant failures can produce knee-jerk reactions that 
can shape an organisation’s emphasis of risk management’s role in ensuring control effectiveness 




over that of challenging assumptions, leading to potentially dangerous levels of complacency and 
risk attenuation. The following section will explore the findings related to the interplay between the 
how and why the Navigational Safety department undertook the practice of risk management and 
the implications this had from cultural standpoint.  
6.4.1 Qualifying Risk Assessments  
In exploring the cultural implications relating to the management of risk, the need to establish and 
maintain control was found to be a commonly, albeit somewhat expected, shared value within the 
department. Part of being an ‘authority’ meant that the organisation’s performance and legitimacy 
revolved around its ability to influence, via the ‘hard and soft’ controls it chose to introduce and 
maintain. As such, how, where, when and why controls were being used was of significant 
importance in communicating and reinforcing the department’s ability to control the likelihood or 
consequence of navigational incidents.  
As the previous sections indicate, risk management was seen to be an inherent skill and 
function of the navigational safety department was well in hand through organisations existing 
structural and functional elements. However, this did not mean that the ERM approach to 
documenting, communicating and ‘registering’ of risks was not significant when it came to 
understanding the role of risk management for navigational safety. Taking the operational risk 
register at face value, it could be seen as a rather unremarkable and expected list of 11 risks that one 
would expect a port authority to be concerned with. The line items spoke to primarily physical 
events, such as collision, damage to infrastructure, or pollution that would impact the ‘enduring 
statutory duty’ corporate objective of the PLA. However, upon closer inspection, it can be argued 
that the register was less about monitoring the status of relevant risks and much more about 
reinforcing and validating a comprehensive set of controls that were linked to a single individual 
within the organisation, the Chief Harbour Master.  
In reviewing the interview transcripts, it was apparent that the Chief Harbour Master had 
struggle to find a way to assess the effectiveness of the applied controls in relationship to specific 
risks that it managed. Outside of using the absence of failure to indicate a correct and well-
functioning control, the Chief Harbour Master knew that a more direct linkage between control 
and risk reduction was required. This is when the overly-subjective risk assessment process started 
to undermine the monitoring evaluator components of well-functioning risk management program: 
 “Although it always involves professional judgment, we understand the relationship between inherent 
and residual risk and the improvement the risk control measure brings over the inherent risk and it’s 
not something I have been able to get my head around yet. So, with our software we want to be able to 
show, over time that we have reduced the risk somehow, and it is something we don’t do enough of” 
(P3) 
As they found it difficult to capture, the ability to instill confidence and communicate the 
comprehensiveness of the risk controls in place was of obvious concern. Despite the expressed lack 




of ability to measure the effectiveness of their controls in relationship to specific risks, the ERM 
register told a much different story. For example, the risk of “Major damage to PLA Infrastructure 
affecting PLA ability to operate” was scored as having a probability of 2 (out of 5) and an impact of 
5 (out of 5) when viewed before applying the controls that were in place. In the column reserved 
for existing controls, 12 controls were identified, all of which spoke to existing and ‘hardwired’ 
functions of the organisation, such as staff training, maintaining key infrastructure, or the process 
of risk assessment itself. The post-control subjective assessment reduced the probability score by 
one and was seen to have no reduction to the severity of the impact. However, much like was 
encountered in the previous chapter, this single point reduction reduced the risk score from 10 
(yellow) in half to that of a 5, or low (green) (see figure 6.5).  
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Loss of VTS 
Center. Major 
Fire at the PLA 
Premises, on a 
vessel, terminal 
or other structure 
affecting 
operations, flood 
2 5 10 
Risk assessment / hazard review 
VTS/TBNC dual location 
Enhanced internal security measures 
implemented following introduction of 
ISPS 
DfT approved PLA Port Security Plan 
Staff fire awareness training 
In house navigation systems 
engineering 
London Titan planned maintenance 
program 
Departmental business continuity plans 
Maintaining key infrastructure 
Survey work maintaining safe depths 
Improvement to fire alarm system 
linking Denton systems to LRH system 
Flood gate procedures agreed with EA 
 
1 5 5 Low 
 
This ‘laundry list’ of controls was consistently applied to each line item in the risk register, save 
that of the final three line items of the register which all spoke to non-physical events such as lack 
of funding or the construction of ‘major projects on or near the river’ each of which lay outside of 
the PLA’s direct influence. In doing so, the register became more of a tool to acknowledge the 
appropriateness of current activities rather than substantiating their influence on the reduction of 
adverse events on the river.  
Not only was there a prevalent need to instill a sense of competent control, the control was 
most often positioned as influencing the prevention, rather than mitigation of a risk event. For 
example, in viewing the 11 line items, nine of them were ranked in the green, or low, after the 
controls were applied. In addition to this, every one of these line items saw the majority of the risk 
being influenced by a reduction in the likelihood, rather than any mitigation of the failures impact. 9 
of the 11 line items had their probability reduced down to 1 out of a possible 5 after the controls 
were applied. As the only true performance metric available to them was the year’s number of 
navigational incidents, preventing an occurrence rather than mitigating its impact is an obvious 
preference. This was further reinforced, much like the other registers, in tying the reputational 




impact of the occurrence of the event to each line item. Again, preventing the incident minimises 
the possible impact to the organisation’s reputation.  
The value of prevention also served to reinforce how many staff felt that in the end, there was 
little they could do to physically stop an event from happening:  
“When it comes down to it, it’s not up to me or my staff, it is up to the guy on that ship, acting 
professionally and following the rules… we have to rely on the fact that the ship is certified, that the 
crew is properly experienced - but in the end, it comes down to the guy steering that ship. What we are 
here to do is put in place information, support and advice for people using the river, how they use it is 
up to them, not us.” (P10) 
The longstanding notion that the Navigational Safety department was designed to manage risk 
and the employees who were responsible for designing and implementing controls were inherent 
experts at assessing risk had deeply engrained the idea that control was who they were and why they 
existed. The culture of the department was focused on establishing, justifying a validating its 
actions, all of which were conceived of as some type of control measure. However, the subjective 
nature of their assessment process left them at a severe disadvantage when it came time to tangibly 
link their efforts to the performance of those very same controls. There is a chance however, that 
as the ERM program continues to expand and mature, that the proposed introduction of explicit 
measurement metrics may begin to shift the reliance on subject and experiential accounts for risk to 
sources of data that are more easily quantified.   
6.4.2 Symbolic Failures and Complacency 
Just as risk management played a significant role in how the organisation used the concept of 
brought value to the work they undertook, so too did it influence the organisation’s culture from a 
symbolic perspective. The catastrophic nature of a failed attempt to manage the risks to 
navigational safety served as a powerful and unifying symbol among the staff of the PLA, regardless 
of the area of the organisation they were working in. However, the seriousness of the potential 
outcomes of a realized risk, such as a collision or grounding that could result in an irreversible loss 
of life, weighed heavy on those working in the navigational safety department. By far above all 
other incidents along the river, the sinking of the Marchioness pleasure boat on August 20, 1989 
served as a constant reminder to the staff of the navigational safety department as to why their job 
was important and why they required the authority that was bestowed upon them:  
“The culture in the port and the catalyst for change in the organisation was the Marchioness disaster 
in the late 80’s and the inquiry that went on the ten years following that. You know, people were 
obviously pulled into court and a lot of press around that and it was a massive thing and that brought 
about big enhancements in safety and the port generally where whether it was the way in which 
communications was scrutinized, potentially dissected during the course of that inquiry as to how 
people responded that evening, the messages that were conveyed or not, and the fallout from that, in the 




way in which the Port tried to protect itself moving forward from future interrogation of that type and 
also to protect people on the river generally.” (P6) 
The ensuing symbolism generated by the Marchioness disaster had implications for how the 
department viewed their ability to influence the likelihood or consequence of events. First, the 
catastrophic failure served as defining moment within the organisation’s history that struck directly 
into its core mandate of navigational safety. In doing so, it provided staff with a first-hand account 
that served as an indisputable fact of just how important the PLA’s role is on the river is and how 
quickly catastrophic failures could occur. This ‘lesson learned’ produced a powerful symbol that 
instils a culture of prevention throughout the PLA, underpinning the focus of navigational safety. 
For example, staff often cited the disastrous event as a reason for the PLA’s vigilance and a 
qualifier of any efforts being applied. Almost serving as a rationalising ‘trump card’, interview 
participants frequently brought up the event when speaking to the risks they were managing, and 
how their immediate work was linked to preventing a comparable incident in the future:  
You know it’s like the Marchioness, people say you can’t have another Marchioness, but you can’t 
say that but what we can do as an organisation and what we have done for the past 20 some odd 
years is but put in as much hardware and software that you can to make it as safe as possible and try 
to prevent it from happening again, so it’s a lot less likely but you can’t say it won’t happen but if 
those things are in place it is a lot less likely that the PLA will be criticised” (P10) 
However, it has been close to 30 years since the terrible day in 1989, and in the absence of any 
subsequent significant failure, organisational controls have somewhat gone unchallenged and as 
evidenced by the previous section, are being conceived as ‘performing as expected’. Although near 
misses and ‘navigational hazards’ (i.e. incidents) are reported and incorporated as lessons learned, 
the underlying cultural message generated by the lack of significant consequences only further 
reinforces the notion that a disaster isn’t being allowed to happen again. It is when organisations 
fail to recognise and address latent systemic failures that disasters can become realised (Turner 
1976). The PLA’s current approach to managing navigational safety risks affords little opportunity 
to explore and uncover systemic risk, and their current lack of involvement with the more ‘system-
wide’ ERM program does not indicate that this is soon to change.  
 The lack of organisational challenge can, and did, lead to a sense of relatively unfounded 
comfort among the senior executive. In a classic response to economic hardships requiring fiscal 
restraint, the organisation sought to reduce or eliminate ‘non-essential’ services. The absence of 
failure has seen resources be reallocated on the grounds that risks, or rather incidents, continue to 
remain low coupled with an inherent ‘culture of prevention’, the need for contingency management 
team was no longer seen as being required. The following quote from P6 exemplifies this: 
“On this floor, we have lost the contingency management team, unfortunately they were one of the 
casualties of trying to streamline the business…. We have had to distribute the workload in order to 
still fulfil our statutory requirements…although you never know, 7,8, 10 years down the line the port 




trade could be booming again, we could have, there could be an unfortunate accident somewhere and 
the need for contingency management team could arise again, cause often with these things you find 
sometimes they are knee jerk reactions in many organisations… without those pressures these things 
have been redistributed” (P6) 
The knee jerk reactions to significant failures incites can increase organisational attention and 
vigilance, yet, as time passes and no further risks are realized, vigilance begins to atrophy and 
complacency can set in (Freudenburg 1992). This complacency was also evidenced by the risk 
registers in regards to a column that was titled ‘Future Actions required’. Many of the line items saw 
the cell in spreadsheet left blank with no follow-up actions identified. When the cell was populated 
the text read ‘continue current regime’, ‘continued vigilance’ or ‘nothing further’. In the absence of 
any recent failures to act as a challenge function, the register served to validate that all of the 
existing controls were adequate and functioning as they should. It has been some time since the 
disastrous Marchioness event that now serves a fading reminder as to what can happen. This begs 
the question of how much time is left to pass until the next ‘unforeseeable’ event will serve to 
bolster organisational vigilance and challenge current conceptions of control adequacy.  
6.4.3 Section Summary 
In exploring how the navigational safety department valued their ability to control risk, it is evident 
that it represents a substantial weakness in the overall approach to managing risk in this area. It is 
not surprising that the element of control would be so highly valued within this area, when the 
structure and function of the department revolved around its ability to control risk and prevent 
unwanted events from happening. Using the ERM register, the department struggled to interject 
any further objectivity into their risk assessments and the register served more as communication of 
what was in place rather than an accurate representation of how well it was performing.  
The Marchioness disaster also played an important role in shaping how the organisation 
viewed the value of risk management. The organisation had ingrained this event deep into its 
organisational psyche and relied on it as powerful symbol of ‘what must never happen again’ and 
signified the importance of the prevention and effective control measures. However, as much as 
symbolic risk events can serve to bring an organisation together and highlight the significance of 
risk management, as time passes, it can begin to further entrench the potential for complacency and 
support a false sense of security. Having rely primarily on the occurrence or absence of failures 
produces a flawed metric that does little to challenge well-ingrained assumptions of how and why 
things fail. A possible opportunity lies in the maturity of the ERM framework and its ability to 
introduce options to develop more rigorous and credible assessments of control effectiveness.   
6.5 Chapter Summary 
As can be seen by the findings of this chapter, the introduction of a more formalised approach to 
managing risk across the organisation was not seen as change or challenge to the existing risk 




management methods being employed by those working in the navigational safety department. If 
anything, the introduction of the company-wide risk management policy and expectations was 
positioned more as an expansion of what they had been doing for decades, rather than being 
something they may need to consider adopting. This lack of uptake of ERM, outside of a mild 
participation in its practice through the population of the risk register, did not mean that valuable 
findings were not uncovered during the case study’s duration.  
To begin with, it was noted that for this area of the PLA, due to the required adherence to pre-
existing institutionalised expectations on how to manage risk being provided by the PMSC, any 
company policy or practice would have to be seen more as an additional layer of protection rather 
than providing any substantive benefit to the employees’ ability to analyse or treat navigational 
safety risks. Risk management had already been hard-wired into the structural fabric of the 
department and the introduction of a broader scope for risk management only reinforced the 
existing ways of operating. Unlike the interactions encountered in the previous section, this area of 
the organisation was very confident in their ability to manage the risks they had been tasked with 
and it was simply second nature to do so. The department’s structure was reflective of the 
underlying principles of risk management. Enabling sets of control mechanisms, soft and hard, 
were used to identify, assess, treat, monitor and communicate information on risks. This meant that 
changes to how the department was structured or operated would be closely, if not dependent on, 
the associated changes in assessed risk.  
 The role of what was often deemed ‘professional judgment’ that represented the amassed 
experiential knowledge of those working in this area further reinforced the notion that ERM had 
little to offer on top of what was already being done. The reliance or even appetite to engage in 
quantitative risk assessments ran counter intuitively to how the Navigational Safety departments 
understanding of the benefits the assessment process could provide. The department had come to 
rely on a subjective and more informal and collaborative assessment process that served as an 
opportunity to engage stakeholders and create shared understandings of values and threats. This 
same process could also be used to navigate organisational challenges and even pit opposing parties 
against one another in a ‘collibratory’ application of managing risk.  
And lastly, a ‘culture of control’ was evident within the navigational safety department. As 
much of the reason for being, as well as the corresponding structure was understood to be 
inherently risk-based, the concept and application of risk control measures served as an interesting 
cultural value. Harbouring the concept of control as an underlying cultural value, the organisation 
espoused the value of preventative controls as being a measure of organisational effectiveness. 
However, having to rely on the absence of failures increased the likelihood that the organisation 
could become complacent to underlying systemic issues that were not aptly captured by the 
subjective cause-effect type risks statements that populated their ERM risk registers.  
All of these finding begin to present a very different understanding of the role risk 
management has, is and should play within the PLA. The next chapter will now present the 




findings generated by exploring the Marine Services department at the PLA in order to round out a 
comprehensive picture of how and why risk was being managed at the organisation. From there, 
the findings of all three empirical chapters will then be used to inform the resulting discussion in 






Chapter 7 Marine Services 
7.1 Introduction 
The following chapter explores the management of more of the operational-type risks at the PLA. 
For the purpose of this study, ‘operational’ risks are representative of the risks primarily associated 
with the work of the Marine Services department, as well as the act of pilotage. Marine Services is 
focused on providing support to the commercial and leisure users of the river by maintaining 
navigational aids (buoys, moorings, etc.), clearing the river of debris (driftwood, rubbish, etc.) and 
providing services such as boat lifting, salvage and underwater inspections. The majority of this 
work is sourced from the operational support facility Marine House located at Denton Wharf, just 
east on the river from the main offices at Gravesend. As can be expected with this line of work, the 
physical nature of this work has employees primarily concerned with the risks posed to the health 
and safety of PLA employees. Although routine in nature, the hands-on aspect of Marine Services 
work presented risks that if inappropriately managed, could result in severe, if not fatal, 
consequences to an employee or contractor.  
Marine Services represents the largest sub-organisational unit in the study with approximately 
200 of the 345 employees contained within it. Of that, Pilotage Services represents the bulk of the 
workforce and activity, with the PLA guiding more than 10,000 vessels along the river every year, 
provided by a team of 90 pilots. Through the act of pilotage, the Marine Services department 
provides the PLA with its primary mechanism for generating revenue. As the PLA is classed as a 
trust port, any revenue generated above the organisation’s overall fiscal needs is re-invested back 
into the organisation in the form various infrastructure improvements. However, the need to 
generate a sustainable income does present a potentially conflicting dynamic when paired against 
the goal of managing risks to the safety of navigation. As noted in the literature review, the 
relationship between the management of societal and institutional risks by regulatory organisations 
has been found to demonstrate a spiralling organisational logic that can proliferate risk management 
activities to the detriment of managing societal risks (Rothstein et al. 2006).  
An overwhelming finding resulting from the exploration of this area of the organisation was 
the sense of individualism. It was repeatedly recounted theme among those interviewed that 
managing risk in Marine Services started and finished with the individual employee. The newly 
introduced ERM framework was supportive of this notion in that ‘every employee is responsible 
for managing risk’, however, the extreme individualisation of this area of the organisation ran 
somewhat counterproductively to the collaborative nature of enterprise-wide thinking. The 
department, like other areas, was quick to acknowledge the potential benefit in adopting an ERM 
program, but there was little evidence of any substantive uptake of the practice at a practical level. 
In fact, as the findings presented below indicate, there was more of an active resistance to the ERM 
approach, with little more than a ceremonial tip of the hat to the largely paper-based outputs. 




Instead, staff opted to demonstrate adherence to protocols through alternate means that were more 
amenable to their existing operating procedures and routines. The following section provides the 
final set of empirical findings for the research study, which yet again present another distinct 
approach and understanding of how risk was being managed at the PLA.  
7.2 Cultural Dimensions 
From a cultural perspective, working in the Marine Services department was positioned as ‘a way of 
life’ that had been consciously chosen by the individual. Employees were well aware that in 
choosing to undertake this type of work, they had also chosen to manage the inherent risks that 
accompanied many of these physically-oriented, and at often time dangerous, tasks and objectives. 
Although navigational safety also expressed a ‘way of life’ mentality regarding their work, the 
underlying theme was that Marine Services work was about ‘getting the job done’. Decisions about 
risk acceptability would ultimately reside with the individual at the time the work was being 
completed. Undertaking the hands-on work associated with piloting craft, maintaining machinery 
and infrastructure, or dredging the river to free it of debris, meant an one had also chosen to accept 
that risk was simply part of the job. Positioning risk as a ‘matter-of-fact’ that a conscious choice had 
been made, begins to further support Luhmann (1993) regarding the turning of danger into risk 
thus the unknown into manageable. Further to this, the acceptability of risks appeared to be 
understood as being attributable more to personal preference as opposed to an explicit 
organisational policy or threshold. Much of this area’s ‘risk-work’ transpired on the river, away 
from desk-top computers and meeting rooms which made the link to ERM’s paper-based risk 
management tools seem more of a disconnection, or additional step, rather than an opportunity or 
benefit. This deep-seated cultural norm of accepting the risks and ‘getting on with it’ was a key 
factor that played out across multiple dimensions for those working in Marine Services, as will be 
evidenced by the following sections.  
 Another significant finding that will be presented in this sub-section was how 
individualistic the culture of marine services was. In assuming a much more individualistic and ‘silo’ 
mentality when approaching their work, Marine Services employees were much less likely to link 
failures in their area to actions or decisions that may have arisen from other areas of the 
organisation. When it came down to it, Marine Services employees relied on the knowledge and 
resources they had at-hand. Those responses were to take place irrespective of any managerial cost-
cutting or strategic decisions in some meeting room back at Gravesend. This meant Marine Service 
staff new they were responsible to minimise failures and that the consequence of any failure would 
also be theirs to minimise. ‘Looking out for one’s self’ was the primary expectation when it came to 
managing risk and this cultural finding, as the subsequent sections will show, had implications for 
how the structural and functional dimensions of Marine Service’s response to ERM.  




7.2.1 An Individualistic Approach to Managing Risk  
As suggested in the introduction to this chapter, a common theme running through the ‘why, what 
and how’ of managing operational risks in Marine Services department was that of ‘individualism’. 
As opposed to the more collective and team-based approach to managing risks in the Navigational 
Safety and Administrative areas, risk management in Marine Services was perceived to be a task that 
started and finished with the individual employee. Further to this, there was a notable effort to 
drive the responsibility for managing risk down to that of the frontline employee. This 
individualistic approach was deeply woven into the culture of Marine Services, and was driven by a 
number of factors. Perhaps the most explicit of these resided front and centre in the PLA’s explicit 
risk management policy. As noted in Chapter 4, the PLA’s policy for risk management outlines the 
various responsibilities as they relate to the organisation’s hierarchy, with:  
“individual employees being responsible for:  
• Identifying risks arising from their work. 
• Implementing and operating controls over those risks through application of the PLA policy 
and processes. 
• Highlighting any areas for concern (e.g. new risks, internal control weaknesses or 
breakdown) through normal management channels.”  
Although the previous sections of the risk management policy outline the responsibilities of 
the executive to ensure a process is in place and being followed, the primary output for executive 
team is a paper-based audit trail that basically starts and finishes with a risk register. It was as 
though the employees in Marine Services were well aware of the symbolic nature of risk register, 
realising that if any ‘real work’ was to be identified in the ‘future controls’ section of the register it 
would most likely not be the executive ‘risk owner’ who would be doing the work. This was only 
further reinforced by the risk management policy stating risk owner ‘Allocate clear responsibility for 
controls and action plans’. As such, and opposed to the other two areas of the organisation where 
employees saw risk management as being a collective exercise, Marine Services employees took this 
messaging to reinforce the well-established understanding that they would be on their own when it 
came to managing risk. This understanding was expressed by the Director of Marine Operations 
and ‘risk owner’ for any operationally-natured items in the register: 
“It is now the responsibility for people to manage their own health and safety – they push it back to 
the worker to identify threats within their environment and bring them up to management – If people 
see something that is broken people report it, we are seeing fewer and fewer of these petty things you 
know like ‘three months ago I noticed this chair leg was broken’ ‘well what did you do about it, oh 
nothing….’ You know, that’s pretty much gone.” (P4) 
Not only did this individualisation influence the perceived or attributed responsibility to 
identify a risk, it meant that the same person would be responsible to control (prevent or mitigate) 




the risk to an acceptable level. So, in this regard, both the nature of the risks encountered and the 
corresponding skill sets required undertaking the work, were unique and could only really be 
addressed by those in the department. This reinforced an understanding by the staff under the 
Director of Marine Operations that their work was inherently different to the rest of the 
organisation as it was ‘hands-on’ and physical in nature: 
“Of all the departments, minus pilotage who are swinging off ladders, we are the most-risky 
department, we carry the most danger, we have got diving, we lift wrecks from the bottom of the river 
with lifting gear, we use 140 odd tonne lifts, we’ve got cranes swinging around, it’s just a department 
that has risk all around it.” (P30) 
This taken-for-granted assumption that Marine Operations work was somehow incomparable 
with the other areas of the organisation runs in direct contradiction to the overall intent of 
enterprise approaches to managing risk, being that of organisational-wide awareness and 
collaboration of risk management effort. This inherent difference is reiterated by the following 
interviewee: 
“It is an extremely tight community [in Marine Services], I mean we are all… we do a similar job 
which is completely different than that to anything else within the PLA…As far as managing risks 
to the business, that’s not me. It’s outside of my comfort zone. I have very little to do with the outside, 
civils and all the rest of it.”” (P24)  
The respondent goes on to state: 
“Although it’s part of the shared risk management process [ERM], part of it is always stand-
alone…I mean I know there is obviously other departments managing risks that could cross [over] 
but a lot of them seem to be like those in the engineering department -they have got their own risk 
assessments that are completely different than what we have.” (P24) 
Here, the ability to assess risks of an operational nature were seen to require a specific set of 
skills that would not be transferable to other areas of the organisation, suggesting a more silo-based 
risk culture, rather than ERM, approach to managing risk (Mikes 2009). This leads to and supports 
the notion that the rest of the organisation should just leave Marine Services to get on with it. It 
was becoming clear that the management of the vast amount of, at times, highly dangerous physical 
tasks would not benefit by any collective organisation-wide assessment or monitoring of risk 
afforded by the ERM programme. This mismatch between the physicality of operational risk vs. the 
paper-based risks being managed by the rest of the organisation is aptly echoed in the following 
statement: 
“I had meetings where I used to have people talking about paper cuts and people operating chainsaws 
at the same meeting. Instead, now I put all the people who are using chainsaws give them a list of 
their main hazards and ask, hey you tell me how you are going to address them. If it puts it into the 




forefront of their mind every day, maybe we will have less falling over and trips with a chainsaw.” 
(P4) 
Others however, saw the work of other departments efforts to manage risk through more 
formalised systems as intrusive and detracting from their ability to ‘just get on with it’: 
“Out of all the departments, pilotage has had its errors, emergency management have had the slip ups, 
everyone else’s has, but our area has never been found wanting because I am simply getting on with the 
job.” (P11) 
In any case, individuals in Marine Services felt that they are the ones responsible for managing 
their risks the way that they see fit. For the most part, this meant managing those risks will take 
place in ‘real time’ by them on the job, not behind a meeting room table with a group of their 
fellow co-workers. If something goes wrong it will be more likely driven by a lack of individual 
attention rather than a more systemic or collective failing to anticipate or respond. However, this is 
a completely understandable mind-set, given the strict adherence to the Health & Safety 
Executive’s (HSE) health and safety regulatory requirements that champions the individual’s role in 
managing  risk. Although no staff directly spoke to the need to ensure that HSE regulations were 
met, it was very apparent that the culture in Marine Services was to ensure each individual was 
responsible for managing risk, starting at the top and moving all the way down the ranks.  
The substantive implications of taking an individualistic approach to managing risk meant that 
the tools and techniques provided by a more collaborative and collective enterprising means of risk 
management were simply not seen as ultimately compatible with the physical nature of managing 
risk in Marine Services. The tools or skills Marine Services required to effectively manage risks were 
unique to each individual and situation and as such, would be applied when and where that 
individual saw fit. However, the identification of an individualistic approach to manage risk is not 
meant to insinuate an absentee or negligent management structure. Risks management was still 
afforded managerial oversight, and management was well aware of their responsibility to ensure 
their staff remained safe at all times. In this regard, the rejection of incompatible practices more 
implies that the current HSE safety culture had little to benefit from the ‘static’ risk assessments 
offered through the ERM programme.    
7.2.2 Managing Risk Represents a Normal Day’s Work 
The individualistic culture of Marine Services also produced more symbolic implications for how 
operational risks would be managed. As inferred in the above sub-section, the concept of risk and 
uncertainty was used reinforce and symbolise an ‘operational norm’ as opposed risk being 
conceived of as a deviation from an expected outcome. This normalisation of risk changed the 
relationship the department created with the targets of their risk management efforts, as opposed to 
that of the Navigational Department that saw risk symbolising their reason to exist.  




Those working in the Marine Services characterised operational uncertainty as to simply be 
expected and as such, should be inherently managed through the application of their skill and 
expertise. In this sense, risk was positioned more as something that arose from their work, rather 
than as the direct and primary focus of their work. The primary focus of their expertise was on an 
alternate objective, (i.e. clearing debris and driftwood or maintaining infrastructure) and although 
these activities lowered the risk to other vessels navigating the Thames, the risks that mattered were 
those that accompanied the work such as safety or liability risks. In essence, the reduction of risk to 
navigational safety was transferred to the individual employee who was paid to go about the job 
they were hired to do. 
In positioning risk as something as part of the job and inherent in what they did, had 
implications regarding when it came time to challenging how things had been done in the past and 
how they should be done in the future. As much of the notion of managing risk was driven by the 
individualistic culture, it had implications when it came time to question if staff were following 
safety protocols and best practices. For example, upon commencing with the PLA, the Director of 
Marine Services soon became aware of undesirable behaviours when it came to staff adhering to 
expected worker safety protocols regarding the use of personal floatation devices: 
“We had years of struggle to get people to wear lifejackets. I mean it’s a cultural thing - one of the 
biggest problems we have is overcoming the culture. When I first came here it was I guess [it’s] ‘sissy’ 
to wear a lifejacket but it’s completely turned around now. You will now have cases where people don’t 
wear them and now people aren’t afraid to say ‘hey put your lifejacket to their fellow workers.  
Previously nobody would have ever done that. So, the culture changes slowly.” (P4) 
Now although modifying the unsafe practice was achieved, it was not through the application 
of traditional risk assessments or ERM-type discussions. The change in behaviours relied on more 
of a cultural shift and was supported by peer pressure. Furthermore, in order to confront this 
notion that applying caution may be interpreted as some type of individual weakness [i.e. sissy], 
management also opted to support another indirect means of changing the undesired behaviour. As 
the Director of Marine Services went on to state, the department simply remained open to the 
reporting of fellow employees’ infractions as a means to police the policy: 
“We introduced a warning system much like football – yellow means warning, red is a dismissal. 
Once you’ve got one group forced to adhere to a policy, they then look around and go ‘why are that 
bunch of people not wearing life jackets’. And in fact, that’s what they did. They would take 
photographs and I would get photographs of people not wearing lifejackets and they would say, ‘what 
are you going to do about these people? If you’re willing to force it [on] us, force it on other people” 
(P4) 
In this sense, it becomes hard to imagine viewing an formal risk register that identifies future 
actions as ‘shift peer shaming to naming’. For those in Marine Services changing undesirable 
behaviour was achieved through means much less amenable to measurement, let alone 




documentation. However, this also represents a potentially problematic issue when seeking to 
eliminate unacceptable risk tolerances and minimising the possibility of ‘normalised deviance’ 
(Vaughan 1998). By continuing to allow employees to self-regulate, ‘professional judgement’ could 
begin to bump up against competing factors such as increased demands from management to drive 
down costs, industry enhancements that can reduce margins of error, as well as personal 
complacency in the absence of failure. Continuing to avoid the explication of these practices that is 
afforded through a collective risk assessment exercise, could mean that high consequence risks 
could go unnoticed, or even worse, be fostered.  The following employee speaks to how pre-
existing personal tolerances for risk shape the potentially dangerous individual risk-risk trade-offs 
being made (and a point that is also expanded upon further in the third section):  
“You always have to take into account the benefits from a commercial point of view. So, over the years 
we’ve gradually taken on bigger ships [and] bigger ships mean more money for the PLA. We have to 
find a way so that we are not stuck when it comes to accepting the bigger ships, so we have to push the 
envelope, and in doing I guess, we gain a bit more expertise. However, from a personal point of view, 
even though our safety culture makes us aware of how risks are getting pushed all the time and that 
health and safety might be pushed on you all the time, so is everything else - like making sure the port 
remains a viable option.” (P24) 
This quote is of particular note in that it shows how the driving risk down to an individual 
decision and removing the analysis from an explicit and more tangible ‘paper-based’ process opens 
the door for ‘routine work’ to normalise inappropriate margins for error that could result in a 
catastrophic loss if left un-checked. Surely it is just a matter of time before envelopes are pushed 
too far and the increased comfort with the reduced margins for error undermine a pilot’s actual 
ability to operate in such unforgiving conditions. Here again, small increments in risk-taking 
become slowly accepted as the norm, the cumulative impacts of increasing risk tolerances present a 
greater chance of latent dangers going unnoticed until it is too late (Turner 1978; Vaughan 1998).  
The above findings are suggestive of where a substantive benefit could be gained by breaking 
down some of the individualistic mentalities and silos and providing the staff an opportunity to 
challenge well-engrained practices or the expectations to be able to ‘push the envelope’ in a setting 
that omits the possibility of severe and immediate failures (i.e. injuries) to manage risks. It is also 
evident that the staff was open to re-evaluating practices and shifting norms in an effort to reduce 
the threat and consequence associated with realised risk events.  
7.2.3 Section summary 
The culture of the operational department, although still focused on the overall well-being of the 
organisation, was much more individualistic than any other area of the organisation. Where 
navigational safety was focused on ‘society’s’ well-being and the administration areas were more 
focused on the well-being of the organisation as a whole, the operational staff paid attention first 
and foremost on the personal well-being of the individual employee. The cultural norm that it was 




up to every employee to manage risk and for them to apply their experiential knowledge about risks 
when and where they saw fit, limited the opportunity to share the collective wisdom through the 
group assessments undertaken in ERM.   
The positioning of risk as a cultural norm had implications for the introduction and adoption 
of the enterprise-wide risk management programme. Hazards and risks were simply a matter of fact 
and were seen simply as being an acceptable part of the job that needed to be done. Introducing 
further tools or techniques were not seen to align or add benefit to the current approaches being 
used to reduce the level of risk associated with the work that needed to get done. Managing risk 
was not about a collective discussion or collaborative approach to identifying threats and 
consequences. For these employees, risk was something that an individual learned to manage on the 
job and they would inherently apply their judgment to ensure that the risk would remain inside their 
tolerances. 
This individualist approach also had implications in regards to its ability to possibly mask or 
normalise possible activities that could compromise existing risk controls. In positioning risk as an 
inherent trait or aspect of the job, it was difficult for employees to explicate the risk reducing 
processes from the actual work that they were undertaking. The ingrained nature of risks in the 
individual work that was transpiring meant that in order to create or introduce the appropriate 
controls (e.g. wearing safety equipment) meant that cultural outlooks would require changing that 
are less than appropriate or compatible with the measurable and explicit world of ERM registers. 
The following section on more functional responses to the introduction of ERM builds on this 
theme of individualisation and demonstrates how this understanding of the individual management 
of risk would play out in the more functional and hands-on aspects of the work they undertake in 
Marine Services.  
7.3 Functional Dimensions 
Continuing on individualist theme of the last section, there was no denying that those working in 
the operational areas of the organisation encountered the highest level of individual risk and 
danger. Operating in high-stakes arenas has been seen to introduce a specific set of organisational 
challenges when it comes to managing risk. Much of this sense of viewing risk from the perspective 
of the individual could be driven by the nature of the risks this area of the organisation was tasked 
with managing. In this sense, the causes of these risk and the subsequent consequences that could 
result were often to seen to again start and finish with the employee. Human error and personal 
safety dominated the interviews with Marine Services employees.  
Further to the nature of these types of risk, they were often realised or transpired ‘on the job’ 
and were often described as unfolding in ‘real-time’ in a dynamic and surprising fashion. This ‘as-it-
happens’ ability to cope with risky scenarios and events challenged the viability of paper-based 
assessments or software applications. The static nature of the ERM types of tools were better 




applied during training regimes that would commute what was expected to be done while at work 
and in doing so, impart the ability to manage risk on the job.  
As much as the Marine Services department supported an individualistic approach to managing 
risks, health and safety was not the only type of risk they were tasked with managing. As such, this 
culture of individualism had interesting implications when it began to rub up against competing 
interests like increasing the efficiency or effectiveness of the PLAs operations. This further 
highlighted for the staff how deferring to professional experience should trump any possible gains 
afforded by an ERM tool set, and there for, its usefulness. Only when faced with the opportunity to 
offer their Hydrographic capabilities as a service to companies undertaking construction work along 
the river banks did the paper-based tools and techniques of ERM begin to show merit for the 
Marine Services department. The following section presents findings that demonstrate the 
perceived incompatibility between occupational risks and ERM methods. It highlights the 
limitations of audit style conceptions of risk management at the micro-level of organisational 
dynamics and how individuals truly respond and cope with the risks that accompany this type of 
operating environment.    
7.3.1 Responding to Risk in the Here and Now 
As noted above, it was quite apparent that the collaborative paper-based approach to managing risk 
that was supported by the ERM tools and techniques had little influence or place in the world of 
Marine Services. For one, very little of Marine Service’s staff time was actually spent behind a desk. 
Mechanical engineers, salvage divers, marine pilots and the like spent the vast majority of their time 
out of the office and on, or near, the river. Their risks were something that required a level of on-
going situational awareness, and in order to ensure operational objectives are met, individual 
experience is the key asset:   
 
“What can happen, probably already has happened so you have to overcome those through experience 
or knowledge and then dare I say, sometimes it’s just seat of the pants. It’s about say ‘I don’t get a 
good feeling about this and how it has been put together’” (P22) 
The application of knowledge and skill was paramount in reducing risk and often this meant 
that staff must rely on gut feel rather than quantitative assessments when executing a measured 
response: 
“There is nothing out there that we can… at Tilbury with going into the berth there, you’ve got 
buildings, you’ve got towers, you know where you are you can associate, you can see where you are, 
more or less along the river. At London Gateway, there is nothing, it is flat, so you have got nothing 
to guide you … so you [are] ‘guess-tamating’, so when it comes to short distances, it is not all that 
accurate.” (P24) 




It was very well understood and reiterated by the majority of respondents working in the 
Marine Services department that they demanded a high level of safety in the face of the inherent 
danger that often accompanies this type of work. As one put it, ‘It’s a dangerous place and if things go 
wrong, they can go badly wrong’. (P30) 
Once again though, if and when things do go wrong, it is ultimately tied back to the employee 
as the source of failure. The following was a response by the Director of Marine Services in 
responding to a line of questions about the risks they are currently struggling with. In it he speaks 
to the fact that it was the employee that found themselves in the wrong place and although he hints 
at the possible ‘safety culture’ perhaps breading a sense of overconfidence, he finishes with it still 
being up to the employee to ‘pause and think’: 
“What is annoying is that we still have, a decided sort of rumpus of accidents we can’t get rid of – 
minor slips trips and falls, and you know if you having those, eventually you’ll have serious one. And 
we almost did a month ago, have a guy nearly cut in half – got caught between a boat and the jetty – 
the odd thing is you know he’s got on his safety gear, shoes, gloves, safety helmet, the whole works but 
somehow, he found himself in the wrong position and he is an experienced person, very knowledgeable, 
very capable and he still had that accident and that really worried me to the extent that if it can 
happen to him and he was unaware and it happened because he hadn’t thought through the thing, was 
it because the culture of safety was at top, I’ll put all the gear on and you know, think ‘I’m safe’ and 
you never are that is never the case. So where do we get to the point where people are thinking, just to 
pause and say, am I alright here, is the really a good place to be standing” (P4) 
As a means to deal with such a dangerous and at times unpredictable operating environment 
the staff, in addition to their experience and skill, relied on procedural certainty to help identify 
possible deviances. Paying attention to your surroundings played a prominent role as staff described 
their operational tasks that comprise the day-to-day work of staff in the marine operations branch, 
especially when it came to ensuring personal safety when working in hazardous environments.  
 
“Most of our risks are well known and have been around for a long time and its things we have 
already dealt with in different ways and it is more about asking if there [are] other ways we could be 
dealing with it – it’s about being aware that when they come up you are not a by-stander” (P22) 
This began to shed some light on how, despite the continual theme of tying risk management 
back to the individual, keeping people safe was still something that actually was dependent on a 
team effort: 
“A lot of what we do repeats itself, but we still undertake a safety briefing every time, especially if it 
slightly different. For example, when the guys afloat we are going to do work on a navigational buoy. 
That involves someone jumping onto a buoy, and then it involves craning and then it involves chaining 
and heavy chain work. It could involve hitting things with sledge hammers, certainly some burning 
and cutting, and the deck is getting very cluttered and everything is moving. So, very much the mate or 




the skipper will pull the guys together and say Joe or whoever, you are doing this so mind yourself of 
that, Bob and Harry you are going to be doing this, so the safety briefing goes out about who is doing 
what. Now depending on the individuals, that [briefing] will be tweaked or raised or lowered but it is 
down to the skipper as they have been through it a hundred times before. They go through the format 
and it is trotted out, or its belaboured, all depending on the skill level of the guys they’ve got, you 
know - its adapted.” (P30) 
The above begins to highlight how although the continually espoused value of individually 
being able to manage personal risk, a collective approach is still underpinning some of the risk-
reduction efforts being undertaken by the employees. Weick (1993) identifies the reliance on a 
‘collective mind’ that leverages the interconnected nature of tasks and, in the case-study he 
provided, for the ability of those working on naval aircraft carriers to what he coined as 
‘heedfulness’ as a way to dynamically adapt learned routines given the present situation’s inputs.  
An organisation’s reliance on heedfulness is driven by the need for reliability and “those demands often 
consist of unexpected, non-sequential interactions among small failures that are hard to see and hard to believe” 
(Weick 1993:366). These types of lessons are then ‘formally’ incorporated into past routines, relying 
on mechanisms such as story-telling in order to persist and integrate into the collective mind’s 
knowledge. 
In looking to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the activities associated with Marine 
Services, technological advancements also played a prominent role in both managing and 
influencing risks for this department:  
 
“Things have changed and we have had to adapt because the new technology is there… ships 
themselves have changed from being the old stop-start engine to highly sophisticated to adjust the pitch 
and the propellers, you’ve got ones where the whole motor turns around beneath the ship, and this is 
new technology that we have had to learn and adapt to because these are ships are what we have had 
to learn the knowledge for” (P24) 
 
As part of addressing cases like the above, acquiring and applying the best available equipment 
was seen as critical in ensuring that the accuracy and quality of the work undertaken by the 
department and that they continued to produce an ‘industry leading’ service offering. However, 
incorporating new technologies increased risk to other areas of the organisation such as 
Navigational Safety. For example, the hydrography department was responsible for the most up-to-
date and accurate maps of the riverbed that were used by internal and external parties to aid in the 
safe navigation of the river, especially at low tide. Some parts of the river, although being 600m 
wide could be only 10m in depth at most. The increased confidence that was provided through hi-
tech computer imaging meant that massive cargo ships were actually calculating their route up river 
allowing for clearances measured in centimetres.  




However, at the end of the day, even with the most up-to-date information technology could 
produce being placed in the palm of their hand, there was little replacement for the skill and 
knowledge that their years on the river had provided them:   
“I’ve got an iPad with all of the most current recreational use charts and it is of a sufficient quality 
that we feel it is good enough for being used as a reference but at the end of the day, the best thing is 
always looking out the window.” (P24) 
7.3.2  Dynamic Risk Assessments and Ceremonial adoption 
As much as those working in Marine Services were resistant to explicating their risk management 
activities due to what they felt as an inherent incompatibility of the risks they faced, an effort to link 
back their integrated management to the policy expectations was still present. A type of ‘middle 
ground’ was established that formally acknowledged the inability of operational risks to be captured 
and managed through written documentation.  The term ‘Dynamic Risk Assessments’ or DRAs 
was used to capture this notion. These assessments are formally recognised by both the 
Department of Transportation, as well as the PLA’s SMS, and defined as: 
“Dynamic risk assessment is used to evaluate the situation, tasks and persons at risk when carrying 
out any form of activity – whether routine or unusual. This process helps an individual to effectively 
assess a situation as it is unfolding. The person can continuously assess the circumstances and adjust 
his or her response to meet the risk presented moment by moment.” (DfT 2013:41) 
However, the document goes on to indicate that these types of assessments will most likely go 
unrecorded. This was something that was expressed at the joint HAZMAN II training session that 
the researcher witnessed. When issues of worker and PLA vessel safety were discussed, a frequent 
default response would be in the nature of “Yeah, but that’s all captured by Dynamic Risk Assessment”, 
with staff openly acknowledging that any ex-post formal documentation of an occurrence would 
rarely, if ever, be captured. It was more as though these types of risks would be ‘mentally captured’ 
and serve to substantiate anecdotal lessons-learned that supported the idea of heedfulness identified 
in the previous sub-sections findings. It was these ‘dynamic risks’ that were the ones that really 
mattered to staff, rather than the broad and generic risks that symbolically populated the register. It 
was visibly apparent that staff speaking to these types of risks were somewhat physically disengaged 
with the conversation when it came to Marine Services and the explicit ranking of risks with staff 
folding arms and leaning away from the conference table. They saw their risks only being managed 
in real-time, as they happened: 
“For getting on and off a ship, you have got to use a pilot ladder, and obviously, there is a hazard of 
two moving platforms, and using a dynamic risk assessment, although we don’t actively think of it 
that way, that is what you do every time, before you go on there you have seen, is that safe? Is the 
ladder safe? Can I safely go on board? Its built in – the dynamic risk assessment – look after yourself 




first, before you look out for others, look after yourself… self- preservation really, common sense.” 
(P24) 
In fact, of the three ERM registers (internal, external and operational) the Director of Marine 
Services was only responsible for three risks in total. All others fell to either to the Chief Harbour 
Master or an executive from the administrative areas (Finance, HR or Public Affairs). Respondents 
in the Marines Services chose to distance themselves from the ERM programme, again suggesting 
that the paper-based assessments of the enterprise risk management techniques were just not 
compatible with their specific needs:  
“There are two sides – navigation safety – is there anything on the riverbed that is going to damage a 
ship coming in, and, we know exactly how to do that, the more time I spent looking at the charts, and 
assessing movements, and talking to the other surveyors, the more chance I have of preventing that, 
than sitting at meetings and looking at boxes with green and orange areas – I know what is required, 
someone else can deal with that.” (P11) 
In reality, respondents felt that messages and communication about risk information was 
something that would be transferred between staff when it was relevant, on the job. Just as risk 
occurred and was managed in ‘real-time’, so too would the event be mentally recorded in an 
individual’s bank of experience, to be retrieved or shared at future date when the time would arise. 
Discussing and recording risk back at the office was not only unlikely to happen in that it wasn’t 
going to be remembered (i.e. not relevant at the later date), the record that would be generated 
would not accompany the individual back to the daily task environment – the format was simply 
incompatible:  
“A lot of information is informal, I mean, two or three of you are there and I might have had an 
incident and I might say I had such and such a thing happen and I might know what happened and 
a lot of that doesn’t go back, it doesn’t get fed into the register apart from if someone is in a meeting, a 
hazard review, or in a navigational risk assessment, and that is when someone will say, oh yeah, so 
and so said they remember having something go on” (P24) 
However, all this being said and despite the majority of the Marine Services bestowing little 
value on the adoption of explicit risk assessment and management techniques, one small area of the 
department did see some value in the audit trails created by such practices. In recent years, a section 
of the Hydrographic function of the organisation had begun seeing an increasing market for 
making available the PLA’s ability to create detailed maps of the riverbed for municipal 
infrastructure projects or commercial developments. From 2005 onwards, the PLA has begun to 
service many development projects through the use of their pre-existing resources that had been 
traditionally reserved from conservancy work and supporting the safety of navigation. The 
department averages approximately 350 contracts of varying size that now averages approximately 
£10,000 per contract; a sizable increase over the initial £3-4000 price tag. This substantive revenue 
stream quickly garnered the attention and subsequent endorsement of the Board to become a 




permanent and fully-supported source of income. With entrepreneurial and commercial nature (i.e. 
private sector focus) of this type of work, it is not surprising that risk has come to play a significant 
role in the formation and monitoring of the projects they undertake.  
Stemming from a department that had historically very little interest in the adoption of any 
formalised mechanism for managing risk, the staff undertaking commercial hydrographic work 
embraced and supported the adoption of both internally and externally generated risk assessments. 
However, despite their enthusiasm for risk assessments and registers to accompany the commercial 
hydrographic contracts, it would appear that much like the administrative areas of the organisation, 
the technical content was still much more reliant on ‘art over science’, as noted by the following 
interview response:  
“at the end of the day, if someone is paying you to do the work, they want to make sure you aren’t 
just cutting corners. When you look at the job, you are looking at the risk to yourself, the risk to your 
reputation and to any future work and you either price the risk out of it and say yeah, I’ll take that 
risk or you just don’t. You know you work with the client you develop a professional and personal 
relationship with the client… Our knowledge and experience tells us what the risks are, so it’ 
becomes about planning not intuition. The longer we have been doing this the better we get at it” 
(P18) 
In the above application, the term risk was used to indicate operational uncertainty and that 
which is unknown or even unknowable, rather than a probabilistic quantification of past historical 
occurrences. For these employees, managing ‘business’ risk wasn’t very different than managing 
health and safety risks. In the end, it too was about indicating their subjective level of comfort that 
things would go according to what was planned and ultimately if it didn’t’, how much would that 
impact the final profit that would be achieved on close of the project. Again, returning to the 
preference to manage a risk based on individual knowledge and a gut feel that can only be acquired 
through experience on the job. 
7.3.3 Section summary 
It became very clear that for the Marine Services, the management of risk was much less amenable 
to formalised assessment and analysis techniques and much more to the integration of standards 
operating procedures and protocols. The introduction of this new and expanded approach to 
managing risk across the PLA was, for the most part, falling on deaf ears in the Marine Services 
department. It was in no way attributable to a lack of care of concern about the threats that they 
face but it was simply something that failed to resonate with staff, given the nature of their work 
and how they had learned to cope with an uncertain operating environment.  
ERM was primarily conceived of as a ‘desk job’, meanwhile Marine Services was seldom, if 
ever this for this area’s employees. The creation of a paper-based dialogue of risk that relied on 
computer screens and spreadsheets was something that not only took staff away from the work 
they needed to get done, it also created a document that was physically inaccessible for those who 




could actually benefit from its content on the job. This being said, risk dialogues were created and 
staff worked together to not only share risk information but to also generate a collective awareness 
that could leverage the sum of collective workforce in-situ.  
7.4 Structural Dimensions 
Despite its apparent lack of interest in the ERM approach to risk management being 
operationalised across the organisation, the Marine Services department displayed the most 
commercial characteristics of the organisation. As a trust port, the PLA is a self-funded 
organisation that relies on charges and dues associated with the provision of pilotage and vessel 
licensing in order to generate the bulk of its financial income. In addition to this, areas of the 
organisation have been recently exploring the ability to generate revenue by contracting out 
services, such as hydrography or dredging, as a means to supplement the bottom line. This focus 
on maximising profit and providing ‘more for less’ had the potential to place its service offering at 
odds with the navigational safety mandate. The need to balance possible competing interests was 
prevalent theme that emerged among the stakeholders when it came to exploring the organisational 
structure and relationships that were influenced by the practice of risk management. 
The practice of risk management also presented notable symbolic implications when it came to 
the structural relationships of the Marine Services department. Unlike the other departments, there 
appeared to be a greater underlying divide between the line-staff and upper management with an ‘us 
and them’ mentality surrounding their interview responses. This tension was in-part due to the 
long-standing relationships between the unionised workers and the management, but was also 
driven by the nature of the risks associated with this type of work. There is a much more immediate 
realisation of risk in the operational arm of the organisation. The speed of onset of these types of 
risk is quicker, however their relatively low frequency provides a greater opportunity to collectively 
spend time exploring options to further reduce risk and perhaps levering ERM’s ability to generate 
a common understanding of the risks being managed.  
7.4.1 Balancing Risk Trade-offs and Competing interests 
The need to manage operational risk was also, more indirectly, associated with the notion of 
balancing competing internal and external interests. Operational risk really represented the 
intersection of physical risks to things like personal safety and ships colliding with less tangible risks 
of reduced revenue streams and managing stakeholder expectations. This positioned the work of 
the marine services department and their ability to trade off risks against each other as a key driver 
for risk management. Respondent P24 expands on how these different sources of expectations 
begins to shape the need to appropriately balance the time and effort spent on each type of risk 
being managed:  
Top of the agenda here is, of course, the safety of the river but also to dovetail to that is to make it 
commercially viable; pays all of our salaries and keeps it going…. Safety has always been there but I 




think there is more things that have been put into place obviously risk management has come more to 
the fore over the last couple of years. A lot has been driven by the harbour master’s office who looks 
after the safety and regulation side of it. I’ve seen a lot more of it probably, having coming to 
management now with all the background on hazard reviews and all of the rest of it. Also, anything 
that comes up there, then there is navigational risk assessment, even the word risk assessment is 
coming a lot more into things that we are doing.” (P24) 
This need to respond to many different fronts that could perceive risks from multiple 
perspectives was beginning to become a risk unto itself. However, Operational staff were quite 
cognisant that the drivers of efficiency could prove hard to reconcile with those driving effective 
reductions in risks to navigational safety: 
“It’s very full on and sometimes a bit frustrating because we tie ourselves up in knots on procedure, we 
are not a money-making organisation but we like to make some money. We are not commercial but 
we are not governmental, so we fall between stalls and we sit somewhere in between. At the end of the 
day we have to do it properly, there is no cutting of corners, but you are also mixing it up in the 
commercial world where corners need to be cut and you know the bottom line is king and 
unfortunately we try to do that but still wear a sort of semi-governmental civil service hat and the two 
are in constant opposition” (P30) 
And these trade-offs between doing things quickly and ensuring that things remain safe were 
not the only trade-offs being weighed, external expectations about what the term ‘river user’ 
entitled stakeholders to, and to what degree were also required to be balanced:  
“the main challenge for the authority, I believe, is finding its proper place within the river – the 
riparian boroughs and Boris as mayor and they all like to think ‘oh it’s the river and we can do this 
and we can do that’ and the authority has been there for a hundred years now just gently guiding, 
persuading and nudging it on the correct course and the challenge for the port authority is to remain in 
the background but not get trampled on, to allow all of this development to happen without it actually 
impeding the safeguarding of the river.”(P30) 
Lastly, the need to allocate resources in relation to the risk posed is a key consideration and 
driver of risk management within public sector organisations. The strain placed on already limited 
resources is exacerbated by the private sector’s continued demand to push the boundaries of 
control in the name of increased efficiency and cost savings. The resulting reduction in margins for 
error places huge demands on the skills and abilities of the PLA’s pilots to account for larger ships 
docking at berths that may were never intended or designed to receive vessels as large as the ones 
being used today. The newly opened London Gateway Port (LGP) is attracting just such vessels to 
the Thames and for the competing ports to stay competitive, the PLA’s pilots are required to guide 
ships past the LGP to facilities lacking the technology and infrastructure offered by the newly 
opened port.  




“Obviously, we are getting bigger ships, London Gateway is a prime example, it has been built to 
design for 400m ships. Other one that springs to mind is VoPac, it started that there were small 
ships going there, so the biggest one you get there would be around 150m and we are now getting up to 
185 -190m ships, also the maximum draft so we are now putting the biggest sized ships we can put 
on to berths that were never designed for that 40 – 50 years ago, they are right on the limit on what 
they can handle.” (P24) 
Although still yet to be captured by the enterprise risk approach, the beginnings of being able 
to draw connections to other departments and objectives through the concept of risk were starting 
to develop. There were opportunities at least being signalled by staff to use the new formal 
approach to risk management as a means to elevate some of their operational challenges up 
through the ranks of the organisation by tying them to larger, more significant concerns. For 
example, in a case where trees along the river banks were ‘self-seeding’ and compromising the 
integrity of portions of the riverbank’s concrete revetments, the issue was connected to broader 
organisational issues, such as navigational safety, as a means to elevate them within the 
organisations priorities. The following interviewee summaries how an issue could be driven up to 
the more senior decision-makers, and in this case, even to be able to link external parties into the 
management of the PLA’s infrastructure (i.e. risks): 
“Things like the river bank issue, should get put on the risk register so it gets discussed at a higher 
level. Issues of funding and what have you that will need eventually to be authorised by the board or 
by exco, they are not going to authorise that unless they understand the background to the risk and 
why the work is necessary. It is part of an overall management strategy and at the end of the day, 
these things cost money and I’m not going to get any funding if I don’t demonstrate a sound case for it. 
A bit of river bank generates no income for us so it is all about the risk, whether it be navigational 
risk, that one is a bit of a difficult one to argue with a bit of river bank but it certainly is a 
commercial risk in that it could cost an awful lot of money. Part of the mitigation is that we can, by 
application to the environment agency, get the funding of the repairs to this part funded by the agency 
because this river bank actually underpins the flood defences to that part of London, so although it is 
an asset owned by us it is a primary source of concern to the EA, they wouldn’t want to see it fall into 
a bad state of disrepair and they would encourage us, even with funding, to carry out modest repairs 
on a continuing basis” (P18) 
The above is significant in that it represents one of the very few times that a respondent 
dealing with these types of operational risks began to frame their issue as being driven by or at least 
dependent on, factors outside of the immediate control of the employee faced with the risk. One of 
the key benefits to an enterprise type model to identifying and responding to risk is the ability to 
break down potential silos between different organisational departments, as well as external 
stakeholders. It is encouraging to see that although the formal process to managing risk across the 
PLA was in its infancy, that employees who were so deeply entrenched in a specific way of 




perceiving and responding to threats and uncertainty would already be contemplating a more co-
ordinated and multi-stakeholder effort to risk reduction.  However, the above also highlights the 
ability for risk management to reframe existing issues. They can overcome resource constraints by 
demonstrating an associated safety risk that can rationalise the request for additional funding. 
Capitalising on the fact that efforts to reduce navigational safety risks are rarely challenged, the 
acquisition of resources was made considerably easier and becomes a quickly learned lesson on how 
to deal with things that aren’t getting the attention that they may (or may not) deserve. 
7.4.2 Risk Knowledge as a Proxy for Representing Employee Value 
Something that was relatively absent in regards to managing risk in Marine Services was the lack of 
reference to a specific type of risk – that of reputation risk. This type of risk was quite prevalent in 
the discussions that were had with employees from the other areas of the organisation, but in 
Marine Services, employees rarely positioned adverse events as something that would broadly 
impact the reputation of the entire PLA. Alternatively, the risk stemming from a perceived lack of 
capacity to execute an organisational role correctly was once again conceived as more as stemming 
from individual, rather than organisational, skill or capacity. Additionally, the ability to individually 
manage risk was also less conceived as a performance issue and instead, the knowledge an 
individual had on how to manage risk was seen as a valuable resource that, if anything, was at risk 
of being explicated through the very process of formal risk analyses and assessments. The 
importance of being seen as an invaluable source of knowledge that was not easily replaced was a 
message many respondents felt the need to expresses given the concerns of the current economic 
climate and the knowledge of the PLA’s longstanding reputation as being an ‘employer of choice’:  
“One of the things we never have to worry about is retaining people because we are such a good 
employer. If someone does go, there are ten guys waiting to take his place just like that.” (P30) 
A viable explanation for this need to stress the importance of an individual and their ability to 
manage risk is tied to the continued reduction in the workforce of the PLA. For members of the 
PLA operational department, job security has come under increasing pressure as the organisation 
has seen sizable reductions over its years of operations as the following staff member notes:  
“When I first came to the Port of London Authority it had been through a very poor time, financially 
stretched. We had gone through massive changes in the early 70’s something like 60 thousand 
employees down to 300 and a lot of the electrical [engineering] knowledge that was around then was 
got rid of at the same time effectively.” (P21) 
The corresponding response to this external environmental threat to job security produced an 
interesting finding in relationship to the management of Marine Services risks. The intimate and 
tacit knowledge of how best to cope with dynamic and uncertain operating conditions was 
something that could only truly be learned through direct exposure to risky situations. Unlike 
Navigational Safety that saw risk management as a collaborative exercise, the individualist culture of 




operational staff meant that workers saw risk information, and their ability to manage it, as 
something that could differentiate their value and performance from fellow employees.  
“The risk of losing talent, you can employ people and people can learn but it doesn’t account for wide 
range in experience that has been gained over the career. It’s the skills and expertise that you have got 
in the organisation and management can say let’s halve it and do something different but they have got 
to take on board what the effect of the action may be with their top-down approaches.” (P22) 
The above statement highlights how those actually responsible for ‘doing’ the work felt that 
there was a disconnect from upper management and the executive when it comes to understanding 
what works best to manage risk. Conference room discussions and excel spreadsheets offer little 
value in comparison to years of experience acquired over lengthy careers. Some respondents took 
this one step further and felt ERM actually detracted from their ability to do the work at hand. 
They positioned risk management as an intrusion of management into a worker’s daily workload:  
“Not in favour of the matrix and the formal system – I know exactly what to do to keep us in the 
‘green area’. That is why I am chartered surveyor and the others are professional surveyors”. We 
know what needs to be done. I only have a finite number of hours and don’t see the benefit given other 
priorities – risk management is burdensome intrusion – each wind farm operator has them go through 
a tick box exercise – it adds no substantive benefit – It would be better if they didn’t do it because 
they don’t have the safety measures to ‘save’ them. Everyone is feeling as though they are clipped on, 
that they can now relax – a lot of the health and safety is also just about ticking boxes.” (P11) 
Further supporting the individualistic approach to risk management was the fact that many 
roles within operations revolved around the need to execute a highly-specialised and narrowly-
focused function. For example, salvage diving, pilotage, and even vessel licensing, all required the 
application of a specific corresponding set of skills combined with historical local knowledge. These 
individuals were required to manage risk in high consequence environments of an unforgiving 
nature akin to high stakes arenas like air traffic control or space flight (Macrae 2010; Perrow 1984). 
The majority of these highly-specialised employees are focused on a very specific area of the 
business that provide a critical function which requires a great deal of organisational investment via 
specialised, in-house training.  Specialisation in managing a specific risk highlighted the importance 
of the role and hence the ability for an individual or department to communicate their functionality. 
Individualising risk management presents the opportunity to express the worth of one’s roles via 
the language of risk; being responsible for managing important risks means important roles that 
theoretically enjoy increased job security. In a sense, this promoted a culture of specialisation whose 
value was enjoyed by those who retained individual skill sets, as noted by the following engineer: 
“I’m the only electronic specialist… I am the expert for the entire company” (P21) 
Personal skill and ability was a prominent value held among the operations staff and was seen 
to set them apart from other areas of the PLA when it came to understanding their organisational 
significance or importance. For example, the high-ranking position the pilots were afforded in the 




organisation was driven by their specialised ability to manage a key operational risk. The ability of 
an individual to apply their knowledge and skill is directly linked to the revenue generated by 
executing the function of pilotage.  This subsequently elevated the pilots standing in relationship to 
other areas of the organisation as indicated by the following respondent: 
“The pilots consider themselves very important, and they are, for bringing in the larger ships” (P23) 
As the ability to apply their skill and reduce operational risk was a key source of self-worth, any 
threat to digging into their personal ‘black boxes’ (i.e. wisdom) would be easily characterised as a 
threat to this amassed capital. Power (2004) notes how ERM approaches to risk management can 
be characterised as essentially ‘turning organisations inside-out’ in their ability to generate explicit 
audit trails that link critical decisions to key individuals, holding them ultimately accountable for 
possible failures. In the case of the Marine Services department a similar phenomenon is present, 
not so much in the accountability for failure as that it well understood to be firmly on the shoulders 
on the individual worker but rather the explication of decision making process presents a clear 
threat to the value a well-seasoned employee can bring to the organisations revenue stream – 
getting things done efficiently and effectively.  This intrusive aspect of the ERM program is another 
piece that management will have to pay rather close attention to if little more than ceremonial 
adoption of the practice is to take place.  
7.4.3 Section Summary 
Marine Services was perhaps the only area of the organisation that was openly focused on balancing 
risks and their associated trade-offs.  For example, the Navigational Safety department saw their 
risks trumping all others. When it came down to it, managing the societal risk would always take 
priority and would default risk control decisions to that of ensuring that no ‘unacceptable’ risks 
would remain. Furthermore, Administrative Services of the organisation, risks were also linear in 
that they were conceived primarily of arising from, and having impact to, the departments in which 
they were being managed by. However, the operational risks were most often required to be viewed 
from at least two underlying and somewhat competing aspects: profit versus safety. This created 
notable link when it came to the employees valuing their expertise and position within the 
organisation, with risk reduced and revenue retained as both being very explicit means to identify 
self-worth. In the end being able to keep things safe and make money for the organisation provided 
employees with a greater level of personal certainty and job security.  
7.5 Chapter Summary 
Yet again, the exploration of another sub-organisational unit produces similarities and differences 
in compared to the other areas. For Marines Services, there was little appetite expressed across the 
department in adopting and practicing this enterprise-wide style of risk management. Risk, for 
operational staff, was something that was ultimately perceived as an individual, rather than 
collaborative, responsibility to manage. They understood risk as being unamenable to the paper 




based, consensus driven approach to managing risk. Risk was something that was to be 
encountered, assessed and understood by the individual. It was not about linking it to other areas of 
the organisation or understanding the possible ripple effects of realised failures resulting from their 
actions.  
Despite this lack of interest in round-table risk discussions, they still leveraged the ‘collective 
mind’ to heed threats as they unfolded. Dialogues and risk would be captured as experiences, to be 
shared with those at an appropriate time and in an appropriate forum. For this intellectual capital 
was a source of individual power and afforded an employee the ability to differentiate themselves 
and their organisational value from the rest of their colleagues. In this sense, the accumulation of 
risk information and its internalisation served as an actual control against the threat of the 
continued attrition of the PLA’s workforce. However, this threat was further exacerbated by the 
ERM process in that it afforded upper management with an opportunity to penetrate their personal 
‘black boxes’, gaining access to valuable proprietary information of specific operating conditions 
and the risks that accompany them.  
As could be expected with an individualistic culture, this area of the organisation was one of 
the only areas to embrace and expand on the entrepreneurial benefits that accompany explicit risk 
management practices. The Hydrographic department that sought to grow its burgeoning service 
offering to an external audience required an enhanced knowledge of contractual arrangements and 
as such, sought to benefit from the additional coverage that explicit and auditable risk trails could 
provide if any failures to deliver on agreements should transpire. In addition to the entrepreneurial 
nature of this type of work, the department on a whole would also be the only area of the 
organisation that was at the forefront of balancing institutional and societal risk. Time and money 
always had the ability to undermine or at least influence decisions on safety. Staff were finding 
themselves increasingly having to push the boundaries of normal operating parameters, in the face 
of technological advancements and increasing demands to move shipments up and down the river. 
Risk tolerances were seen to slowly creep upwards, as the cutting of corners failed to materialise 
into realised losses. The lack of appetite for explicit documentation in a group setting only further 
embedding the cultural notion that risk was ultimately up to the individual and as such, primarily 
managed through the application of professional judgement, on the job, as things happened.    
The next chapter will now move on to a discussion of the empirical findings of the previous 
chapters. The findings of each of the organisation’s areas of the will be compared and contrasted 
against each other in order to explicate the PLA’s differentiated response to the operationalisation 







Chapter 8 Discussion 
8.1 Introduction 
The literature on ERM adoption, as well as that of neo-institutional organisational analysis, suggests 
that organisational responses to formal management frameworks, like ERM, have a notable 
potential to depart from the intended end goals, sometimes resulting in less than desirable 
outcomes (Power 2004; Rothstein et al., 2006; Huber & Rothstein 2012; Hutter 2005; Powell and 
DiMaggio 1991; Bromley and Powell 2009). Specifically, the adoption of a management system that 
intends to identify and challenge long-standing assumptions, actually ends up reinforcing and 
protecting existing practices and ways of seeing the world (Rothstein & Downer 2012). As such, 
this research study has explored how the PLA responded to the recent implementation of an 
organisational-wide ERM style of risk management policy and how it unfolded across three sub-
organisational units. In looking to the promises of ERM and its ability to minimise failures, 
proportionally allocate resources, and increase the likelihood of achieving organisational objectives 
and outcomes, the PLA served to gain a lot from adopting the practice throughout its various 
departments. 
In seeking to address concerns raised by their Executive Board, the PLA enlisted the aid of a 
consultancy in order to formalise an ERM programme. This approach was intended to harmonise 
risk management across the organisation and in doing so, address risks posed to the organisation 
and to society. All areas of the organisation could be considered to be tasked with some significant 
risks. Navigational Safety was continuing to deal with an increased mix of leisure and commuter 
traffic on the more central parts of the river. Marine pilots were having to aid increasingly larger 
ships, with reduced margins for error, into aging ports that were less than adequate when it came to 
providing moorage. The financial status of the National Pilots Pension Funds posed considerable 
threat to the long-term sustainable of the PLA’s compensation regime. And finally, Corporate 
Affairs were having to deal with a range of high-publicity events, like the 2012 London Olympics 
and the Queen’s Diamond Jubilee Pageant, each looking to maximise the exposure of their media 
coverage. The adoption of ERM was seen as viable option to ensure that the risks posed by issues 
like these remained managed and under control.  
ERM provided promise of a coordinated and standardised management of risk across the 
PLA. However, given recent research, the question becomes how and why might the different areas 
of the organisation respond in unified and rational manner or would they decouple ERMs tools and 
technologies in an attempt to preserve pre-existing rationalities and practices? The empirical 
chapters of this research study have explored and detailed the three different areas of the PLA’s 
observed response to the introduction of ERM and now this chapter moves on to discuss and 
explain the ‘how’ and ‘why’ behind what was found.  




The first half of this chapter looks across the findings of Chapters Five, Six and Seven and 
discusses how the different departments responded to the introduction of ERM in relationship to 
what the literature suggested would transpire. In doing so, the goal is to understand how ERM is 
being positioned as a mechanism to increase situational awareness about potential failures and 
reduce operational uncertainties. Section 8.2 speaks to the costs and benefits associated with the 
introduction of ERM at the PLA. As noted in the literature review, ERM is not easy to implement 
and its inherently bureaucratic nature can come at a high transactional cost.   
In order to explain why the different areas of the organisation responded in the fashion that 
they did, Section 8.3 moves on to explore the mechanisms that shaped the departmental responses 
to ERM’s introduction. In doing so, it is proposed that the PLA enacted a set of ERM 
rationalisations or logics that enabled a process of ‘organisational conservatism’ to transpire that in 
turn, preserved the existing identities of each department. As noted in Chapter 2, organisational 
logics have been defined as “the socially constructed, historical patterns of material practices, 
assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which individuals produce and reproduce their material 
subsistence, organize time and space, and provide meaning to their social reality.” (Thornton & 
Ocasio 1999: 804). It is argued that the emerging logics afforded each department the wiggle room 
it required to reinterpret the means and ends of risk management in a manner that preserved the 
various social groups (i.e. departments) cultural norms and identities, and values while at the same 
time allowing them to both validate existing practices as well as further their overall legitimacy 
among a range for stakeholders.  
8.2 How Did the Organisation Respond to ERM?  
The introduction of ERM presented a potential change to each of the three areas of the 
organisation that were studied. In returning to the question posed at the end of Chapter 2 regarding 
if ERM will act as force challenge and change at the PLA or will it serve as a force of organisational 
conservatism and buffer existing practices (Meyer & Rowan 1977; Huber & Rothstein 2013), the 
following section will now discuss the range of responses the PLA’s three departments displayed. 
ERM practice variation has been established as a phenomenon unfolding across public and private 
sector organisations, with different organisations adopting different styles of practice (Mikes 2009). 
However, little is understood about how the practice of ERM can vary across a single organisation. 
Enterprise-wide or holistic approaches to risk management drive towards a standardised and 
repeatable practice of risk management (ISO 2009). This uniformity of practice is predicated on the 
notion that risks that have been subjected to a similar, if not identical, construction process can 
thus be compared against each other in order to prioritise the allocation of resources to the areas of 
most concern i.e. high risk. As will be discussed below, although the PLA did strive to adopt a 
‘unified’ practice of risk management, the explicit process spoke more to a need to legitimise 
actions of the organisation rather than distributing organisational resources or redirecting 
managerial attention to potential modes of failure. However, in enabling this multiplicity of practice 




it will be argued that it afforded the organisation the ability to deal with institutionally pluralistic 
operating environment and the flexibility in which to demonstrate their competence to a wide range 
of stakeholder expectations. 
Furthermore, past research had indicated that although ERM is ‘packaged’ as uniform and 
somewhat generic managerial practice, a range of challenges can arise in it operationalising it. When 
it comes to understanding how organisations vary in their application of legitimising ‘standardised’ 
practice such as ERM, Pedersen and Dobbin (2006) support a cultural view of legitimacy-seeking 
behaviours. These behaviours are dominated by intra-organisational factors that are characterised 
by internal learning and socialisation processes that generate individualised identities. If this holds 
true for the PLA, the organisational response to ERM will have been shaped by contextual factors 
such as organisational culture and institutionalised expectations, which are known to act as 
complementary or competing forces that shape organisational behaviours (Masuda & Garvin 2006; 
DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Schein 2004). In this regard, the practice of ERM becomes less about 
technical competencies, skills and resource acquisition and more about the overarching struggle of 
organisations seeking to understand who they are and how they should act (Whetten & Albert 
1985). However, aligning new institutionalised practices with that of pre-existing organisational 
arrangements can have a wide range of impacts, often noted being that of organisational decoupling 
(Kodieh & Greenwood 2014) to that of a wider-ranging ‘sedimentation’ of institutional 
arrangements (Soin & Huber 2103). The following section will now explore the interaction between 
the newly introduced ERM programme and how the PLA responded to it. It provides a cross-
cutting analysis of the three departments and discusses the observed interactions in regards to how 
the PLA’s structured its organisational arrangements, approach to assessing risks and finally, if there 
were any observed changes in how they responded to risk. 
8.2.1 Did ERM Influence any of the PLA’s Structural Arrangements? 
Perhaps one of the most easily observable responses identified in the empirical evidence was from a 
structural point of view. The literature presented evidence of the role that organisational structures 
and arrangements can have when it comes to institutionalised practices, such as ERM (Meyer & 
Rowan 1977). Specifically, ERM has been demonstrated to lead to the creation of new 
organisational roles, responsibilities and reporting structures (Power 2007; Mikes 2011; Arena et al., 
2010). However, when faced with adopting external practices, decoupling either policy from 
practice, or means from ends, is a frequently anticipated response to institutional expectations 
(Meyer & Rowan 1977; Bromley & Powell 2012). What could be perceived as a uniform adoption 
of risk management protocols is more aptly described as an effort to graft and merge a new 
management system into one comprised of well-established organisational arrangements and 
rationalities (Kodeih & Greenwood 2014; Huber & Rothstein 2012).  
Looking at the three areas, the internal structural implications of the ERM introduction were 
seen to vary, with each area resorting to some level of blending of practices. For example, the 




Administrative Services area was perhaps the most receptive to the ERM programme and made the 
most notable change to their structure in the creation of a new role. As new as this role and 
responsibility was, a new position was not created but the role was merged with a pre-existing 
position, that of commercial development. As noted in Chapter 5, Human Resources took this 
grafting of the ERM practice even further with the attempt to merge the underlying control ERM 
language and terminology, such as ‘owners’ or ‘key performance controls’ in developing their 6-
point strategy, in what substantiates past research findings of ERM’s propensity to turn every 
aspect of organisational into a ‘manageable’ risk (Power 2004; Hardy & Maguire 2016).    
For Navigational Safety, the introduction of ERM appeared to have minimal structural impact, 
outside of the required participation in the internal, external, or operational risk committees. 
Demonstrating a favourable and receptive response to the ERM programme, this department felt 
comfortable with the existing risk management process and technologies it already had in place. As 
such, ERM was positioned more as an item that could extend their current approach and rather 
than alter or shape it. The Navigational Safety Management Team was still considered the primary 
mechanism for managing the risks in this department and ERM would function more as a means to 
communicate their risks and associated management activities to the rest of the organisation. Vessel 
Traffic Services, radio and satellite equipment, navigational aids, etc., were all in place and 
functioning as expected when it came to reducing the likelihood and severity of any incidents on 
the river. The ‘rolling hazard list’ was reviewed regularly and the information was routinely inputted 
into HAZMAN II, the risk assessment software. All of these well-established technologies and 
processes meant that ERM offered very little enhancement to what was already considered to be a 
highly function Safety Management System. ERM was seen more as a means to bring this 
enlightened thinking to the rest of the organisation and convert them to them to what was well 
understood as the way to avoid organisational failures.  
Marine services, saw the least amount of structural change when it came to the 
introduction of ERM. With their ‘leave us to get on with it’ mentality, there was little expectation or 
pressure placed on this group to adopt the programme, although they did participate in the various 
risk assessment exercises and committee discussions. It was almost as though ERM ran counter-
intuitively to this area of the organisation in that they approached work from a highly-specialised 
and individualised ‘expert’ role. If anything, the amassing of this individual capital served to protect 
those in Marine Services from what was considered to be a continued reduction in the number of 
employees working for the PLA. This in turn lead to a ‘hoarding’ of key knowledge in which 
specialist sought to ‘black-box’ their risk knowledge with themselves serving as the impenetrable 
black box - a response that runs in direct contravention of the increased organisational awareness 
that ERM seeks to generate (IRM 2002). 
As much as the introduction of ERM had relatively minor structural implications when it 
came to the existing roles and responsibilities, there were other notable impacts in regards to how 
the PLA positioned itself in relation to major issues, like the failing pension fund or loss of major 




customers. The ability of risk management to aid organisations in navigating complex institutional 
arrangements has been demonstrated through the construction of risk objects and how 
organisations assume different points of view in relationship to what poses a threat and what 
constitutes a source of value (Boholm & Corvellec 2010; Corvellec 2010). Recent research has also 
begun to emphasise the interpretative nature of risk, as well as how individuals and organisations 
develop these threat-value ‘risk relationships’ (Boholm & Corvellec 2010; Hilgartner 1992). This 
line of thought is suggestive of risk management being shaped by, and dependent on, local and 
historical interpretations of the context in which a risk is conceived (Boholm, Corvellec & Karlsson 
2012). In regards to the relationships the PLA had with external stakeholders, ERM offered a new 
dimension in how they could relate to the issues put forward by different internal and external actor 
groups.   
 For example, labelling things as risk objects afforded those working in the Administrative 
Services the ability to have the organisation relate differently to the ‘unsanctioned’ gym equipment. 
By labelling the equipment as a hazard and the usage as ‘risky’ the organisational discourse was 
shifted from being positioned as a bothersome complaint to one requiring managerial action. 
Exchanges between staff in Corporate Affairs, as well as Navigational Safety, during the public 
meetings often incorporated a lot of ‘risk talk’ when it came to exchanging concerns. Although not 
directly attributable to the ERM programme, these ‘risk-based’ exchanges with the public, coupled 
with the increased awareness and attention to risk that ERM created, reinforced the importance of 
risk management in general. Most notable of these was the somewhat heated exchange between a 
group of competitive rowers seeking access to the river during times of high fluvial flows. The 
Navigational Safety department leveraged the existing relationships the rowers had with their 
insurers, who were threatening to pull their coverage if the ‘expert’ rowers disregarded the PLA 
flag-based warning systems.  
As much as internal Structural arrangements were absent in the Marine Services’ response 
to ERM, there were some external relationships that were influenced by the programme’s 
introduction for this area of the organisation. The intersection between the need to maintain 
navigational safety as well as maximise PLA revenue had this area of the organisation confronting 
potential risk trade-offs. Staff felt they were routinely facing the need to balance increasing 
demands associated with larger and faster ships that would challenge a pilot’s skill and capabilities 
as they, at times, struggle not to push the safety envelope too far. Although the ERM programme 
did not specifically capture this issue, the increased attention the programme brought to managing 
risk in general meant that staff were beginning to realise a possible tool that could begin to broach 
the subject. However, whether ERM at the PLA can make the leap from conservatism to change, 
and achieve what should be considered its primary function, remains to be seen.   




8.2.2 Did ERM Influence How the Organisation Assessed Risks? 
The assessment process associated with an ERM approach to managing risk, often lies at the heart 
of the management system, as figure 2.1 in chapter 2 depicts (ISO 2009). Comprised of the 
sequential steps of identifying, analysing and evaluating risk, risk assessment is about as explicit of a 
‘risk-relationship’ construction process that you can get. However, as methodical and robust as the 
risk assessment process is purported to be, it is ripe with opportunity to be biased and influenced 
by a multitude of cognitive, cultural and organisational factors (Slovic et al., 2005; Kahneman 2011; 
Cox 2008; Mikes 2009; Douglas 1982). A common theme prevalent in all the departments when it 
came to assessing risk was the reliance and deference to that of ‘professional judgment’.  
The primary source of information on risk was housed within the PLA’s employee’s past 
experiences and tacit knowledge. Relying on past experiences meant that in the absence of any 
large-scale failures, the most notable being the Marchioness disaster over 15 years ago, the 
acceptability of the current level of risk was largely left unchallenged. For example, in the 
Navigational Safety department, when being asked to describe risk events or risk that required 
management, employees gravitated towards a reliance on an availability or familiarity bias in 
applying their professional (i.e. career experience) during the risk assessment process.  As many of 
the consequences the PLA was considering were rather severe, the frequency of those events was 
quite rare (e.g. cyberattacks, vessel groundings closing the river, or death of a contractor on PLA 
property). The absence of adversity inherently implied that controls were sufficient and that in the 
event adversity was realised then it would be framed as an accident rather than a failure. This left 
the application of availability and familiarity heuristics largely left unchecked and if anything, the 
constructed ‘risk-relationships’ were further validated (i.e. made real) by their accepted presence in 
the risk registers. Perhaps one of the most notable being the inclusion of a lottery win on the 
register due to the HR Directors past experience at other organisations where this had transpired. 
Lastly, the navigational safety department had developed an increasingly sophisticated software 
solution to aid in their calculation and evaluation of navigational safety risks. Explicit risk 
assessment for them had been a core task in their work for well over a decade and the adoption of 
ERM saw little challenge posed to the sunk costs associated with the computer-based assessments. 
However, as noted in Chapter 6, the reliance on the software afforded no greater level of 
sophistication than that of the excel registers. Inputting risk scores into the program merely 
resulted in the information being re-organised and presented in a visual interface rather than the 
software outputting anything ‘new’.  
The significance of professional judgement held true for employees in the Marine Services area 
and led to a second interesting observation regarding the reliance on experiential data and ERM. 
Unlike in the Navigational Safety Department, where employees were quite willing to document 
their wealth of knowledge about how things have gone wrong in the past, the audit-like aspect of 
explicit risk documentation posed a threat to the very application of experiential risk knowledge. As 
the ‘vessel’ of experiential knowledge is that of the employee, any request or attempt to access it 




becomes a rather intrusive affair. Much like audit, ERM has been characterised as having the ability 
to turn organisations ‘inside-out’ as Power (1997; 2007) puts it, and it seemed like this same logic 
applied to the individuals in Marine Services. It was as though their amassed risk knowledge as a 
source of capital that helped characterise them as an irreplaceable expert would be compromised by 
divulging how they personally manage specific risks as implied in the following quote:  
 “…I know exactly what to do to keep us in the ‘green area’. That is why I am chartered surveyor 
and the others are professional surveyors. We know what needs to be done… risk management is 
burdensome intrusion…” (P11) 
This resulted in a reluctance to engage in the risk assessment process and was reflected by the 
overall lack of line items being attributed to the Marine Services Director’s ‘ownership’.  
This brings us to another notable point being that of the role of communicating experiential 
risk information in ERM. As noted above, employees across the organisation would look to first-
hand accounts of risk events in order to inform their initial understanding of what posed a risk to 
departmental or organisational objectives (i.e. objects at risk). When asked to speak to risks that 
staff saw requiring management’s attention, employees often used stories or narratives to serve as 
examples of why and how risk would play out. The role of risk played a significant part in how the 
PLA made sense of the world around them. The language, talk and communication about risk 
enabled employees to attribute meaning to events and to guide goal-directed behaviour (Weick, 
Sutcliffe & Obstfeld 2005). As much of the information on risks faced by the organisation was 
housed as tacit knowledge and mental models distributed among various employees, it was as 
though the ERM risk discussions allowed for the socialisation of different scenarios, allowing 
employees to gauge the reaction to the plausibility of the recounted story. Whether it was the 
Navigational Management Team recounting a memorable example of a near miss event on the river 
during their monthly meetings, or the Marine Services department speaking about the public 
meetings on how best to deal with trees along the river banks, they provided evidence through a 
personalised recollection. Situating the description of the risk within a story had made it much 
more memorable to the others around the table and at the same time added the knowledge to the 
‘collective mind’ of the organisation (Weick 1993). These contributions to the collective knowledge 
could then be leveraged by less experienced staff members when faced with similar situations.  This 
held especially true for those in the Navigational Safety and Marine Services areas where many 
calculations or assessments of risk would happen in on the job with employees ‘making sense’ of 
risky situations as they unfolded. 
ERM also served as a self-reinforcing mechanism in regards to the introduction and 
application of experiential risk data. In making the assessment of risk, the PLA had a suite of both 
pre-existing and newly introduced technologies for calculating the level of risk associated with 
various activities, behaviours and conditions associated with their work. The more sophisticated 
tools, such as HAZMAN II, was reserved for the high profile navigational safety assessments.  
However, outside of the ‘automated’ probability x consequence calculation and the ability to ‘heat 




map’ the risks together, the enhanced technology provided little more than its paper-based 
counterparts (i.e. excel registers). As all tools were fed the same experiential data and the software 
solution worked more to substantiate and protect the pre-existing understanding of how risky 
something was or was not. Each tool gave the user the same level of comfort that the appropriate 
amount of ‘rigour’ had been applied to the assessment. All of this reinforcing activity suggests that 
although ERM is positioned as a means to reduce uncertainty, it actually acted as a way to reinforce 
what was certain. The overall outcome is somewhat the same in that any organisational ‘anxiety’ 
about what the future might hold is reduced, an actual reduction in the likelihood or severity of 
future events remains more fantasy than fact (Clarke 1999a).  This was evidenced by the pushing of 
risk assessments from a colour of concern (i.e. yellow or red) into the ‘calming’ green through a 
single point reduction in the likelihood or consequence scoring, highlighting the inherent issues 
with risk matrices (Cox 2008). As such, the time and effort spent creating and populating the 
various risk registers is best characterised as an attempted codification of existing practices.   
8.2.3 Did ERM Influence how the Organisation Responded to Risk? 
Representing a corner stone of good corporate governance, ERM has becomes a taken-for-granted 
and highly legitimising (i.e. institutionalised) practice within public and private sector. As such, the 
literature suggests the PLA could adopt an isomorphic response to its introduction, one that could 
be subject to a host of strategies that serve to preserve the existing traditions, practices and the 
cultural core of the organisation (Meyer & Rowan 1977; DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Oliver 1991; 
Pederson & Dobbin 2006; Westphal & Zajac 2001). Specifically, introducing a management system 
like ERM, that is designed to inherently question existing ways of doing business, has been linked 
to the creation of symbolic or ceremonial responses (DiMaggio & Powell 1983). These types of 
self-preserving responses serve to elevate the practice within the organisation and provide ‘tangible’ 
proof of its adoption, while serving as a buffer of well-entrenched practices and cultural 
arrangements that were in place long before its introduction (Rothstein & Downer 2012). In 
introducing a standardised and collaborative approach to this activity, it will now be discussed if 
ERM influenced how the organisation responded to the challenges and issues that they had worked 
so hard to translate into risk-based conceptions. 
For all of the risk committees that were developed to manage the different types of risks, each 
of them was quite concerned with ‘accurately’ populating a risk register. Outside of the 
Administrative Services department, much of the organisation struggled to challenge any of their 
preconceived notions and ideas about what might pose a risk to their objectives. The risk 
identification process represented more of a translation rather than discovery mechanism. Each of 
the committees used their round-table discussion as a means to socialise, rather than challenge, 
existing problems and the associated potential failures that they though felt deserved organisational 
attention. As described in Chapter 6, the wording captured in the risk registers actually highlighted 
the lack of change or challenge to existing practices and control set-ups. Under the column of 




‘further action required’ many of the line items across all of the registers used language like 
‘continue current regime’, ‘continued vigilance’ or ‘nothing further’. The registers produced little to 
no evidence that there was any immediate need to change anything; as far as the assessors were 
concerned, risk levels were seen to be acceptable.  
Further to this lack of challenge and populating the register with ‘well-established’ risks, was 
the absence of any truly uncertain risks. There was no apparent attempt by any of the committees 
to include risks that they were not familiar with. Surely there had to be scenarios, new technologies, 
or emerging threats that the organisation had yet to experience first-hand. Including these on the 
register would most likely have led to the ‘future actions’ column being populated with some type 
of research or investigative action. However, it was as though these items were not up for 
discussion, perhaps due to the uncomfortableness of being unprepared or perhaps they posed 
challenges to existing hierarchical arrangements. Either way, ERM’s ability to uncover new and 
unaccounted-for risks was being neutralised by the PLA’s risk assessment processes.  
As noted by DiMaggio and Powell (1983), the artefacts (i.e. registers, policies, committees, etc.) 
of ERM served much more of a symbolic role for all of the departments rather than contributing to 
a substantive change in how they saw or responded to risk. A number of examples of symbolic 
responses to the introduction of ERM were identified across all three of the areas. There were the 
Administrative Service’s efforts to identify and link explicit controls with external threats became an 
effort to create an illusion of control that ultimately satisfied the ideology of risk management 
rather than actually change the way they actually went about their existing work or routines. 
‘Bracing for the impacts’ resulting from a loss of key customers was something that saw little 
change in possible mitigations relating to such an event and rather continue the business-as-usual 
approach to ‘maintaining positive customer relationships’ as a means to simply alert the PLA to an 
impending loss.  
The Navigational Safety department leveraged the ERM as a further symbolic nod to their 
overall commitment to managing the risks to Navigational Safety. Again, the risk registers saw little 
evidence of any challenge or need to change current practices. If anything, the laundry list of 
controls outlined under their areas of the registers suggested that all of the controls were 
appropriate and working as expected. In addition to the pre-existing controls symbolising a well-
functioning ERM system, symbolic failures were also elevated through the explicit programme. The 
Marchioness disaster assumed a powerful position across the organisation’s culture and had 
implications for how the department viewed their ability to influence the likelihood or consequence 
of events. It provided staff with a first-hand account that served as an indisputable fact of just how 
important the PLA’s role is on the river is and how quickly catastrophic failures could occur. 
Lastly, Marine Services showed very little desire for, let alone uptake of, the ERM programme. 
However, this being said, there was indication that the increased reliance on risk information and 
the ability to link individual and departmental performance to this ‘explicit’ metric suggests that 
future change, or at least challenge, may be in store for Marine Services. As much as the employees 




in this area distanced themselves from the ‘meeting room’ nature of ERM’s collaborative risk 
management process, the increased situational awareness created by gaining a common 
understanding of the challenges facing different teams provides access to what they consider to be 
extremely valuable capital. Although ERM has yet to make any significant inroads in this area of the 
PLA, it will be interesting to see how this ‘intrusive’ new programme evolves when it comes to 
managing the risks associated with Marine Services.  
8.2.4 Section Summary 
In comparing the how the various areas of the organisation responded to the introduction of the 
ERM programme, very little substantive change was actually witnessed. From a structural point of 
view, the Administrative Services area saw the most significant impact, with a minor shift in roles 
and responsibilities. The navigational Safety department simply tacked on the ERM program and 
positioned as an extension of what was considered an already highly-functioning risk management 
programme in via the Safety Management System. Marine Services saw little to gain at all with 
ERMs collaborative nature running counter-intuitive to the individualist culture that was so 
prevalent among the experts and specialists employed in this area. However, there were some 
notable structural aspects that saw influence from the introduction of ERM. Internal issues 
between departments like the relocation of gym equipment or from an external perspective, using 
risk to shift accountabilities in regards to rowers accessing the river during dangerous fluvial flows, 
were able to be repositioned through the ERM programme. The ability to create and leverage 
explicit ‘risk relationships’ afforded some ability for departments to reframe existing issues in the 
language of risk, making the amenable to managerial control. 
A similar story unfolded when it came to how the organisation assessed risk. Although the 
introduction of ERM was met with little resistance, its ability to challenge pre-existing 
understandings of what was a risk and how things might fail fell somewhat short. However, of note 
was the organisation wide reliance on and appreciation ‘professional judgement’. The ability to 
recall and apply experiential data when it came to identifying, analysing and evaluation risk was a 
repeated theme across all three departments. Perhaps in part due to the fact that the organisation 
had yet to identify more quantifiable or statistical sources of risk data, the deference to professional 
experiences in assessing risk was largely left unchecked. This provided both positive and negative 
responses; positive in the communicative nature of recounting past experiences between staff 
members and increasing knowledge of the ‘collective mind’; negative in the fact that many of these 
anecdotal stories were largely unverifiable and could easily be subjected to personal biases. Much of 
the ERM only compounded these issues through its seemingly legitimising calculations captured by 
the risk assessment registers and computer software program, HAZMAN II. 
Lastly, and at this point unsurprisingly, there was little change or challenge posed to how the 
PLA responded to risk. The majority of all risks captured during the ERM risk assessment exercises 
and workshops, by all of the departments involved, identified and captured issues that were well 




understood and had been ‘managed’ for quite some time. This is where the truly symbolic nature of 
the ERM response really began to become evident. The majority of the artefacts served a 
ceremonial function rather than any substantive benefit. The process became one that was more 
representative of translating existing issues into the common currency and language of risk. 
Avoiding putting anything uncomfortable on the register ensured that risks remained certain and 
under control.  
The above demonstrates new insights into the practical implications of implementing ERM 
within an organisation. The introduction of an explicit management system, such as ERM, comes at 
a considerable cost to an organisation and can begin to overshadow the intended benefits of 
realising reduced risk. On the surface, costs can be easily quantified in the increased time and effort 
that is required to practice ERM. Staff are now required to attend meetings, populate risk registers, 
undertake training, hire consultants, etc., in order to ensure the appropriate skills and tools are in 
place to operationalise the system. Allocating the increased level of resources does provide the 
immediate benefit of the increased auditability of the decision-making process associated with 
managing risk. However, the transactions associated with ERM also appear to contain hidden costs 
for the PLA that have yet to be realised.  
The apparent mis-match between how risks were being captured by the tools and documents 
of ERM and how it was actually being managed begins to suggest the creation of ‘fantasy 
documents’, which were discussed in Chapter Two. In one sense, it can be argued that the PLA was 
actually engaged in the production of fantasy documentation in that the resulting ERM narrative 
was a “tool of persuasion designed to create the impression of expertise for certain audiences” 
(Clarke 1999:137). As Clarke further notes, these audiences are not simply the public, which the 
PLA is mandated to protect, but rather the organisations that hold the PLA accountable to achieve 
its mandate. The risk management tools and documentation, such as registers, policies, and risk 
assessment software, serve to communicate the PLA’s ability to address and control the risks it is 
ascribed via its mandate. Yet, how divorced is this documentation from reality?   
The PLA’s adoption of ERM also challenges the thinking that fantasy documents are, at their 
core, a symbolic mechanism which can compensate for a lack in experience or first-hand 
knowledge of risks by creating ‘apparent affinities’ of control - i.e. false senses of security (Clarke 
1999). Rather, in the case of the PLA the creation of ERM documentation actually stripped the rich 
tacit knowledge and historical context out before it got a chance to be captured and communicated. 
This was seen to happen in two predominant ways; first, the reductive nature of risk calculations 
inherently removes the rich contextual data that is present in the verbal accounts and assessments 
of risk. And secondly, the layout of excel based spreadsheets forced participants to edit out any 
associated context that actually supported the inclusion of the risk being placed in the register in the 
first place. It is the context and relevant nature of the relationships between risk objects that 
ascribes the vital ‘meaning’ of why a risk should be managed and in turn, how best to go about 
managing it. The context communicates the rationale to actors by embedding the risk within the 




broader field of the organisation’s cultural values. In this sense, the concept of fantasy arises less 
from an apparent affinity of control but rather that the removal of the essential contextual data 
actually undermines the overall effectiveness of the control system. The immediate ‘cost’ of this 
stripping process may not be evident, but as time passes and those staff possessing the tacit 
knowledge that informed these reductive assessments leave the organisation, the ability for the 
ERM documentation to present an accurate risk ‘reality’ may be significantly hampered.  
The above has provided a cross-cutting comparison of how the PLA responded to the 
introduction of ERM. For the most part, it represents a rather straight-forward and clear-cut 
example of an organisation decoupling policy from practice as well as means from ends (Bromley & 
Powell 2009). However, understanding why this has transpired in the way that is has becomes a 
little more complex, and begins to shed light on the role that organisational identity and the need to 
conserve it, plays in shaping organisational responses to institutionalised practices like ERM.  
8.3 Departmental ERM Logics of Organisational Conservatism 
The following section presents a conceptualisation of why the different areas of the organisation 
responded to the introduction of the ERM programme in the way that they did. In doing so, it 
identifies three ‘ERM logics’ that emerged from the analysis of the empirical chapters. When 
confronted with ambiguous and pluralistic (i.e. conflicting) institutional environments, 
organisations have responded by decoupling a practice’s means from its intended ends (Meyer & 
Rowan 1977; Bromley & Powell 2009; Bersharov & Smith 2014). Acting under what can be 
characterised as an end goal of ‘organisational conservatism’, it is proposed that each area sought to 
decouple ERM’s means from its intended ends of risk reduction in order to further existing 
agendas while changing as little as possible.  In order to achieve this, ERM facilitated the enactment 
of three organisational logics that served to rationalise and guide behaviours in a manner that 
would, on the surface, represent the adoption and implementation of the policy but in practice, the 
means employed served to achieve an outcome that reinforced rather challenged existing 
organisational norms, practices and identities.  
In essence, the three emerging rationalisations served to answer three basic questions that 
could then provide the ‘if -then’ logic required to inform how they should best respond to the 
ERM programme. Firstly, a logic of ‘if this is who we are, then this is what ERM mean to us’ was 
applied. This logic served as an ‘identity aligning’ mechanism that sets the stage for how ERM was 
positioned by each department and in turn, shapes the next two logics. The second logic that was 
seen to emerge, speaks to the aspirational notion of organisational identity (Kodeih and 
Greenwood 2014) and presents a ‘value proposition’ logic of ‘if this is who we want to be, then this 
is why we should practice ERM’. And lastly, the third and most ‘organisationally conserving’ risk 
logic allowed actors to apply ERM as means to confirm that ‘if this what we have been doing, then 
this is why it was right’. This final logic repurposed ERM as a validating mechanism of past 
behaviours and values and completes a self-reinforcing process of organisational conservatism. 




Each of these three logics elicits a corresponding departmental response that shapes the overall 
practice of ERM, as depicted in figure 8.1. In addition to this, each of these logics overlap in some 
regard, for example the validation of how risks were managed in the past would be reflective of 
how a department’s current identity is visualised through the use of a Venn diagram in visual 
representation below.   




For each area of the organisation that was explored, risk management was reinterpreted in a 
manner that resonated with how they saw themselves and the purpose their individual role or 
department played within the organisation. Although the overall interpretation of what a holistic 
risk management framework could offer the PLA was generally unified, local interpretations and 
practices were distinct and differentiated. The pluralistic institutional environment in which the 
PLA operates drove these separate conceptions of risk management. The following three 
subsections will now highlight these different logics and how they enabled the PLA to shape the 
practice of ERM into something that fit into their pre-existing organisational arrangements and 
rationalities. 
8.3.1 Identity Alignment  
Identity Alignment was all about situating ERM in the ‘here and now’ present tense. When it came 
to the introduction of risk management and its interaction with the culture of the various 
departments, the organisation sought to protect and defend existing practices. Organisations seek 
to gain legitimacy and establish identities simultaneously (Pederson & Dobbin 2006). Although 
much of risk management’s purported benefit is in its ability to serve as means of organisational 
challenge, each of the areas characterised ERM as a means to protect well-entrenched 
organisational identities. Each area of the PLA had developed distinct and ‘unique’ identities within 











shared norms and values and through the adoption of an enterprise-wide approach to managing 
risk - an activity that afforded them increased legitimacy among their peers and stakeholders. The 
adoption of the ERM programme, and its ability to ‘turn organisations inside out’ (Power 2007), 
presented to some a very clear threat to what each of these departments had worked so hard to 
establish themselves as, while others saw it as an opportunity to advance their departments standing 
and reputation. As such, each department was seen to ensure that ERM was enacted in a way that 
supported and aligned with who they believed themselves to be.  
For those working for the Corporate Affairs department in the Administrative Services area, 
the alignment of their identity with ERM was achieved through the management of reputational 
risk. For the PLA, the category of reputation risk had little to do with explicit external evaluation of 
their performance through ranking or rating systems, such as those that UK universities are judged 
by (Huber 2009: Power et al., 2009). As much as the notion of reputational risk was directly linked 
to the possible implications of any individual or departmental failure (i.e. being held accountable) 
there was another driving force behind the incorporation and significance of reputational risk. For 
example, in characterizing failure as ultimately playing out as a reputational risk, the associated 
actions and strategies of the Corporate Affairs department are deemed necessary and requisite. The 
ERM risk registers, each one with a separate and distinct column for ranking reputational impacts 
associated with every risk, reinforced the need for, and appropriateness of, the Corporate Affairs 
group.  
Further to the need to align ERM with a ‘behind-the-scenes’ organisational role, the culture of 
the administrative services department placed an increased amount of value on their ability to 
support the organisation in an integrated fashion. For example, there was the expressed interest of 
the Corporate Affairs department to be seen as ‘completely embedded’ within the operations of the 
organisation. Here the goal was stated as being “[able to] manage the communications around those 
issues to try to ensure the reputation of the organisation isn’t damaged”. The Human Resources 
department assumed a similar position regarding the practice of ERM and sought to incorporate 
‘risk thinking’ into its newly developing HR strategy. In their affinity to the broader organisational 
mandate of navigational safety, the administrative services emulated this commitment through its 
identification of risks. If they were going to take up this mission critical activity, they too would 
seek to protect others from harm. In assuming this protectionist stance, a raft of risks of external 
origin populated the risk register. Cyberattacks, labour union unrest, pandemics, loss of customers, 
etc., were the types of risks that would align with the role that Administrative Services employees 
saw themselves fulfilling.  
When it came to the Navigational Safety department, they had perhaps the longest standing, 
formalised approach to risk management that had been developed by any of the three departments. 
They had prided themselves on the fact they were seen as ‘community leaders’ and an exemplar and 
industry leading port authority among their national and international peers. In assuming this 
‘authoritative’ identity, they placed a strong emphasis on the value of hierarchy as this felt to be key 




requisite for the retention of the Chief Harbour Master’s power and influence. As such, 
Navigational Safety strongly identified with the control-centric concepts of ERM and was quick to 
champion its practices across all areas of the organisation. It had long been seen as the dominant 
expert on risk management and was not about to relinquish any of that authority. The department 
had been relying on the ‘black-box’ of risk assessment for some time via the development and 
usage of the HAZMAN II software programme. The department had created a bureaucratic and 
highly inaccessible ‘black-box’ that basically laundered anecdotal and experiential risk accounts into 
a ‘technically valid’ risk calculations, such as comments like ‘I’ve never seen that happen before’ into 
an unchallenged risk score of ‘rare’. The fact that only one member of the organisation, whose desk 
was positioned directly outside the CHM’s office, was responsible for entering data into the 
programme meant that little challenge would be tolerated when it came to assessing navigational 
safety risks.  
The Marine Services department was the strongest resistor to the adoption of the ERM 
programme and as such, simply rejected the ERM practice as much as possible due to it being 
viewed as intrusive to their existing individualistic culture. If working in Marine Services was about 
individual value, then getting on with what they were trained to do would be the best way to 
demonstrate it. Here, it was as though employees felt the more that employees rejected the practice, 
the more it emphasised their irreplaceable nature. Limiting involvement, such as minimising the 
number of line items Marine Services was responsible for in the register, also meant that there was 
a much lower chance that the other areas would intrude on how Marine Service’s conducted its 
business. And lastly, providing any knowledge in through the ERM risk assessment actually posed 
more of a direct threat to their ‘intellectual capital’. Much like Power’s (1997) audit society speaks to 
the turning inside out of organisational life, the last thing this area was interested in was creating 
explicit audit trails that essentially turned an employee ‘inside out’. This meant that if ERM was 
going to align with Marines Services, then avoiding alignment would have to be the name of the 
game.  
8.3.2 Establishing Value Propositions 
The logic of establishing value propositions now had employees thinking about the future 
implications of adopting the risk management programme. The adoption of institutionalised 
practices, such as ERM, have been viewed as a means to achieve greater organisational legitimacy 
(DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Suchman 1995) and this would appear to hold true for this case study. 
As much as each area saw the introduction of ERM as a positive move and one that could afford 
the ability to make better decisions, it soon became evident that efforts to formally manage risk 
were speaking to a wide range of unspoken or sub-conscious agendas. Typically, efforts to increase 
legitimacy have been described as being achieved from a uniform and organisation-wide 
perspective, what is different here is how legitimacy played out in a more micro fashion, at the 
individual and departmental levels of the PLA.  




Research has shown that the status of an organisation influenced their responses to 
institutional pressures to change (Kodeih & Greenwood 2014). Organisations enjoying an elite 
status were more likely to ‘graft’ new practices onto existing ones, where lower status organisations 
would frame change as means to reconstitute their status and ‘move up the ranks’. The findings of 
this study echo this at an intra-organisation level in that the ‘high status’ Navigational Safety 
department saw ERM as an add-on rather than a whole sale change. However, the lower status 
Administrative Services saw a great amount of potential to reposition themselves and the issues 
they faced, elevating them up to equal footing among the other departments.   
For those working in the administrative services departments, ERM afforded them an 
opportunity to increase their legitimacy in relation to the other areas of the organisation. As the 
practice of risk management was much more prevalent in both the Navigational Safety and Marine 
Services departments, the adoption of ERM provided the ability to demonstrate their support and 
allegiance to the newly expanded risk management programme. As a self-admitted ‘risk 
management zealot’, the Chief Harbour Master had made no bones about the significance and 
prominence risk information should have in the decisions relating to Navigational Safety. With little 
established skill or methods in place to manage risk, the employees in the Administrative Services 
area were left somewhat wanting when it came to demonstrating their contribution to the collective 
management of risk when compared to the use of the HAZMAN II software or application 
Dynamic Risk Assessments being employed by the other departments. ERM was clearly a required 
skillset that must be acquired if their work was continued to go unquestioned. As such, the 
corresponding response was that of an unwavering and unquestioned support for the introduction 
of the ERM programme.  
As a formalised response to risk management had yet to ‘take hold’ within this area of the 
organisation, little resistance to the practices and technologies was seen. This lack of first-hand 
experience in managing risk through explicit means also resulted in a perceived ambiguity as to how 
best to enact the policy. In responding to institutional pressures to adopt external practices, lack of 
knowledge has been seen to lead to mimetic responses (DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Bromley and 
Powell 2012), as was the case for Administrative Services. This area was quick to assume new roles 
and responsibilities as a means to bolster their risk managing capacity. These structural changes, 
such as tasking the newly appointed Head of Risk Management with co-ordinating multiple risk 
management committees, help to substantiate this ‘important’ new role and function. In addition to 
this, the creation of risk registers allowed for their issues to finally be seen in relation to, and on a 
par with, the long-standing more ‘mission-centric’ risks associated with the other departments.  
Additional benefit for Administrative Services was realised through the communicative and 
visual nature of risk management, both verbal and written (Holt 2004; Power 2004). Often being 
faced with less than the lion’s share of the resource pool, administrative areas of the organisation 
were tasked with managing risk that posed equal if not greater risks to the organisation’s long-term 
survival but with little opportunity to compare or contrast this with other areas of the organisation. 




The ability of areas like HR to use risk to place their issues, like industrial action and flu pandemics, 
side by side with navigational and operational concerns meant that staff felt that they had their 
voice heard. The communicative nature of risk management also provided a fruitful opportunity to 
manage various stakeholder relations through risk-based dialogues. The language of risk was often 
used as an interface between internal and external stakeholders in a way to signify and convey areas 
of concern. 
As the Navigational Safety department had already established a well-defined and explicit risk 
management framework through its adherence and compliance with the Port Marine Safety Code, 
ERM served to increase legitimacy more from an external perspective. Specifically, the adoption of 
ERM afforded an opportunity to directly influence the level of moral legitimacy the PLA could 
claim. Moral legitimacy places the emphasis on the ‘social goodness’ rather than a direct benefit and 
asks: ‘is the organisation doing the ‘right thing’ or is it acting in a manner that contradicts societal 
values?’ (Suchman 1995). This strikes directly at the core of the societally themed mandate of 
keeping people safe on the river. As those working in the Navigational Safety department had 
already positioned themselves as the PLA’s foremost experts on managing risk, the introduction of 
an expanded risk management programme only served to further this form of organisational 
legitimacy. In addition to this, the introduction of ERM also served to expand the already 
dominating influence and reach of the Chief Harbour Master’s office. An organisation-wide 
required adoption of a practice that had once been the sole purview of the Navigational Safety 
department, meant that now everyone in the organisation would be required to become fluent in 
what was essentially this department’s ‘native tongue’.  
For Marine Services, the value proposition associated with ERM adoption was one that could 
increase individual status within the organisation. Legitimacy for them was through the application 
of skill and the ability to retain autonomous decision-making processes. As they had basically 
rejected the entire process, Marine Service’s symbolic compliance was already being tolerated by the 
rest of the organisation. If anything, the embracing of professional judgement as a means to inform 
ERM’s qualitative risk assessment process only further celebrated the individual skill sets that the 
experts in Marine Services had prided themselves on. For example, as captured in Chapter 7, the 
individual status of ‘the only specialised electrical engineer’ in the organisation was significantly 
elevated through their participation in the ERM collaborative risk assessment workshops and their 
ability to speak to risks that no one else felt qualified to discuss. As such, symbolic and ‘light-touch’ 
approach to the ERM programme became a logical value proposition for those working seeking to 
further their individual standing within the department, and organisation.  
8.3.3 Validating Past Practices 
The third and final logic that was identified in how the organisations responded to the ERM 
programme was that of one premised on the idea that ERM could validate and account for past 
behaviours and practices. This differs from the initial theme of legitimacy in that where legitimacy 




was primarily focused on gaining acknowledgement from an external party, this logic served more 
to confirm and defend the appropriateness of what the organisation had always been doing. In this 
sense, ERM, through its inherently explicit and communicative nature, could articulate that existing 
understandings and processes were ‘measurably’ benefiting the organisation and demonstrate that 
they had taken a suitable course of action.   
The function of ERM, understood by interviewees as a means to achieving a reduction of 
unwanted events impacting their respective objectives, was rarely executed in a fashion that 
achieved its intended outcome. Alternatively, departments rationalised ERM and its ability to 
explicate specific relationships as a means to validate their current practices. For example, as we 
saw in Chapter 5, Administrative Services placed an emphasis on how their role within the PLA 
was to support and facilitate the achievement of the more functional or ‘hands-on’ departments’ 
goals by keeping workers healthy and content with their employer. They understood themselves to 
be the support function of the PLA, a critical function but one that was not directly acting upon the 
statutorily mandated objectives. This meant for them that the risks they should concern themselves 
with would primarily arise from outside of their immediate and direct control. If risk management 
was to serve any type of challenge function for this area of the organisation, then identifying how 
they may have greater control of these threats than they feel they do, would be a logical place to 
start. 
 However, rather than allowing the assessment of risks to uncover any unidentified threats 
stemming from internal procedures or relationships, it was much more convenient to externalise 
threats and in doing so demonstrate how they lay outside of their direct influence. This placed the 
‘problem’ as being attributable to something or someone outside of the PLA and alleviated any 
need to directly confront existing practices or rationalities. This validated the general organisational 
conception that the root of problems, whether they are to do with navigational safety or the 
efficacy of management systems, will arise from a short-coming external to the organisation. 
Protecting the organisation from all of these external threats was, according to the ERM 
programme, the correct thing to be doing.  
The Navigational safety department had the most to potentially lose by the introduction of 
what could have been perceived as a competing system to manage risk. This area of the 
organisation had long-prided itself on its increasingly sophisticated and well-orchestrated means to 
manage risk. The almost unquestionable nature of the elaborate and hard-wired technologies and 
processes to uphold navigational safety meant any adoption of the ERM programme must only 
further reinforce the pre-existing system competence. ERM provided the opportunity to explicitly 
link the absence of any significant failures to the pre-existing infrastructure. Controls were validated 
as being competent and appropriate by virtue of their inclusion in the register. There was no 
discussion about potential latent or unidentified interactions that could produce an undesirable 
outcome generated by the tools of ERM. This lack of challenge is troubling in that in the Perrovian 




sense, the types of accidents they seek to reduce are not ‘normal’ and would be served well by 
greater effort to uncover warning signals (Downer 2011; Perrow 1984). 
For Marine Services, ERM provided an account of the actions of the individual employee. 
Continuing with the over-arching individualistic culture of the Marine Services, ERM afforded staff 
the ability to demonstrate the validation of individual experiential knowledge and for the need to 
continually increase their individual skills and competencies. Rather than ERM capturing and 
articulating how their past actions were seen to be valid, it was the incompatibility with paper-based 
audit style risk registers that highlighted how the existing approaches to managing risk were the 
right way to do things. Dynamic Risk Assessments was the way they had utilised risk management 
in the past. Hazards and the associated risks were continually monitored in real-time on the job and 
would be responded to accordingly. An excel spreadsheet back in the office was seen to offer little 
benefit to those ‘swinging from rope ladders’ or repair radio masts in inclement weather. These 
types of risks never made it on to the ERM registers as they could only be ‘managed’ as they 
happened. Rejecting the only made sense in that if they were to shift to the paper-based and accept 
to the new tools, it would in of itself present a challenge to how things had ‘always been done’.  
Overall, the adoption of ERM acted as an explicated mode of compliance in that it 
supplemented existing expectations to manage risk. In this regard, ERM was able to indirectly 
further substantiate a department’s legitimacy by communicating its adherence to prior 
commitments, obligations and organisational arrangements. For example, ERM further 
substantiated the validity and efficacy of the Navigational Safety Department’s Safety Management 
System that is required for adherence to the Port Marine Safety Code. Similarly, the Marine Services 
department benefited by participating the ERM programme in that it further substantiated the 
department’s commitment to adhering to the HSE Act and associated regulations. The finance 
department served to gain increased legitimacy through its interaction with auditors, as did the 
pension fund managers. Associating themselves with ERM, regardless of proficiency or expertise, 
inherently increased the overall legitimacy and acceptability of the actions captured in risk 
assessments and registers. 
8.3.4 Section Summary 
In each of the above identified modes, the introduction of ERM, a conceptual model can be 
derived that explains how and why the PLA operationalised the practice in their specific area. 
Firstly, each area of the organisation sought to confirm their identities through the ERM practice. 
In understanding who they were, they sought to position themselves in regards to how and why the 
practice should pragmatically unfold in relationship to the type of work they were tasked with. In 
essence they asked themselves, ‘Given who we believe we are, what should ERM mean to us?’. 
From here they moved on to ask ‘What do we have to gain from adopting ERM?’. This speaks to 
the institutional pressure to adopt the practice in order to maintain legitimacy at a broad sector or 
field level, viewing the PLA in relation to other national or international counterparts. However, for 




each of the groups, legitimacy was sought at a of the departmental or individual level, with only the 
Navigational Safety department seeking legitimacy from external audiences. Finally, the last stage or 
phase of this model speaks to an appropriate response that accounts for the other stages and 
provides a guiding logic that can begin to shape how best to go about demonstrating the practice 
and complying with the policy, while at the same time conserving the identity and way of working 
that was identified and established at the outset. Table 8-a provides an overview.   
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These logics worked together and served to conserve their established organisational identities, 
further the legitimacy of those established identities and finally, validate the past actions that 
generated those identities. Although this concept of ‘organisational conservatism’, originally 
conceived of in Chapter 2, could be applied to the introduction of any new institutionalised 
practice, the temporal aspects of ERM played a significant role. Specifically, the management of risk 
enabled three distinct modes of organising: prospective, real-time and retrospective (Hardy & 
Maguire 2016). It allows the ‘problematising’ of uncertainty to be undertaken prospectively through 
things like risk assessments and scenario planning activities; in real-time through the enactment of 
response plans or hardwired controls such as safety valves; and finally, retrospectively through the 
use of lessons-learned exercises or reporting mechanisms. Enabling these temporal shifts in 




organising allow actors to reinforce and further entrench norms and practices through the 
legitimate discourse of risk enterprise risk management. Further to this, what becomes especially 
powerful is the fact that ERM systems are inherently focused on the achievement of existing 
organisational objectives. This makes it relatively straightforward for employees to translate all 
existing challenges into the language of risk and essentially reconstruct their everyday practices as 
ones representing risk management controls (Palermo et al., 2017). The importation of ERM did 
not open a debate about the appropriateness of existing goals but rather it positions ERM as a 
means to protect them from failure. It serves to reinforce that the goals are, and will remain, 
achievable as long as the employees continue to do what they have been doing.    
The above begins to shed light on why an organisation that hasn’t experienced a major risk 
event for almost three decades would see the need to adopt an ERM practice. The reform of risk 
management at the PLA was initially driven by the Board of Directors and their need to better 
understand how risks were being managed at the operational level. It wasn’t as though any 
disturbing trends or string of near misses had called the efficacy of current risk management 
techniques into question. As such, why should the PLA invest further resources into a program, 
that through its performance, should provide adequate level of assurances to those at the executive 
level? Accountability, blame and impacts to reputation are the catalysts for ERM colonisation 
efforts.  The current overhaul and updating of the ERM framework at the PLA is less about 
enhancing the ability to manage risks it actually has agency over but rather ERM is about managing 
the risks it could be blamed for. Protecting the identity and reputational capital that the PLA has 
been amassing over the years is no longer simply achieved by ‘doing their job well’.  
Yes, the need for ERM can be linked to the management frameworks ability to present 
auditable and justifiable decision-making trails that explicate competence. These audit trails aid in 
justifying the organisation’s existence if it is ever brought into question by a catastrophic event on 
the Thames. However, despite the increased adoption of ERM by a wide range of public and 
private sectors, significant failures continue to happen (e.g. 2008 financial) and there is no reason 
that the PLA will prove to be an exception, which brings the accuracy and efficacy of ERM into 
question. In this regard, the implementation of ERM at the PLA offered little benefit to reforming 
the quantitative accuracy of the risk assessments, nor did it offer much attention to shedding light 
on how future failures might actually happen. Rather, ERM was about defining and limiting the 
managerial bounds of the risks the PLA is paying attention to.  
The PLA’s track record suggests that it has an ample ability to manage the safety of navigation 
along the 95 miles of river under its jurisdiction. However, its ability to respond to the new 
emerging threats of external judgement about how it is going about doing that is where ERM can 
now provide tangible benefit to the PLA. As much as organisations do have the ability to be 
brought down by catastrophic events, much less tangible threats are playing a greater role in 
impacting the legitimacy of an organisations existence. It is how the PLA constructs, and perhaps 
more importantly documents, its risk object-management relationships that is of concern to the 




higher-ups in the PLA. For the PLA, the organisation has a well-established and relatively robust 
informal means of assessing, capturing and sharing knowledge about risks. If anything, the formal 
adoption of ERM poses more of a threat, than an opportunity, if it is allowed to compromise the 
context rich narratives that are used to disseminate critical risk information freely throughout and 
between the different departments. However, these narratives do little to substantiate contentious 
decisions that are exposed to increasing levels of external scrutiny, nor will they satisfy external 
review boards in the disastrous event a tragedy does ever occur again on the river. It is this balance, 
between formal and informal frameworks of risk management, that the PLA must achieve in order 
to address the broad range of risks it is now required to manage.   
8.4 Chapter Summary 
The primary impetus for this research stemmed from the growing acknowledgement of risk 
management’s increasingly dynamic role within public sector organisations (Power 2004; 2007; 
Power et al., 2009; Huber & Rothstein 2012; Scheytt et al., 2006; Arena et al., 2010). A spectrum of 
organisational level responses has been noted at the field and organisational level, however little 
research has explored how the ‘micro dynamics’ associated with ERM programmes unfolds. For 
the PLA, the introduction of ERM did not represent any dramatic or pivotal shift in organisational 
logic or thinking. Risk had, for the most part, played some type of formal or informal role within 
the existing practices and decision-making processes. As such, it is better described as an 
evolutionary step in the ongoing ‘colonisation’ of the organisation, one which is responding to the 
institutional pressure to adopt a dominant risk management logic. So, in seeking to operationalise 
an enterprise-wide approach to risk management across the PLA, what exactly did the organisation 
achieve? The answer is both very little and quite a lot, depending on how you view the situation. 
In regards to the literature, the above findings speak to how organisations respond to 
institutional pressures to adopt practices as a means to further their legitimacy and organisational 
standing (DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Meyer & Rowan 1977; Power 2004). A significant finding of 
the research speaks to how the development and adoption of institutional logics unfolded at a 
departmental, and at times, individual level. However, little is understood about how the practice of 
ERM can vary across a single organisation. Enterprise-wide or holistic approaches to risk 
management drive towards a standardised and repeatable practice of risk management (ISO 2009). 
This uniformity of practice is predicated on the notion that risks that have been subjected to a 
similar, if not identical, construction process can thus be compared against each other in order to 
prioritise the allocation of resources to the areas of most concern i.e. high risk. Although the PLA 
did strive to adopt a ‘unified’ practice of risk management, the explicit process spoke more to a 
need to legitimise actions of the organisation rather than assigning or distributing resources needed 
for efficient and effective risk control measures. This multiplicity of practice afforded the 
organisation the ability to deal with institutionally pluralistic operating environment and the 
flexibility in which to demonstrate their competence to a wide range of stakeholder expectations.  




The review of the literature also examined the theory of ‘risk colonization’, represented by a 
two-stage process in which organisation first frame objects of regulation as risk in order to better 
respond to any associated institutional risks. However, this can result in a subsequent second stage 
which produces ‘spiralling feedback loops’ that create institutional risks and actually modify the way 
in which organisations respond to societal risks (Rothstein et al., 2006). The evidence from this 
research study supports the theory of risk colonization in that the adoption of ERM did heighten 
the organizational attention to institutional risks and at times reshaped existing risks that the 
organisation was attending to. For example, the significance of reputation risk as a ‘common 
currency’ produced an entirely new category or dimension of risk that the organisation was required 
to explicitly manage. Societal risk assessments could be captured as scoring relatively low and then 
amplified or reshaped through a second assessment which emphasised the impact to reputation if 
the risk was to occur i.e. media salience. There was support for the notion that this spiralling 
feedback mechanism only further served to reinforce the ‘quantitative power’ of risk assessments in 
that the highly subjective nature of assessing impacts to reputation were validated through 
somewhat arbitrary risk scoring. Although for now, the PLA sees the best way to manage these 
risks by ensuring societal failures don’t happen, it could just be a question of time before the risks 
to the organisation’s reputation begin to divert resources away from upholding the mandate of 
navigation safety.  
The notion of risk objects was also explored in the literature and how a ‘relational theory of 
risk’ can help better understand how the public and organisations come to construct and frame risk 
issues (Boholm & Corvellec 2010; Hilgartner 1992). The relational theory of risk stresses the 
interpretive nature of risk and the associated socially constructed means through which people 
come to understand what is of value and the associated threats posed to that value. The study 
provided significant insight into how different areas of an organisation come to understand what 
should be considered to be at risk and how the pre-existing departmental cultures influenced how 
they constructed a risk object to be managed. As noted by Hilgartner (1992), risk objects are 
constructed, or deconstructed, through a process of ascribing a value to some type of object 
(person, place, things) and then associating some type of harm to it.  Once an object and 
corresponding threat are identified, the resulting ‘risk object’ can become the focus of a managerial 
system that can intervene in the relationship by introducing controls. The amount of control 
exercised should then be in direct relationship to the amount of reduced risk that is achieved (i.e. 
benefit). However, as the case the of the PLA further substantiates, the ways in which these risk 
relationships and objects are constructed are far from objective and continues to highlight the 
significance of the context in which the risk object is constructed.  
 Overall, all of the tools and techniques both associated with the new ERM programme, 
and those that had been long adhered to by the more operational areas of the organisation, served 
mainly to legitimise the application of, and reliance on, experiential data. A recurrent theme in all 
three empirical chapters highlighted that the calculative aspect of the risk assessment process was 




rendered somewhat irrelevant in that the numbers entered into the likelihood and consequence 
columns were most often based on hunches, heuristics and gut-feelings, rather than any truly 
quantifiable failure frequencies or statistics. The ability to override any assessment that may 
challenge popular opinion was made most evident in the risk assessment involving the Chief 
Harbour Master. In reviewing how the organisation was responding from a structural perspective 
and how it was using ERM to assess risk, the lack of substantive change in both instances suggest 
that there is little chance that the organisation changed how it responded to risks because of the 
ERM programme’s introduction.  
Research has also shown that organisations, much like the PLA, can demonstrate competing 
logics as the organisation is forced to respond in order to meet the expectations of a pluralist 
institutional field. At a macro level, institutional pluralism for the PLA can be seen to take the form 
of the State in its role a regulatory authority, the market in its need to facilitate international trade as 
well as generate a means to self-fund operations, and also the community, in the form of the 
competing interests of multiple stakeholders who rely on the river for prosperity and enjoyment. 
These institutional drivers set up an interesting dynamic in which the organisation seeks to 
operationalize a standardised and consistent approach to risk across the organisation and yet at the 
same time reconcile the practice with pre-existing employee conceptions of what it means to be the 
PLA.  
The above discussion also highlighted the role ERM had in regards to existing organisational 
identities as well as its impact on organisational legitimacy. In this regard, ERM can be seen as 
much as an exercise in the organisation understanding who they are and why they exist, as much as 
it was about reducing uncertainty or avoiding future failures (Albert and Whetten 1985). Much of 
the research today has positioned the operationalisation of risk management as a response to 
increased demands for transparency or as a means to limit and mitigate possible blame (Hood 2002; 
2011; Power 2007; Power et al., 2009) as well as being driven by compliance or performance (Arena 
et al., 2010; Mikes 2009; 2011). However, in this study the research presented an alternate view in 
that although practising ERM was essentially a mode of compliance with internal policies and 
external obligations, employees framed it as means to express what that compliance meant in 
relation to who they thought they were. Rather than framing ERM as a means to limit blame when 
things might fail, it presented an opportunity to position and communicate their identity as a 
trustworthy and competent authority, as was the case with Navigational Safety. Rather than seeing 
it as a performance enhancing mechanism, Marine Services staff used ERM as a means to 
communicate individual expertise. For the Administrative Services, it demonstrated their ability of 
providing support and enabling the functions of other areas of the organisation. Reforming ERM at 
the PLA was less about increasing the effectiveness of current controls or challenging the status 
quo but rather presented tangible benefits in the by-products of the adoption. The applied set of 
organisational logics demonstrate a concerted effort to shape and repurpose the functional ‘means’ 
of ERM to achieve the ‘ends’ of conserving existing organisational cultural arrangement and 




identities. Although the significant amount of decoupling the ERM practice was subjected to across 
the entire organisation might suggest a minimal response was demonstrated to ERM 
implementation, it was the active and concerted shaping of ERM programme that enabled the PLA 







Chapter 9 Conclusion 
9.1 Introduction 
The starting point for this research study was driven by the headlong and sometimes unquestioning 
drive to adopt adoption of risk management by public sector organisations. ERM is purported to 
afford organisations improvements to compliance, assurance and enhanced decision-making, as 
well as increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of operations, and the ability to achieve strategic 
objectives (IRM 2010). It is understandable that public-sector organisations would be interested in a 
tool that could achieve all of this. However, these risk management frameworks have more evolved 
into a process seeking to capture everything as risk (i.e. controllable) rather than seeking to change 
the risks themselves. However, despite the significant possibility that ERM will amount to little 
more than a self-checking and reaffirming exercise in control validation, it continues to grow in 
popularity. As such, further understanding how and why organisations continue to operationalise 
ERM frameworks becomes extremely significant.   
A review of past research suggested a lack of consensus on how ERM might actually unfold 
within a public-sector organisation. The managerial literature supported the notion that ERM was 
indeed a mechanism to increase organisational effectiveness; drawing organisational attention to the 
things that matter most and allocating resources accordingly. In this sense, risk was positioned an 
‘object to be discovered’ of which the practitioners of ERM would be fully capable of identifying, 
assessing and evaluating. However, how people and groups perceive and understand risk had been 
clearly demonstrated to be influenced by a range of cognitive and cultural factors (Fischhcoff 1978; 
Douglas 1992; Lupton 1999). Organisations can filter risks in order to reinforce, rather than 
challenge ways of working and seeing the world, (Rothstein & Downer 2012). Furthermore, others 
noted that despite the best efforts of organisations, some failures are simply inevitable no matter 
how much foresight is applied (Perrow 1984; Downer 2011). In addition to this, the neo-
institutional literature on organisations suggests that newly adopted managerial practices, like ERM, 
are often decoupled as a means to preserve an organisation’s ‘technical core’ and achieve greater 
institutional legitimacy (Meyer & Rowan 1977; DiMaggio & Powell 1983). Organisations have been 
demonstrated to decouple ‘means from ends’ when it comes to implementing practices in which 
the outcomes are ambiguous or unclear. In this regard, ERM has long-struggled with providing an 
easily definable way to measure its impact, outside that of relying on the absence of failure. In 
acknowledging all of the above, it would appear that the ability of ERM to achieve its underlying 
challenge function and ‘do what it says on the tin’ is relatively unlikely (Huber & Rothstein 2013).  
In order to investigate the issue of how public organisations respond to ERM, a case study was 
undertaken that focused on how different areas of the PLA would respond to the introduction of 
enterprise-wide approach to risk management. The PLA was an interesting organisation in that not 
only had it been created as means to manage the risks to navigational safety on the Thames, it had 







also been mandated to manage risk through a variety of external requirements for quite some time. 
Health and Safety regulations and the Port Marine Safety Code were two existing coercive pressures 
driving the organisation’s need to manage risk and complying with these expectations was 
something that had been taken very seriously. Apart from one significant event, the Marchioness 
Disaster in 1989 (which the PLA was not held accountable for), the PLA could boast a significant 
track record in its ability to keep the organisation, and the public it serves, free from any significant 
failures. However, much like so many other public organisations, the PLA and its executive board 
saw a pressing need operationalise an ERM framework. 
Curious to understand the implications of introducing a more holistic and coordinated 
approach to risk management, the researcher gathered evidence of how the PLA implemented 
ERM from multiple sources. To gain as complete a picture as possible, three sub-organisational 
units were used that provided a representative sample of the major types of risks the organisation 
sought to manage. Data collection took the form of a review of associated ERM documentation, 
interviews with the staff involved with the implementation of ERM, and finally, through passive 
observations of employees engaging in, and discussing the management of, risk.  After collecting a 
year’s worth of empirical data, the analysis of the PLA’s response to the need to implement practice 
both confirmed and challenged previous understandings of how a public organisation responds to 
ERM.    
9.2 Summary of Research Findings 
The following section provides a summary of the key findings of this thesis. In returning to the 
original research question of how and why the PLA is practicing ERM, two broad and yet 
interrelated contributions emerged from the study. The first speaks to the literature on how 
organisations are slowly being colonized by risk management practices and the production (and 
costs) of institutional risks associated with managing societal risk. For the PLA, it would appear 
that the implementation of ERM is producing a heightened attention to the institutional 
implications of managing the risks to navigational safety. In turn this substantiates and reinforces 
the need to further formalise and expand the role of ERM, supporting the notion of risk 
colonization (Rothstein et al. 2006). These attentions are coming at a cost to the organisation, not 
only from the inherent transactional costs of the time and effort associated with the additional 
activities required by ERM but also in the impacts to the organisation’s ability to maintain a 
contextually accurate account of the risks it is charged with managing. Uncovering the micro-
dynamics of ERM suggests that a lot of ‘risk work’ still transpires outside of what is captured in the 
‘fantasy documents’ of ERM. The management of risk is so dependent on the context and is much 
more dynamic than the linear likelihood x consequence assessments convey. Editing down the rich 
verbal risk narratives that are relied upon by staff to communicate what risks to manage and how 







best to managed them are being compromised by a need to register risks in computer spreadsheets. 
Furthermore, the repurposing of ERM to create apparent affinities of control and enhance 
organisational legitimacy creates an explicit audit trail that could actually raise more questions than 
it answers.      
The second theme that emerged from the study spoke to how the PLA is absorbing and 
responding to the increased demands to explicate their risk management processes. Here, the 
adoption of ERM affords the organisation the ability to communicate and reinforce the different 
department’s understanding of their institutional identities through the legitimising rhetoric of risk 
management. The departments can then use ERM as a means to position the objects of their risk 
management frameworks in a way that supports their current worldviews and cultural orientations. 
In this sense, the research methodology and the resulting empirical data sets, have contributed to 
the current understanding of how organisational, institutional and cultural dynamics drive and 
shape how ERM transpires at the employee level. The findings demonstrate that despite the clear 
and well-defined intent of current ‘best practices’ of ERM, well-intentioned organisations will 
decouple means from ends in order to preserve institutionalized and culturally embedded 
understandings of what risks should and should not be explicitly managed through ERM. The cost 
of shifting the intended means of ERM (i.e. risk reduction) to one that reinforces the departmental 
identities and cultural preferences, is that the new system could produce more risks than were being 
managed before ERM was implemented.   
In recognising the costs and risks associated with ERM, it is fair to ask if organisations should 
continue to spend time and effort associated implementing ERM despite the fact that the very tool 
being employed could be inherently undermining the organisation’s ability to respond to risk. In 
response to this, it is the opinion of the researcher that although ERM has the ability to increase the 
amount of time and effort afforded to managing risk, the costs still outweigh the net benefits. To 
truly reform the way in which risks are managed at the PLA, and ERM program must begin to 
adopt a much more reflexive turn in how it understands the implications of implementation - i.e. 
the risks of risk management.  
 
Finding 1: Increased Situational Awareness  
At the outset of this research, it was expected that the PLA would show little uptake of the ERM 
programme, in order to resist challenges to existing ways of seeing the world. The literature 
suggested that in a case like the PLA, the organisation would decouple the practice (Meyer & 
Rowan 1977), struggle with ‘probability x consequence’ assessments of risk (Huber & Rothstein 
2013), and quite possibly experience clashes with existing organisational preferences (Meek 1988; 
Lupton 1999). However, as much as ERM at the PLA served as mechanism for organisational 
conservatism and lacked its challenge function, it was responsible for some substantive changes to 







emerge. For one, it was very apparent that the introduction of ERM got everyone to start talking 
about risks. For those at the PLA, ERM was much more about discussing and sharing information 
about risks, rather than actually doing anything about it. Although it could be argued that the 
program was in its infancy, the lack of ‘future actions’ in the risk registers suggest that no significant 
course corrections lie ahead. However, this lack of ‘response’ does not mean there wasn’t a positive 
benefit to ERM’s implementation. Risk is inherently communicative in that it relies on observation 
and transmission of specific information relating to harm and value (Kasperson et al., 1988). It is 
also heavily influenced by an individual’s, or group’s, perspective on the relationship between the 
‘object at risk’ and what ‘risk object’ is introducing the risk (Boholm & Corvellec 2010). The fact 
that the PLAs adoption of ERM substantially increased the discussions about these ‘risk 
relationships’, meant that new perspectives on long-standing organisational arrangements were 
generated.  
For example, employees were starting to leverage the way in which they navigated things like 
discarded gym equipment occupying valuable space or keeping inexperienced river users out of 
dangerous river conditions by effectively banning experienced rowers from entering. These changes 
did not take place by introducing a specific ‘risk control measure’, it was through acts of discussing 
the risks, sharing knowledge and shifting stakeholder views on how things might be different that 
began to result in positive changes. It was the need to gain access into the ‘locked up’ experiential 
knowledge that the employees saw as truly valuable information, not what the risk register had 
articulated. In support of Holt (2004:267) risk management could begin to “structured and 
contested activity involving multiple stakeholders engaged in perpetual translation from within 
environments of operation and complexes of aims”. It is as though the language and tools of risk 
management served more as catalyst that sparked informal information exchanges on risks rather 
than serving to introduce new formal controls or strategies that would require on-going monitoring 
and attention.  
 
Finding 2: Risk Registers and Ownership 
Another significant finding generated by the research spoke to how organisational actors 
considered the risks they manage as being discoverable and known for the most part, as lying 
outside of the organisation’s walls. Actors in all areas of the organisation saw risks as something 
that they had to ‘find’, and given their reliance on experiential data, the risk registers were populated 
with things they had found to be true in the past. HR was adamant that lottery wins was a risk well-
worth commanding space on the register; Navigational safety risks mirrored the rolling hazards list 
the Navigational Safety Team had long relied on; And, for the few Marine Services line items, the 
register reflected well-understood cause effect relationships. It could be argued that this is an 
accurate reflection of the things they are truly worried about and are actively working to manage.  







However, the seemingly benign risk-register column of ‘risk owner’ introduced an interesting 
dimension to the risk management process. The register explicitly assigned ‘ownership’ to each risk 
it contained and in doing so, this solicited a different response from each of the sub-organisational 
units. For Navigational Safety, ‘more is more’ in that they all but dominated the risk registers, happy 
to own as many risks as they could. If not an identified owner, then at least the register line items 
spoke to how other areas were to work in the interest of the upholding navigational safety. This 
sent a clear message to the rest of the organisation about who was in-charge. The employees in 
Administrative Services responded to the ownership of risks by attributing their risks to external 
threats, that could be easily demonstrated as hard to influence. Cyber-attacks, flu-pandemics, and 
economic down-turns, all presented a series of threats that the organisations could do little to 
prevent. If the organisation was going to survive the impacts of these types of threats, then the key 
would lie in listening and respecting the advice of Administrative Services employees.  And lastly, 
the lack of ownership demonstrated by Marine Services was unsurprising, given their expressed 
dislike for paper-based assessments. The ‘dynamic-risk managers’ of Marine Services were relatively 
reluctant to claim ownership of risks that had been transferred from a ‘hands-on’ approach to one 
being managed through such bureaucratic and dynamically incompatible means as an excel 
spreadsheet. All of this strongly suggests that assigning ownership of risks may have little impact 
when it comes to attributing accountability and more about diffusing or deflecting it.   
 
Finding 3: Micro-Cultural Influences on ERM Practice 
Another important finding from the research was in regards to how the practice of ERM varied 
across the organisation and, in particular, how different sub-organisational units responded to the 
‘one-size fits all framework for managing risk’ way of managing risk. At the PLA, it soon became 
apparent that different areas of the organisation approached ERM quite differently. Beyond the 
universal, but in large part symbolic, exercises of filling out risk registers and attending risk 
assessment workshops, each area of the organisation engaged with ERM in a different style and 
with distinctly different motives. The sub-organisational and individual level perceptions on risk as 
well as their cultural preferences and world views impacted the way in which they undertook the 
practice of risk management.  
For example, Marine Services demonstrated what cultural theory would position as an 
‘individualistic’ world-view. This cultural orientation positioned the intrusive nature of a rule-based 
approach to risk management as one that could directly impact the value of an employees amassed 
experiential knowledge, turning not just the organisation but the individual inside out (Power 2004). 
However, the hydrographic arm of Marine Services saw value in ERM and how it could further 
facilitate contractual arrangements with clients. Again, this speaks to the entrepreneurial spirit that 
is associated with an individualistic cultural outlook. In contrast, ERM was understood more as an 







opportunity for control by the more hierarchical and bureaucratic areas of the organisation. 
Navigational Safety and Administrative service saw benefit in ERM’s ability to further the amount 
of control and influence they had in the organisation. HR and Public Affairs were quick to leverage 
the ability of ERM to link their work to other areas of the organisation and in turn, increase the 
status of their work. From yet another perspective, Navigational Safety did enjoy some of the 
‘black-boxing’ effect that risk assessments can have through their ‘advanced’ practices. Decisions 
were either protected by their professional judgements being seen as unquestionable in light of the 
many years’ experience employees had gain over their long careers, or through the use of software 
programs that few had access to. All of these micro-culture preferences had significant impacts on 
how each area of the organisation approach the adoption of ERM. 
 
Finding 4: Decoupling and Symbolic Adoption 
This bring us to the fourth notable finding of the research, being that of the amount of decoupling 
that was transpiring across the organisation. In demonstrating the process of ‘organisational 
conservatism’, the PLA adopted a set of ERM logics that could help align the practice of ERMs in 
relationship to existing organisational arrangements and understandings. However, unlike more 
traditional conceptions of organisational decoupling where actors decouple policy from practice 
core activities, the PLA decoupled ERM’s means from its ends (Meyer & Rowan 1977; Bromley & 
Powell 2009). Rather than simply buffering organisational arrangements, the practice was actually 
repurposed as a means to further preserve and substantiate its technical core and the identities of 
the various sub-organisational units. Where a traditional approach to decoupling would have 
organisational actors ‘go through the motions’ of ERM, by treating risk registers and assessment 
workshops as ‘boxes to be ticked’ the staff at the PLA, for the most part, fully engaged with these 
activities and believed in the effectiveness. However, when faced with rather ambiguous 
measurements and the ability to demonstrate tangible risk reductions, employees saw other ‘ends’ 
they could achieve via the ERM practice. Public Affairs was keen to further embed themselves 
within the other areas of the organisation by emphasising both the significance of reputation risks, 
as well as mimicking the ‘seamless integration’ that ERM seeks to achieve in relation to how the 
work of Public Affairs should be viewed. Navigational Safety was quick to pick up on relational 
component of ERM and felt it was an excellent means to achieve further reach of their ‘authority’ 
both internally and externally. And lastly, despite their lack of enthusiasm, and perhaps more in-line 
with classic ‘policy-practice’ decoupling, Marine Services saw the value in the ‘symbolic compliance’ 
with the ERM policy and responded by throwing a couple risk up on the corporate registers.  
However, all of these repurposed ‘means from ends’ activities, begins to highlight the troubling 
notion of ‘fantasy documents’ (Clarke 1999a). The accuracy and ‘representativeness’ of the risk 
registers went largely unchallenged. To the employees of the PLA, the data used to populate the 







registers and the assessments that resulted, was the most relevant the organisation could hope for. 
Yet there were little explicit linkages to the effectiveness of controls due to them including 
everything but the kitchen sink under the ‘current controls’ column. This suggested more that 
‘apparent affinities’, as Clarke (1999a) puts it, were being enacted rather than any substantive 
representations of cause-effect relationships being put forward. Furthermore, these fantasy 
documents served less to suggest those things which were uncertain were actually controlled, but 
rather more as a means to suggest that which was certain was being controlled. This amounted to 
creating documents that basically communicate that what employees were doing was not only the 
right thing to do but was working as it should. And, this brings us to the final significant finding of 
the research study.  
 
Finding 5: Organisational Identities and Institutional Legitimacy 
Finally, the major overarching finding of this case study draws on all of the above findings in 
speaking to how the sub-organisational units adopted ERM, not as means to enhance 
organisational efficiency or challenge previous risk conceptions, but rather as a means to confirm, 
protect, and communicate their organisational identities. In this regard, each sub-organisational unit 
saw ERM as means to express and confirm their legitimate place within the organisation and 
among the broader river community. The practice of ERM really came down to different groups 
asking themselves, and answering, ‘Who am I?’ and given who I am, ‘how should I act?’.  
For all areas of the organisation, their understanding of a legitimate identity of their sub-
organisational unit, shaped how they responded to the practice. For example, ‘being’ Administrative 
Services meant that ERM was about demonstrating their ability to protect and support others. They 
chose risks that required that expressed how they protected the organisation from external threats 
or how they made life easier by keeping individuals healthy and protected from legal action. Marine 
Services identity shone through in their ability demonstrate the individual competence of its 
employees in the fact they didn’t need ERM. Refuting the practice only further substantiated their 
skills and individual legitimacy. And lastly, Navigational Safety communicated their ‘total control’ 
over all of which the Harbour Master could survey. The adequacy of the decisions and experience 
of those working Navigational Safety would simply not be brought into question. ERM, and risk 
management in general, was something that came always came to them naturally.  
This interplay between how ERM was being implemented the different organisational 
identities was significant when viewed in relationship to the shifting institutional pressures. As 
noted in the literature on port authorities, the PLA’s role within the river communities it serves has 
evolved from one focused primarily on regulatory and landlord duties, to one of a community 
advocate and market entrepreneur (Verhoeven 2010). This shift in roles for the PLA introduces a 
level of uncertainty and anxiety in regards to who the PLA has seen itself as for such a long time. 







This institutional shift was evidenced by dealing new and emerging organisational arrangements 
like: achieving an increased presence in the community by holding public meetings; facilitating the 
use of river for novel events like the London Olympics, Charity stunts, or the Queen’s Jubilee; and 
diversifying their revenue streams by offering hydrographic services. However, as a means to 
reduce the uncertainty accompanying that accompanies the ‘unknown’ (or rather, unfamiliar), ERM 
afforded the PLA the ability to explicitly document and communicate how their values and actions 
(i.e. identity) are, and will remain, legitimate.  
9.3 Practical Implications of the Research Findings 
The above findings would have little use if they did not at least identify some opportunities 
influence the ‘real world’ in some positive manner. In this regard, the most glaring issue is the fact 
that there needs to be a way for ERM to ensure that it introduces some type challenge function. 
ERM should be about generating new knowledge about risks, not confirming what organisations 
already know. As such, what needs to be incorporated into ERM is a secondary or meta-analytical 
component in order to compensate for the simple fact that sophisticated risk analysis is not a skill 
that many organisations have readily available. Yes, risk calculations based on first-hand experiential 
knowledge are well-informed and can provide a locally-informed contextual account of how things 
have unfolded in the past. However, if the majority of data is being generate by past individual 
experiences, then how can begin to anticipate novel system interactions? In recognising and 
supporting the importance of experiential data, perhaps increasing an emphasis on scenario 
planning, as well as providing opportunities for employs to experience, first-hand, other areas of 
work within their organisation, might serve to increase overall awareness of the ‘unknown’ risks. 
There needs to be a concerted move away from ‘codifying’ risks to one that seeks to explore them. 
Exploring new futures before they exist, embracing ‘real-time’ risk management, and focusing on 
employee skill and knowledge may be better time spent than pouring over color-coded risk 
registers. All of the above begins to speak to the notion of ‘intelligent risk management’ as 
proposed by Power (2004). Intelligent risk management emphasises that for risk management to be 
effect if should: be selectively applied; emphasis learning and experimentation; and, should 
“question and criticise the formal risk management system itself” (Power 2004:61). 
Secondly, it is suggested that the deference to experiential knowledge throughout the risk 
management process needs to be accounted for more fulsomely. Little, if any, of the 
professionalised guidance material or international standards recognises any of the pitfalls or 
challenges associated with ERM. However, it is as though risk perception, biases, and the 
application of heuristics, is nothing of concern. In the absence of an appetite to admit any short-
comings of ERM within the standards material, organisations would benefit from introducing some 
type of challenge function during the solicitation of risk information, if for nothing more than a 







‘gut check’. It is understood that ERM was designed to deal with a lack of available actuarial data, 
yet surely the validity and reliability of the knowledge on which ERM relies must be worthy of 
consideration. In this sense, what becomes evident is the need for type of ‘reflexive stage’ to be 
incorporated into the ERM model, in so much as there needs to be more explicit recognition of the 
socially constructed nature of risk. Introducing a mechanism that supports discussions relating to 
how the identification and assessment of risk may have been shaped by pre-existing organisational 
arrangements rather than being representative of ‘unquestionable expertise’, could allow room for a 
true challenge function to be introduced. Although avoiding a theme of infinite regression (analyses 
of analyses of…), there must be room for some type of overt challenge function to be introduced 
into the process, something lies outside of the monitoring function and more focused inside the 
ISO ‘risk assessment’ stage. 
Lastly, in acknowledging the communicative nature of ERM, another consideration of the 
practitioners of ERM is that of expanding the set of tools they rely on to capture and communicate 
the risks they are facing. The risk register is an auditor’s dream when it comes to capturing a wide 
range of activities, assessing their effectiveness, attributing ownership and assigning follow-up 
actions. However, while acknowledging the high likelihood that paper trails may not represent fact 
(Power 1997), there could be more useful tools that emphasise and explore different cause-effect 
relationships (e.g. bow-tie risk analyses or mind-mapping exercises during risk assessment 
workshops). Currently, the majority of excel-based risk registers limit user inputs to relatively small 
‘soundbites’ of risk information within the predefined cells. As such, valuable data may be excluded 
due to space constraints or due to column titles that do little to elicit critical thought. The problems 
and limits associated with all risk tools need to be explicitly recognised if risk management is to be 
distanced from its ‘audit society’ roots. There needs to be a shift from ‘registering’ what is known to 
‘constructing’ what is unknown, for risk is socially constructed and ERM needs account for that.  
9.4 Limitations and Future Research Opportunities 
In acknowledging the limitations that can accompany a single case study, an obvious avenue for 
future research becomes one that addresses sample size. Collecting data from a single organisation 
does not lend itself to a strong generalizable case study. However, this research did leverage 
analytical depth by the focusing on sub-organisation units of analysis and in doing so, captured a 
highly nuanced account of individual responses to the ERM programme. As the intent was to 
explore the effects over a single organisation, future research should expand the methodology 
employed here to a cross-comparative multi-organisational case study.  
A second theme for future research would address some of the temporal limitations of this 
study. For one, the PLA had been around for 100 years and as such, had some extremely ingrained 
cultural values and organisational practices. In fact, the PLA could almost be viewed as being an 







institution in its own right, one that ERM would have little chance of infiltrating in a significant 
manner. However, does this hold true for a much younger organisation? The need to manage risks 
in a newly created regulatory agency are no different to those of an organisation with a century of 
service under its belt. Yet, the emerging cultures and practices associated with a recently formed 
organisation should surely interact differently and if so, how? Further to the element of time, is the 
need to understand how ERM continues to manifest as it seeks to mature and further embed within 
a single organisation. Soin and Huber (2013) describe a process of institutional sedimentation at a 
‘field level’ by using the example of financial regulation ‘sedimenting’ itself over a period of decades 
through the layering of competing logics. Does a similar process transpire at the level of 
organisations and similar catalysts, such as scandal or failures, serve a similar role? And lastly, what 
does the ‘end’ look like for ERM within organisations? Does its role fade into the background as 
with so many other past ‘flavours of the day’, and become another rote report that is generated 
because it always has been, much like the taken-for-granted need for financial or annual reports that 
are produced each year? 
In focusing on the intra-departmental and more micro dynamics of the adoption and response 
to the managerial practice of ERM, the findings produced insights into what is emerging to be a 
significant theme within the neo-institutional literature on organisational analysis, that of the role of 
collective identities and legitimacy. Much of the findings of this research speaks to the significance 
that identity and legitimacy has in how organisations interact with newly adopted institutionalised 
practices. So much of risk management has to do with expressing organisational values and the 
explicit positioning of pre-existing routines in regards to current issues and challenges. This was 
especially true in within the PLA, in that it undertook concerted efforts to align and validate its past 
in a manner that reflected their espoused identities. As such, the identity of the organisation (who it 
saw itself as) was seen to have a considerable impact on how it understood and responded to ERM. 
Each of the sub-organisational units were continuously seeking to demonstrate and confirm their 
organisational legitimacy, whether it was from a moral position of keeping river-users’ safe, or from 
a cognitive standpoint of how the organisation has ‘always been managing risks’ and world without 
the PLA can’t be imagined. It is in this sense that ERM afforded organisational actors that ability to 
engage in multiple dialogues and at the same to convey who they were and what they stood for. 
And yet, does the significance of identity hold similar implications for the implementation of other 
management systems? For instance, the ‘six-sigma’ world of continuous improvement or the 
Operational Excellence Management Systems that seek to apply auditable internal standards on 
‘routine’ operations. Are there times when there isn’t a need to align and express identity through 
the adopted management systems, or is this an inevitable result in that organisations will always 
seek to put their ‘cultural stamp’ on the practices they ‘choose’ to adopt? 







Finally, there is a significant opportunity to research the role of risk perception as it transpires 
across different departmental settings and which warrants further exploration. There was a uniform 
response when it came to the reliance on professional judgement in the risk assessment process. 
The reliance on experiential data and the corresponding heuristics they drove, demonstrated that 
there was considerable room for differing interpretations of risk across a single department, let 
alone the entire organisation. There were also noticeable cultural underpinnings that varied across 
each of the departments. As such, exploring Cultural Theory’s ‘grid-group’ conception of social risk 
perception across the PLA may prove insightful in understanding how standardised risk 
assessments are influenced. One could argue that Navigational Safety demonstrated a hierarchical 
cultural stance when it came understanding what constituted a risk, or the fact that Marine Services 
opted for a more individualistic take on their risk conceptions. Understanding how different areas 
of the organisation are going to approach the ‘construction’ of risk and the linkages risk creates, will 
surely provide valuable insight into how organisations might effectively navigate the practice of risk 
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Appendix A: List of Interviews 
Participant ID Departmental 
Area 
Interview Length Date 
P1 Administrative 00:55:09 2013-08-05 
P2 Administrative 00:57:05 2013-08-12 
P2 Administrative 00:49:36 2014-05-02 
P3 Navigational 01:12:45 2013-08-10 
P3 Navigational 00:56:22 2014-02-07 
P4 Operational 00:53:34 2013-08-10 
P5 Administrative 00:48:43 2013-09-08 
P6 Navigational 00:58:25 2013-09-14 
P6 Navigational 00:38:35 2013-11-09 
P7 Navigational 00:55:13 2014-01-29 
P8 Administrative 01:06:53 2013-10-09 
P9 Administrative 01:09:47 2013-11-14 
P9 Administrative 00:49:16 2014-02-20 
P10 Navigational 01:03:54 2013-12-05 
P11 Navigational 00:58:43 2013-12-14 
P12 Navigational 01:01:43 2013-12-21 
P13 External 00:47:47 2013-12-27 
P14 Operational 00:51:16 2014-01-12 
P15 External 00:50:04 2014-02-23 
P16 Administrative 00:59:48 2014-03-06 
P17 Administrative 00:45:31 2014-03-08 
P18 Navigational 01:09-54 2014-05-20 
P19 Administrative 00:41:28 2014-05-20 
P20 Administrative 00:50:01 2014-05-20 
P21 Operational 01:02:37 2014-05-21 
P22 Operational 00:56:11 2014-05-21 
P23 Administrative 00:48:08 2014-05-23 
P24 Operational 00:47:08 2014-05-28 
P25 Navigational 01:03:11 2014-06-03 
P26 Administrative 01:05:05 2014-06-04 
P27 Administrative 00:49:16 2014-06-04 
P28 Administrative 00:47:11 2014-06-11 
P29 Administrative 00:52:32 2014-06-26 
P30 Operational 00:55:48 2014-07-02 
P31 Administrative 00:46:06 2014-07-03 
P32 Navigational 00:48:27 2014-07-09 
P33 Administrative 01:05:51 2014-07-14 
P34 Operational 00:43:22 2014-07-22 
P35 Operational 01:10:32 2014-08-01 
P36 Navigational 01:04:34 2014-08-05 







Appendix B: Information Sheet for Participants and Consent Form 
Participant Information Form 
YOU WILL BE GIVEN A COPY OF THIS INFORMATION SHEET 
 
Title of study: An Exploration of the Organisational Dynamics of Risk Management 
We would like to invite you to participate in this postgraduate PhD research project. You 
should only participate if you want to; choosing not to take part will not disadvantage you in any way. Before you 
decide whether you want to take part, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what 
your participation will involve.  Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if 
you wish.  Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information (contact details at the 
bottom of the sheet). 
 
In the past decade, the role risk management plays in organisations continues to gain prominence. The impacts 
of this increased reliance on organisational-wide risk management programmes can have both positive and negative 
influences on an organisation. Understanding the relationship between these impacts and the components of a risk 
management programme is the primary objective of this research study.  
 
The benefit of such research is focused on addressing the varied challenges associated with operationalizing 
explicit risk management frameworks inside organisations. It is hoped that the study’s findings will assist those 
practicing risk management as well as those researching the context in which it takes place. The study will provide 
opportunities for organisations to reframe the activities, technologies and rationales that constitute the practice of risk 
management and foster an appreciation for the possible ‘side effects’ of this management practice.   
 
Your contribution to the research will be in the form of participating in an interview, which will take no longer 
than 90 min. By participating, you will provide invaluable insight into the current organisational practice of risk 
management by responding to questions on why you (and your organisation) choose to formally or informally 
manage risk(s), the activities, technologies and rationales used to achieve this, and how this might influence the 
overall dynamic of the organisation. With your permission, interviews will be recorded and transcribed to aid analysis.  
 
Your confidentiality is very important. No sensitive personal data will be recorded, with all research data 
encrypted and stored in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998. Collected data will be given a unique 
identification code for analysis. Personal details, including your name, title and role within the organisation will not be 
identified, and any data used in the final report will appear in an anonymous form unless prior consent is given. Upon 
dissemination and publication of the final report raw but still anonymous data may have to be made available to other 
researchers for peer review purposes.  
 
Your participation in this research project is voluntary and there is no mandatory requirement to 
participate. If you decide to participate, you may withdraw any information immediately without giving a reason up 
until August 1st 2014. Notably, in the event of producing article papers from the research for journal publication, data 
will be kept indefinitely to abide by the requirements of publishers and journals. 
 
If you have any questions or require more information about this study, please contact the ‘Principle 
Investigator’ (details below). If this study has harmed you in any way, you can contact King's College London using 









King's College London 
King's Building 




 Postal address: King's College London 
Room K7.38 
King's Building 
Strand, London WC2R 
2LS 
UNITED KINGDOM 
E-mail: philip.hendy@kcl.ac.uk  E-mail: henry.rothstein@kcl.ac.uk 
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CONSENT FORM FOR PARTICIPANTS IN RESEARCH STUDIES 
 
Please complete this form after you have read the Information Sheet and/or 
listened to an explanation about the research. 
 
Title of Study: An Exploration of the Organisational Dynamics of Risk Management 
Thank you for considering taking part in this research. The person organising the research must explain 
the project to you before you agree to take part.  If you have any questions arising from the Information Sheet 
or explanation already given to you, please ask the researcher before you decide whether to join in. You will be 




• I understand that if I decide at any time during the research that I no longer wish to 
participate in this project, I can notify the researchers involved and withdraw from it 
immediately without giving any reason. Furthermore, I understand that I will be able to 
withdraw my data up until August 1st 2014. 
 
• I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes explained to me.  I 
understand that such information will be handled in accordance with the terms of the Data 
Protection Act 1998. 
 







agree that the research project named above has been explained to me to my satisfaction and I 
agree to take part in the study. I have read both the notes written above and the Information Sheet 
about the project, and understand what the research study involves. 
 




Confirm that I have carefully explained the nature, demands and any foreseeable risks (where 
applicable) of the proposed research to the participant. 
 








Appendix C: Interview Topic Guide 
 
Introduction  
• Introduce researcher and the research. 
• Explain the interview will last approximately one hour. 
• Participation is optional and they can stop the interview or decline to answer specific 
individual questions at any time should they wish. 
 
Confidentiality and consent 
• Explain that the findings will be written up and published. 
• Ask if they are comfortable with the interview being recorded  
• Ask if they have any questions 
 
1. Background on interviewee and company represented 
1.1 Could you give me a little background on your role in the organisation? 
1.2 How Long have you been with the Organisation? 
1.3 What roles have you have had at the organisation? 
1.4 What brought you to want to work at the PLA? 
1.5 What are the current objectives/focus for the PLA? 
1.6 What is the future direction and challenges of the organisation? 
 
2. Establishing the Context of Risk Management 
2.1 What types of risks does the PLA manage? 
2.2 How did you come to know about these? 
2.3 What are the major risks, which are more minor? 
2.4 How have the risks changed over the years? 
2.5 Who are seen as the PLA’s stakeholders when it comes to managing risk? 
2.6 Does the organisation have a risk appetite statement or established tolerance levels for any 
risks? 
 
3. Describe the Practice of Risk Management 
3.1 How does your role relate to managing risk at the PLA? 
3.2 Why is risk management important to the PLA? 
3.3 What is the objective behind the risk management program? 
3.4 How were risks managed in the past? 
3.5 How is the current approach intended to change how risks are managed? 
3.6 What are the challenges you see with this change? 
3.7 Who is responsible for managing risk at the PLA? 
3.8 Who is held accountable for the management of risk? 
3.9 Do you have any specific tools do you use to manage risk? 
3.10 How are risks identified and assessed? 
3.11 How are risks communicated throughout the organisation? 
3.12 What do you see as the primary benefits of the program? 
3.13 Is there a way of measuring how effective the program is? 
 
